Zelensky Plus Guterres Equals Zero Without Erdogan. Incentive For Putin- No BSGI Exports To EU And NATO Countries. Only Distressed Countries. Can Turkiye Make It Work Without Turkish Naval Forces?
Testicular Fortitude Required…
Bold Move? Ukraine And UN Cannot Go It Alone With BSGI. They Need Turkiye
Volodymyr Zelensky Plus Antonio Guterres Equals Zero Without Recep Tayyip Erdogan
Might Be A Role For The Turkish Naval Forces- Escorting And Protecting All Commercial Vessels- Russian And Ukrainian, Acting Outside Of NATO Alliance?
Initially Focus BSGI Exports Only To Distressed Countries- No Exports To EU And NATO Members?
Diplomat(s) (With Plenty Of Life Insurance) From Purchasing Country On Each Vessel To Ensure No Targeting?
Full Replacement Insurance For Vessel, Cargo, And Extra Life Insurance And Payments For Vessel Crew- And Additional Insurance For Salvage If Vessel Is Sunk?
Government Of Ukraine Could Use Portion Of Its US$39 Billion In Foreign Currency Reserves To Fund Insurance Coverage
Continuing Fallout From NATO Summit In Vilnius, Lithuania: Lack Of Gratitude By Ukraine… Belief By Zelensky Administration That The World Owes Ukraine- Forever
The government of Ukraine believes it, along with the New York, New York-based United Nations (UN) and the government of Turkiye can continue to manage the Black Sea Grain Initiative (BSGI) absent participation by the government of the Russian Federation and despite the presence of and hostile intention by the armed forces of the Russian Federation.
For this to work, Volodymyr Zelensky, President of Ukraine (2019- ), and Antonio Guterres, Secretary-General of the United Nations (2017- ), need Recep Tayyip Erdogan, President of the Republic of Turkiye (2014- ), to agree to either an end-run around Vladimir Putin, President of the Russian Federation (2000-2008 and 2012- ), or obtain cooperation by President Putin.
The Black Sea borders with Bulgaria (EU member; NATO member), Georgia (EU potential candidate), Romania (EU member; NATO member), Russian Federation, Turkiye (EU candidate member; NATO member), and Ukraine (EU candidate member).
Vessels traveling to ports in Ukraine must transit from the Mediterranean Sea or Aegean Sea through the Dardanelles Straits which connects to the Sea of Marmara and then to the Bosporus Strait and into the Black Sea.
Turkiye has the longest border along the Black Sea while Romania and Bulgaria border the north-south westernmost coast of the Black Sea from Ukraine to Turkiye.
If a vessel wanted to avoid transiting the center of the Black Sea from a port in Ukraine to the entrance of the Bosporus Strait in Turkiye, the route would follow the coast of Ukraine-Romania-Bulgaria-Turkiye. The route would be longer by distance than transiting a straight line from a port in Ukraine to the entrance of the Bosporus Strait and then through to the Sea of Marmara and onward to the Aegean Sea, Mediterranean Sea (an entrance to the Suez Canal), and Atlantic Ocean.
On 18 July 2023, the government of the Russian Federation informed the UN that it was withdrawing participation from the BSGI. Concurrently, the government of the Russian Federation confirmed areas within the territory of Ukraine, specifically port facilities, were again subject to military targeting and safety of commercial vessels in operating in the Black Sea could not and would not be guaranteed.
TASS News Agency (21 July 2023): “Russia wants ships in the Black Sea to be inspected to make sure they are not being used to carry weapons, Deputy Foreign Minister Sergey Vershinin told a briefing on Friday. Speaking about the statement of the Russian Ministry of Defense that Moscow will consider all ships that go to Ukrainian ports along the Black Sea as carriers of military cargo, Vershinin said: “What is meant there is that we must make sure of this, we must check if a ship is carrying something bad. This means an inquiry, an inspection, if necessary, to make sure whether this is true or not,” the deputy minister stressed. Vershinin called this approach “completely logical, especially after the attacks that took place. Now there is no maritime humanitarian corridor; there are already zones of increased military danger.”
On 21 July 2023, the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine “warns that from 00:00 on July 21, 2023, all vessels heading in the waters of the Black Sea in the direction of the seaports of the Russian Federation and Ukrainian seaports located on the territory of Ukraine temporarily occupied by Russia may be considered by Ukraine as carrying military cargo with all the corresponding risks. In addition, navigation in the areas of the North-Eastern part of the Black Sea and the Kerch-Yenikal Strait of Ukraine is prohibited as dangerous, from 05:00 on July 20, 2023. Relevant navigational information for mariners has already been published.”
The government of Ukraine believes President Putin will not want to squander existing goodwill towards the government of the Russian Federation particularly from countries in The Americas, Caribbean Sea-area, on the continent of Africa, and in the Middle East region where particularly economically distressed and financially distressed countries are destinations for BSGI commodities.
The government of Ukraine believes the government of the Russian Federation will not seek to disrupt the arrival, loading, and departure of a commercial vessel laden with commodities, regardless of source, when the destination is specifically to “friendly” countries- including China, Egypt, Ethiopia, Pakistan, South Africa, and Turkiye (NATO member), and participating countries in World Food Program (WFP) initiatives.
That President Putin will not want to risk fractures amongst the “Global South” countries which thus far have supported, abstained, or have not criticized decisions since 24 February 2022 by the government of the Russian Federation relating to the territory of Ukraine. This despite some of these countries having endured colonialism particularly from countries on the European continent which would suggest opposition to decisions relating to Ukraine by the government of the Russian Federation.
Fourteen countries on the African continent source from the Russian Federation and Ukraine approximately fifty percent of their wheat imports according to the United Nations Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO). Primary purchasers of agricultural commodities using the BSGI include China, Egypt, Spain, and Turkiye. According to the United States Department of State: Sixty-five percent of agricultural commodities using the BSGI support the “world’s most vulnerable countries” including “Afghanistan, Horn of Africa, the Sahel, and Yemen.” Antony Blinken, United States Secretary of State, shared that “fifty percent of the agricultural commodity exports have gone to the developing world.”
One head of government for a country on the African Continent offered they (Africans) are black and poor while “Ukrainians are white and mostly Jewish, so they get hundreds of billions from America and EU [European Union] in nineteen months while Africans get nothing for more than one hundred years. Ukrainians don’t want to sacrifice for Africa, but they want Africa to sacrifice for Ukrainians.”
The government of the Russian Federation may find palatable authorizing certain countries to purchase commodities sourced from Ukraine- excluding members of the Brussels, Belgium-based European Union (EU) and Brussels, Belgium-based North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).
European Union (EU): Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, and Sweden.
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO): United States, United Kingdom, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Albania, Lithuania, Bulgaria, Montenegro, Croatia, Czech Republic, Poland, Estonia, Romania, Germany, Slovakia, Greece, Slovenia, Hungary, Spain, Turkiye, Latvia, and North Macedonia. The 600-member Grand National Assembly of the Republic of Turkiye has yet to approve the ascension of the Kingdom of Sweden- which has no border with the Russian Federation. The 199-member National Assembly of Hungary (Country Assembly) has yet to approve the ascension of the Kingdom of Sweden.
Might President Putin make a distinction- permitting “friendly” countries and WFP recipients while prohibiting EU and NATO countries? Might he then gain goodwill from some countries? He might very well.
There is also the prospect of the BSGI continuing absent the consent of the government of the Russian Federation. President Zelensky would be supportive- actually, enthusiastic. The proverbial wild card is President Erdogan- could he obtain cooperation from President Putin to remain a non-participant in the BSGI while taking no initiative to disrupt the BSGI?
As of 19 July 2023, the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation reported: “In connection with the cessation of the functioning of the Black Sea Grain Initiative and the сlosing of the maritime humanitarian corridor, from 00.00 Moscow time on 20 July 2023, all vessels sailing in the waters of the Black Sea to Ukrainian ports will be regarded as potential carriers of military cargo. Accordingly, the countries of such vessels will be considered to be involved in the Ukrainian conflict on the side of the Kyiv regime. In addition, a number of sea areas in the north-western and south-eastern parts of the international waters of the Black Sea have been declared temporarily dangerous for navigation. Corresponding information warnings on the withdrawal of safety guarantees to mariners have been issued in accordance with the established procedure.”
As of 18 July 2023, from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation: “Almost a year ago, on July 22, 2022, two interconnected agreements were signed in Istanbul - the “Black Sea Initiative” on the export of Ukrainian food and Russian ammonia and the Russia-UN Memorandum on the normalization of Russian exports of agricultural products and fertilizers. A year later, the results of work on the implementation of these agreements look disappointing. The Black Sea Initiative was launched just a week after the signing. However, contrary to the declared humanitarian goals, the export of Ukrainian food was almost immediately transferred to a purely commercial basis and until the last moment was aimed at serving the narrowly selfish interests of Kyiv and its Western curators. As for the Russia-UN Memorandum, it actually never came into effect. In Washington, Brussels and London, they continued to "stamp" their restrictions. As a result, Russian bank payments, insurance and transport logistics, supplies of spare parts and foreign assets were completely blocked. We are forced to state that none of the five systemic tasks envisaged by the Russia-UN Memorandum has been fulfilled. Under these conditions of outright sabotage in the implementation of the Istanbul agreements, the continuation of the "Black Sea initiative" that did not justify its humanitarian purpose loses its meaning. In accordance with paragraph H of the agreement, the Russian side objects to its further extension. It means: “withdrawal of guarantees for the safety of navigation,” curtailment of the maritime humanitarian corridor, “restoration of the regime of a temporarily dangerous area in the northwestern waters of the Black Sea, “Disbandment of the SKC in Istanbul. Without the participation of Russia, the "Black Sea Initiative" ceases to function from July 18. Only upon receipt of concrete results, and not promises and assurances, Russia will be ready to consider restoring the “deal.” https://mid.ru/ru/foreign_policy/news/1897157/
These statements by the government of the Russian Federation would result in commercial vessels avoiding participating in the BSGI.
However, for those owners of commercial vessels willing to accept the inherent risk, and enough money will always find risk-accepting participants:
Owners of commercial vessels venturing to ports in Ukraine would certainly require insurance from some entity for the full replacement value of the commercial vessel (which would need to be ascertained prior to participation in the BSGI); full replacement value of the cargo (if any); additional salary payments and additional life insurance policies for each member of the crew (commercial vessels have approximately twenty); and specific insurance coverage to salvage and remove the commercial vessel should it be damaged, sunk, or scuttled.
The government of Ukraine has indicated its willingness to provide insurance coverage to any vessel participating in the BSGI; likely using a portion of the approximately US$39 billion in reported foreign exchange reserves- primarily provided by taxpayers in other countries- or it would seek funds from outside of Ukraine- so taxpayers outside of Ukraine would again be tasked with providing additional funds to the government of Ukraine. The National Bank of Ukraine (NBU) could deposit an initial US$500 million in an outside of Ukraine third-party account as guarantee for participating BSGI commercial vessel owners and a third-party would control the disbursement of any funds claimed by commercial vessel owners.
“We are not afraid. We were approached by companies that own ships. They said that they are ready, if Ukraine and Türkiye are ready to continue, then everyone is ready to continue supplying grain.” Volodymyr Zelensky
One proposed idea: Include a diplomatic representative from the country to which the agricultural commodity will be destined be aboard the commercial vessel as it travels to a port in Ukraine and then departs a port in Ukraine; embarking in Turkiye and disembarking in Turkiye. The thinking- the armed forces of the Russian Federation would not target a commercial vessel carrying a diplomat(s).
The Black Sea Grain Initiative was implemented on 27 July 2022 from negotiations by the government of the Russian Federation, government of Turkiye, government of Ukraine, and the United Nations. There had been three extensions of the BSGI. The most recent extension expired at midnight on 17 July 2023. LINK To Map
“The Joint Coordination Centre was established under the Black Sea Grain Initiative in Istanbul on 27 July 2022. It comprises senior representatives from the Russian Federation, Türkiye, Ukraine and United Nations and its role is to enable the safe transportation, by merchant ships, of grain and other foodstuffs and fertilizers from three key Ukrainian ports in the Black Sea to the rest of the world.” The first shipment of over 26,000 tons of Ukrainian food under a Black Sea Grain Initiative was cleared to proceed on 3 August, towards its destination in Lebanon. LINK: https://www.un.org/en/black-sea-grain-initiative/vessel-movements
Text Of Initiative on the Safe Transportation of Grain and Foodstuffs from Ukrainian Ports
“1. The Parties to this Initiative are the Republic of Türkiye, the Russian Federation and Ukraine as proposed by the Secretary-General of the United Nations.
2. This Initiative is based on agreements of parties of the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, 1974, as amended, (SOLAS), Regulations XI-2/11 and the International Ship and Port Facility Security Code (ISPS Code), Part B, paragraph 4.26;
3. The purpose of this Initiative is to facilitate the safe navigation for the export of grain and related foodstuffs and fertilizers, including ammonia from the Ports of Odesa, Chernomorsk and Yuzhny (“the Ukrainian ports”).
4. The Parties recognize the role of the Secretary-General of the United Nations in securing the discussions for this initiative and request his further assistance in its implementation, in the furtherance of the humanitarian mission of the United Nations and subject to its authorities and mandates.
5. To achieve the purposes of this Initiative, and to provide for the safe navigation of vessels carrying grain and foodstuffs, the Parties agree as follows: Primary Aspects of the Initiative
A. This Initiative assumes that all Parties will provide maximum assurances regarding a safe and secure environment for all vessels engaged in this Initiative. Prior to operations commencing, a coordination structure will be established. A Joint Coordination Centre (JCC) shall be set up in Istanbul under the auspices of the United Nations and includes representatives of the Parties and the United Nations. The JCC shall conduct general oversight and coordination of this Initiative. Each Party and the United Nations will be represented in the JCC by one senior official and an agreed upon, required number of personnel.
B. Inspection teams will be set up in Türkiye. The inspection teams in Türkiye will consist of representatives from all Parties and the UN. Vessels will transit to and enter the Ukrainian ports in line with the JCC-approved schedule upon the vessels’ inspection by an Inspection Team. The primary responsibility of the Inspection Teams will be to check for the absence of unauthorised cargoes and personnel on board vessels inbound to or outbound from the Ukrainian ports.
C. All activities in Ukrainian territorial waters will be under authority and responsibility of Ukraine. The Parties will not undertake any attacks against merchant vessels and other civilian vessels and port facilities engaged in this Initiative. Should demining be required, a minesweeper of another country, agreed by all Parties, shall sweep the approaches to the Ukrainian ports, as necessary.
D. Merchant vessels will be prior registered in the JCC, verifying their details and confirming their loading port, having liaised closely with port authorities. Vessels will be technically monitored for the duration of their passage. Vessels will proceed through the maritime humanitarian corridor, agreed by all Parties. The JCC will develop and disseminate a detailed operational and communications plan, including identification of safe harbours and medical relief options.
E. To prevent any provocations and incidents, the movement of vessels transiting the maritime humanitarian corridor will be monitored by the Parties remotely. No military ships, aircraft, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) may approach the maritime humanitarian corridor closer than a distance agreed by the JCC, without the authorization of the JCC, and after consultation with all Parties.
F. Should any suspicious activities, or non-compliance with the rules of this operation or emergencies occur on a vessel transiting the maritime humanitarian corridor, depending on its location, upon the request of a Party to the JCC and under international maritime law, the Parties will provide the required assistance to the crew or conduct an inspection against the security guarantees.
G. All merchant vessels taking part in this Initiative shall be subject to inspection conducted by an Inspection Team in the harbours determined by Türkiye at the entry/exit to/from the Turkish strait.
H. This initiative will remain in effect for 120 days from the date of signature by all Parties and can be extended automatically for the same period, unless one of the Parties notifies the other of the intent to terminate the initiative, or to modify it.
I. Nothing in this Initiative will be deemed as a waiver, express or implied, of the privileges and immunities of the United Nations, and the Parties will ensure that the Initiative does not entail any liabilities for the United Nations. Done in Istanbul on the 22nd day of July, 2022.”
War Timeline
On 24 February 2022, the armed forces of the Russian Federation invaded and further invaded the territory of Ukraine in what Vladimir Putin, President of the Russian Federation (2000-2008 and 2012- ), defined as a Special Military Operation [SMO] then on 22 December 2022 he redefined as a war. The initial invasion of Ukraine by the armed forces of the Russian Federation was in part from the territory of Belarus.
The war between the Russian Federation and Ukraine did not commence on 24 February 2022. The roots began their trajectories on 20 February 2014 when the armed forces of the Russian Federation invaded the Crimean Peninsula and the area known as the Donbas Region (Donetsk Oblast and Luhansk Oblast).
