Zelensky Has It Reversed. He Needs To Visit China. Xi Does Not Need To Visit Ukraine. Ukraine Needs China. China Does Not Need Ukraine. Plaques And Air Raid Sirens Do Not Impress Xi
President Zelensky Has It Reversed. He Needs To Visit China. President Xi Does Not Need To Visit Ukraine.
Ukraine Needs China. China Does Not Need Ukraine.
President Xi Does Not Need Zelensky. President Zelensky Needs Xi.
President Zelensky Continues To Maintain That Heads Of State And Heads Of Government Should Not Expect An Invitation To Visit Kyiv Unless They Bring Something- Money, Military Equipment. What Does He Expect From President Xi As The Price Of An Audience?
Important Note For President Zelensky And His Team: President Xi Is Not Impressed With President Zelensky’s Self-Created Celebrity.
Has President Zelensky Requested A Meeting In Beijing With President Xi? No One Is Saying. If Not, Why Not?
“I Want To Speak With Him,” Shared President Zelensky. Good. Then Ask President Erdogan Of Turkiye For A Lift And Visit Beijing.
If President Xi Refuses To Meet With President Zelensky, Then President Zelensky Should Make Public That Refusal.
Volodymyr Zelensky, President of Ukraine, might find more productive to focus efforts upon securing a meeting with Xi Jinping, President of the People’s Republic of China, rather than focus upon welcoming celebrities and installing plaques (which are solely tools to stimulate a political orgasm from politicians and celebrities).
Like television ratings, President Zelensky should appreciate that audiences eventually move onward to the next newness- and celebrities (and their handlers) and most politicians have demonstrated consistency- short attention spans. There is always a next moment or crisis, naturally-occurring or human crafted, which will absorb attention. Regardless of the production expertise of the Zelensky Administration- and its successors, Ukraine will not be for all time in the global consciousness as it is today.
President Xi would gain on-the-ground perspective from touring the city of Bucha in Ukraine, but that inspection is not required for appreciating the destructive result from decisions by the armed forces of the Russian Federation. He has an Embassy in Kyiv. Media from Beijing are reporting from Ukraine. And Bucha as visible in March 2023 does not have the impact upon the human senses as did Bucha in March 2022. For President Xi, being in Ukraine further connects him to the victim, Ukraine, rather than to the attacker, the Russian Federation. President Xi does not at this moment seek to tilt further and destabilize the balancing he currently embraces.
On 24 February 2022, the armed forces of the Russian Federation invaded and further invaded the territory of Ukraine in what Vladimir Putin, President of the Russian Federation (2000-2008 and 2012- ), defined as a Special Military Operation [SMO] then on 22 December 2022 he redefined as a war. The initial invasion by the armed forces of the Russian Federation was in part from the territory of the Republic of Belarus.
The war between the Russian Federation and Ukraine did not commence on 24 February 2022. The roots began their trajectories on 20 February 2014 when the armed forces of the Russian Federation invaded the Crimean Peninsula and the area known as the Donbas Region (Donetsk Oblast and Luhansk Oblast).
President Xi believes regardless of the positions adopted by the government of the People’s Republic of China relating to the Russian Federation-Ukraine war, Beijing will continue to have robust commercial, economic, educational, military, and political relationships with the Russian Federation and Ukraine. Regardless of the animosity by Moscow toward Kyiv and by Kyiv toward Moscow, Beijing believes that each will be guided by commercial, economic, and political necessity to re-engage one another regardless of enacted constitutional amendments and laws - and Beijing will continue to engage with each.
Link To Related Analysis
Instructive to note the decision by Vladimir Putin, President of the Russian Federation, to order the armed forces of the Russian Federation to invade and invade further into Ukraine on 24 February 2022 has created opportunities for the People’s Republic of China:
Decisions by governments relating to the use and sourcing of oil and natural gas, and the use of renewable energy sources, which had languished for decades- yet remained subject to continuing political dialogue, were unexpectedly provided opportunities for implementation as politicians no longer feared (at least temporarily) increasing costs for their taxpayers as now there was a “moral” high ground and satisfaction from punishing an aggressor. The results for the People’s Republic of China are new sources of energy, less expensive sources of energy, and new development opportunities and export opportunities for renewable energy-related products. However, for the People’s Republic of China there remain stresses- feeding (with disruptions to arable land), providing employment, and increasing quality of life for more than one billion citizens- particularly youth.
Decisions taken during the last twenty years which focused upon the creation and maintenance of global supply chains- outsourcing products and services, often critical products and services, were subject to increased debate and criticism. The impact globally of COVID-19 commencing in January 2020 and continuing through January 2022 was a primary source code for governments to focus upon the consequences of outsourcing. 24 February 2022 further escalated the focus by governments to insource the most important products and services for their respective countries. The focus upon insourcing has consequences for the People’s Republic of China because it has for the last twenty years been a primary location for outsourcing. Now, as many governments are doing, Beijing is focusing upon replacements of what was imported with what may be designed and manufactured within the country- which may also create new export opportunities.
China-Ukraine Background
G8 (1997-2014) included Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, United Kingdom, United States and Russia.
G7 (2014-Present) includes Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, United Kingdom and United States. The Russian Federation was excluded in 2014 as a result of its military actions on the Crimean Peninsula.
The People’s Republic of China is a member of the Group of 20 (G20), although inexplicably not a member of the Group of 7 (G7) despite status as the world’s second-largest economy.
G20 includes Argentina, Brazil, China, Germany, Indonesia, Japan, Republic of Korea, Russia, Turkey, United States, Australia, Canada, France, India, Italy, Mexico, Republic of South Africa, Saudi Arabia, United Kingdom, and representatives of the Brussels, Belgium-based European Union (EU).
The 18th G20 Heads of State and Government Summit is 9 September 2023 to 10 September 2023 in the capital of India, the city of New Delhi. President Xi will attend. President Putin may attend. President Zelensky has not (yet) been invited to attend either in person or by video link.
Embassy Of Ukraine In China
According to the State Statistics Service of Ukraine, in 2021, the trade turnover between Ukraine and China amounted to $18.97 billion, exports of goods from Ukraine to China amounted to $8.0 billion (+12.7%), imports of Chinese goods to Ukraine amounted to $10.97 billion (+31.9%). The negative balance for Ukraine during this period was -$2.97 billion.
The Structure of Bilateral Trade in Goods: The structure of Ukrainian exports to China in 2021 was dominated by supplies of: ore, slag and ash; cereals; fats and oils of animal or vegetable origin; ferrous metals; residues and waste from the food industry; boilers, machines; wood and wood products. The structure of imports of Chinese goods to Ukraine was dominated by supplies of: electric machines; boilers, machines; land vehicles other than rail; plastics, polymeric materials; optical and photographic devices and apparatus; shoes; various chemical products; toys; organic chemical compounds; furniture; ferrous metals; ferrous metal products; rubber, etc.
State of Trade in Services: In 2021, according to the State Statistics Service of Ukraine, the trade in services amounted to $387.2 million. Exports of services from Ukraine to China amounted to $88.5 million (-28.7%), imports to Ukraine from China – $298.7 million (+51.5%). The negative balance for Ukraine was -$210.2 million.
The Structure of Bilateral Trade in Services: The structure of Ukrainian exports of services to China was dominated by: business services; transport services; repair and maintenance services not included in other categories; travel services; telecommunications services, computer and information services. The structure of imports of services from China was dominated by: financial services; transport services; business services; telecommunications services, computer and information services; royalties and other services related to the use of intellectual property.
Bilateral Investment Cooperation: According to the National Bank of Ukraine, as of December 31, 2021, $111 million of direct investments from China were attracted to the Ukrainian economy (since the beginning of the year, this figure has decreased by $36.6 million). Mainly Chinese investments are made in: Ukrainian industry; agriculture, forestry and fisheries; wholesale and retail trade, repair of vehicles; professional, scientific and technical activities; real estate transactions; transport, warehousing, postal and courier activities; construction, etc.
From Geopolitica.info
The first investment forum organised by the Ukrainian government after Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s election to the presidency, held in Mariupol on October 29, 2019, brought in “hundreds of millions of dollars in investments and loans” for the Black Sea port city. A $50 million investment by China National Cereals Oils and Foodstuffs Corporation (COFCO) “to implement an investment project at Mariupol Sea Port” was among the important projects highlighted. According to the Chinese investment project, “three and a half times the handling of agricultural cargo.” In partnership with Ukrainian Sea Ports and private companies, the agreement calls for “the development of the port’s berth infrastructure, the construction of a grain terminal in the back of Berth No. 3 and a single handling facility for food, three and a half times the handling of agricultural shipments,” according to the Chinese investment project. The agreement involves “the development of the port’s berth infrastructure, the construction of a grain terminal in the back of Berth No. 3 and a single handling facility for food” in collaboration with Ukrainian Sea Ports and private firms. To put it another way, China intended to buy a lot more grain and food from Ukraine and ship it through Mariupol, which proved to be one of the important logistics centres for the export of agricultural products, ensuring Ukraine’s status as a logistics nexus in the global supply chain. For the time being, such prospects have vanished. Surprisingly, only two companies in Ukraine supply over half of the neon needed in the fabrication of semiconductor chips worldwide. Since the Russian invasion began, both of those companies, Ingas in Mariupol and Cryoin in Odesa, further west along the Black Sea coast, have discontinued operations. China could be harmed in a number of ways as a result of the supply disruption. First, Chinese enterprises will be compelled to either locate alternative overseas suppliers or use neon gas produced in China for the fabrication of chips created in China.
From Wikipedia
The two countries have built a strong trade ties, specifically since 2008. China has become Ukraine's largest trading partner since 2019, with a trade turnover of 15.4 billion US dollar in 2020, of which Ukraine exports goods worth 7.1 billion US dollar. The total trade turnover increased from 2% of Ukraine's GDP in 2001 to 11% in 2020. The two countries has cooperated closely in term of the military-technical domain and in the space industry, with some famous bilateral projects, such as the Chinese purchase of the Ukrainian aircraft-carrier Varyag in 1998, which later became China's first aircraft carrier Liaoning in 2012. By 2018 Ukraine had replaced the United States as the largest exporter of corn to China, and has begun supplying China with modern jet engines for military craft.
China Briefing
China has retained its status as Ukraine’s top foreign trade partner in January-February [2023], with combined bilateral trade of US$2.3 billion, or averaging just over US$1 billion a month. China is followed by Poland at 1.95 billion and the remaining significant players are Turkiye and Romania. However, Ukraine is a declining market – the trade levels for the period are 30% down from the same period in 2022, according to the Ukraine State Customs Service. That said, China is a key trade partner for Ukraine, providing 14.4 percent of its imports and a destination for 15.3 percent of its exports. Thina mainly exported machinery, equipment and vehicles, fuel and energy products, and chemical products to Ukraine. It imported food products, metals, metal products, and some machinery, equipment, and vehicles.
Ukraine joined China’s Belt and Road Initiative in 2014, and a BRI trade and investment center opened in Kiev in 2018. Chinese companies have been investing in Ukraine’s ports. COFCO, China’s state-owned agribusiness giant, invested US$50 million in Mariupol – now a frontline city in Donetsk province, which has been besieged by pro-Russia separatists since 2014 – to triple its agricultural transshipment capacity. Chinese companies also have been involved in projects to dredge the Ukrainian ports of Yuzhny (north of Odessa) and Chernomorsk (south of Odessa).
Pre-conflict, Chinese companies also saw opportunities in Ukraine’s energy sector, including renewables (solar and wind) and nuclear power. Ukraine hopes to become self-sufficient in uranium and there have been discussions with the China Development Bank about Chinese investment in this sector. China imports nearly all of the uranium it uses.
In June 2021 Ukraine and China signed an intergovernmental agreement to promote joint cooperation in infrastructure development, while the country is estimated to have borrowed as much as US$1 billion – 12 percent of the country’s total budget deficit in 2020 – from China to finance road construction projects.
China has called for a ’12 Point Peace Plan’ and will be hoping a ceasefire can be brokered. Beijing will be looking to assist with Ukrainian reconstruction in the event the conflict can be resolved and will likely be offering Kiev loans to do so. If so, this may be conditional on Chinese construction companies carrying out the work given outstanding loans and construction MoUs being in place – meaning Ukraine has a cheaper option than EU contractors to rebuild, and China’s loans are effectively returned to the country in payments for infrastructure and other reconstruction build.