“G2” Meets On Monday- Bilateral Conversation Will Impact “G20” On Saturday 

It’s All About Timing…. 120 Hours 

President Putin Has Unique Opportunity To Convey A Message Or Messages… Will He Use It? 

Will President Putin Ask President Erdogan To Deliver A Message To G20 Members?

Will President Erdogan Deliver A Message From G20 Members To President Putin? 

Will The Meeting Be A Building Block Towards Peace Or Another Building Block Towards An Unknown Outcome? 

A Non-Sanctioned BSGI Continues- And It Is Now Moving Vessels Carrying Iron Ore.  Can Or Does President Putin Want To Disrupt It?  Unlikely.  Grudgingly.

President Erdogan Wants All Turkiye-Connected Vessels, Approximately Sixty, Constrained Since 24 February 2022 To Depart Ukraine ASAP.  He Previously Secured Authorization From President Putin And President Zelensky To Release Of Two Military Aircraft That Had Remained At Boryspil International Airport in Kyiv.

What is most significant about the meeting on Monday, 4 September 2023, in the Black Sea coastal resort city of Sochi, for Recep Tayyip Erdogan, President of the Republic of Turkiye (2014- ), and Vladimir Putin, President of the Russian Federation (2000-2008 and 2012- )?

It is not solely what they will discuss- Russian Federation-Ukraine war; Black Sea Grain Initiative (BSGI); Syria; Trade; Energy (oil, gas, nuclear fuel); Tourism (Turkish Airlines flights to/from the Russian Federation), Finance; and Sanctions (imposed by countries other than Turkiye).

• Syria remains a substantial issue for the government of Turkiye and citizens of Turkiye- with an estimated four million individuals of Syrian descent having taken residence within the territory of Turkiye beginning in 2011- with costs to the taxpayers of Turkiye at the equivalent of billions of United States dollars annually and creating substantial societal fissures.  President Putin is supporting Bashar al-Assad, President of the Syrian Arab Republic (2000- ), whose relationship with President Erdogan has fractured from its pre-2011 levels.  As President Erdogan was a catalyst for the BSGI which brought together the interests of President Putin and President Zelensky, President Putin can be a catalyst to bring together the interests of President Erdogan and President Assad.

It is what they will discuss will be one hundred and twenty (120) hours prior to the beginning of the 9/10 September 2023 G20 Leaders’ Summit in New Delhi, India.

This presents the nearest to a real-time opportunity for heads of state and heads of government to hear directly not only what was said, but how it was conveyed and what opportunities may exist. 

President Erdogan will also have an opportunity to converse with Volodymyr Zelensky, President of Ukraine (2019- ), and convey what was said and determine if opportunities exist.  However, President Erdogan will tread carefully as President Zelensky will expectantly make public his position to dissuade any country from perceived or real accommodation with the government of the Russian Federation- despite an accommodation having value to the citizens of a particular country.  President Zelensky will not be a guest at the G20 Leaders’ Summit – and that was a proper decision by host Narendra Modi, Prime Minister of the Republic of India (2014- ).

The Russian Federation-Turkiye relationship is similar to a dealer and an addict- although uncertain who represents the dealer and who represents the addict.  Each country is commercially, economically, financially, militarily, and politically entwined with the other. 

Commercially, meaning Brand Turkiye, is far more advanced, far more attractive, and far more innovative than Brand Russia.  And, Turkish Airlines is an airborne embassy and Turkish Cargo is an airborne chamber of Commerce.  The same cannot be said (yet) for Aeroflot.

For Joseph Biden, 46th President of the United States, his second bilateral meeting (after Prime Minister Modi) upon arrival to the G20 Leaders’ Summit should be with President Erdogan. 

• Those heads of state and heads of government whose countries are members of the G7, the twenty-seven Brussels, Belgium-based European Union (EU), and the thirty-one Brussels, Belgium-based North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) should also queue to meet with President Erdogan.  

NOTE: Sergey Lavrov, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation (2004- ), will be representing President Putin at the G20- and unproductive for a repeat of the G20 Leaders’ Summit in Bali, Indonesia, in November 2022 when he was all but ignored.

• Group of 7 (G7): (2014-Present) includes Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, United Kingdom, and United States. The Russian Federation was excluded in 2014 due to its military actions on the Crimean Peninsula.

• Group of 20 (G20): Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, France, Germany, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Republic of Korea, Mexico, Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Turkiye, United Kingdom, United States, and the European Union (EU) representing collectively its twenty-seven country members. 

• European Union (EU): Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, and Sweden.

• North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO): United States, United Kingdom, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Albania, Lithuania, Bulgaria, Montenegro, Croatia, Czech Republic, Poland, Estonia, Romania, Germany, Slovakia, Greece, Slovenia, Hungary, Spain, Turkiye, Latvia, and North Macedonia.  The 600-member Grand National Assembly of the Republic of Turkiye has yet to approve the ascension of the Kingdom of Sweden- which has no border with the Russian Federation.  The 199-member National Assembly of Hungary (Country Assembly) has yet to approve the ascension of the Kingdom of Sweden.  

There is only one head of state who has since 24 February 2022 communicated directly- by telephone, by teleconference, and in person with the principal protagonists in the Russian Federation-Ukraine war. 

Recently re-elected to a final five-year term, President Erdogan is in a position like no other head of state- he is unencumbered by the politics of re-election (although he remains keenly focused on local and regional elections in Turkiye, particularly in the cities of Ankara and Istanbul, currently controlled by an opposition party). 

The terms for both President Putin and President Zelensky are scheduled to expire in March 2024.  Likely none of the country leadership of the G7 will be in office for the end of President Erdogan’s term.  Perhaps a few of the country leadership in the EU, G20, and NATO will be in office for the end of President Erdogan’s term.  This means he can look past where most other heads of state and heads of government can look- an expanded perspective, possibly a more deliberative perspective.    

The unknown is can he convince President Putin to be elastic with his requirements to re-engage with the BSGI.  Or will President Putin convince President Erdogan that the requirements of the government of the Russian Federation are reasonable- and then can President Erdogan convince President Biden and members of the G7, G20, EU, and NATO.    

Yes, the BSGI will be the most consequential subject on their agenda.  The BSGI will also be the most delicate subject on their agenda.

The message from President Erdogan, spoken or unspoken, will be does President Putin want to risk further isolation that arises from governments who feel domestic political instability from their inability to obtain agricultural commodities for their populations- at reasonable prices, or permit a continuation of the BSGI in some form so the government of the Russian Federation is not perceived as an impediment, but as a guarantor of global food security.

• The government of the Russian Federation is crafting a replacement or augmentation to the BSGI which may again involve the government of Turkiye as the organizer along with a new partner, the government of Qatar, as supply sponsor.

BSGI Current Status

On 16 July 2023, the last commercial vessel departed Odesa, Ukraine, under provisions of the BSGI. 

On 17 July 2023, the government of the Russian Federation suspended its participation in the BSGI. 

Non-Sanctions BSGI Current Status 

On 8 August 2023, the armed forces of Ukraine reported it would operate a commercial vessel transit corridor and filed its intention with the London, United Kingdom-based International Maritime Organization (IMO).

Thus far four commercial vessels have used the corridor- and they were amongst the approximately sixty commercial vessels berthed at ports in Ukraine since 24 February 2023.   

On 16 August 2023, the container vessel Joseph Schulte was the first to traverse the non-BSGI-sanctioned coastal corridor. 

On 26 August 2023, the bulk carrier Primus traversed the non-BSGI-sanctioned coastal corridor. 

On 1 September 2023, two commercial vessels departed Pivdennyi Port in Odesa Oblast, Ukraine.  They carried 56,000 metric tons of pig iron and 172,000 metric tons of iron ore.  The Ocean Courtesy’s destination was Constanta Port in Romania.  The Anna-Theresa’s destination was Varna Port in Bulgaria.

From The Maritime Executive (1 September 2023): “Metals and minerals were another important export for Ukraine before the war. A Ukrainian research firm, GMK Center, asserts that Ukraine is losing $420 million each month with the closure of the Black Sea ports. They calculated that exports provided $20 billion per year in foreign exchange earnings, with $5 billion in taxes. In a report prepared by GMK Center, they said that Ukraine had exported 1.3 million tons of iron ore, 151,000 tons of pig iron, 192,000 tons of semi-finished products, and 218,000 tons of finished metal products each month before the start of the war.”

The Black Sea Grain Initiative was implemented on 27 July 2022 from negotiations by the government of the Russian Federation, government of Turkiye, government of Ukraine, and the United Nations.  There had been three extensions of the BSGI.  The most recent extension expired at midnight on 17 July 2023.  LINK To Map

• “The Joint Coordination Centre was established under the Black Sea Grain Initiative in Istanbul on 27 July 2022. It comprises senior representatives from the Russian Federation, Türkiye, Ukraine and United Nations and its role is to enable the safe transportation, by merchant ships, of grain and other foodstuffs and fertilizers from three key Ukrainian ports in the Black Sea to the rest of the world.”  The first shipment of over 26,000 tons of Ukrainian food under a Black Sea Grain Initiative was cleared to proceed on 3 August, towards its destination in Lebanon.  LINK: https://www.un.org/en/black-sea-grain-initiative/vessel-movements

Text Of Initiative on the Safe Transportation of Grain and Foodstuffs from Ukrainian Ports

“1. The Parties to this Initiative are the Republic of Türkiye, the Russian Federation and Ukraine as proposed by the Secretary-General of the United Nations.

2. This Initiative is based on agreements of parties of the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, 1974, as amended, (SOLAS), Regulations XI-2/11 and the International Ship and Port Facility Security Code (ISPS Code), Part B, paragraph 4.26;

3. The purpose of this Initiative is to facilitate the safe navigation for the export of grain and related foodstuffs and fertilizers, including ammonia from the Ports of Odesa, Chernomorsk and Yuzhny (“the Ukrainian ports”).

4. The Parties recognize the role of the Secretary-General of the United Nations in securing the discussions for this initiative and request his further assistance in its implementation, in the furtherance of the humanitarian mission of the United Nations and subject to its authorities and mandates.

5. To achieve the purposes of this Initiative, and to provide for the safe navigation of vessels carrying grain and foodstuffs, the Parties agree as follows: Primary Aspects of the Initiative

A. This Initiative assumes that all Parties will provide maximum assurances regarding a safe and secure environment for all vessels engaged in this Initiative. Prior to operations commencing, a coordination structure will be established. A Joint Coordination Centre (JCC) shall be set up in Istanbul under the auspices of the United Nations and includes representatives of the Parties and the United Nations. The JCC shall conduct general oversight and coordination of this Initiative. Each Party and the United Nations will be represented in the JCC by one senior official and an agreed upon, required number of personnel.

B. Inspection teams will be set up in Türkiye. The inspection teams in Türkiye will consist of representatives from all Parties and the UN. Vessels will transit to and enter the Ukrainian ports in line with the JCC-approved schedule upon the vessels’ inspection by an Inspection Team. The primary responsibility of the Inspection Teams will be to check for the absence of unauthorised cargoes and personnel on board vessels inbound to or outbound from the Ukrainian ports.

C. All activities in Ukrainian territorial waters will be under authority and responsibility of Ukraine. The Parties will not undertake any attacks against merchant vessels and other civilian vessels and port facilities engaged in this Initiative. Should demining be required, a minesweeper of another country, agreed by all Parties, shall sweep the approaches to the Ukrainian ports, as necessary.

D. Merchant vessels will be prior registered in the JCC, verifying their details and confirming their loading port, having liaised closely with port authorities. Vessels will be technically monitored for the duration of their passage. Vessels will proceed through the maritime humanitarian corridor, agreed by all Parties. The JCC will develop and disseminate a detailed operational and communications plan, including identification of safe harbours and medical relief options.

E. To prevent any provocations and incidents, the movement of vessels transiting the maritime humanitarian corridor will be monitored by the Parties remotely. No military ships, aircraft, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) may approach the maritime humanitarian corridor closer than a distance agreed by the JCC, without the authorization of the JCC, and after consultation with all Parties.

F. Should any suspicious activities, or non-compliance with the rules of this operation or emergencies occur on a vessel transiting the maritime humanitarian corridor, depending on its location, upon the request of a Party to the JCC and under international maritime law, the Parties will provide the required assistance to the crew or conduct an inspection against the security guarantees.

G. All merchant vessels taking part in this Initiative shall be subject to inspection conducted by an Inspection Team in the harbours determined by Türkiye at the entry/exit to/from the Turkish strait.

H. This initiative will remain in effect for 120 days from the date of signature by all Parties and can be extended automatically for the same period, unless one of the Parties notifies the other of the intent to terminate the initiative, or to modify it.

I. Nothing in this Initiative will be deemed as a waiver, express or implied, of the privileges and immunities of the United Nations, and the Parties will ensure that the Initiative does not entail any liabilities for the United Nations. Done in Istanbul on the 22nd day of July, 2022.”

War Timeline 

• On 24 February 2022, the armed forces of the Russian Federation invaded and further invaded the territory of Ukraine in what Vladimir Putin, President of the Russian Federation (2000-2008 and 2012- ), defined as a Special Military Operation [SMO] then on 22 December 2022 he redefined as a war.  The initial invasion of Ukraine by the armed forces of the Russian Federation was in part from the territory of Belarus.   

• The war between the Russian Federation and Ukraine did not commence on 24 February 2022.  The roots began their trajectories on 20 February 2014 when the armed forces of the Russian Federation invaded the Crimean Peninsula and the area known as the Donbas Region (Donetsk Oblast and Luhansk Oblast).

LINK TO COMPLETE ANALYSIS IN PDF FORMAT