Will President Erdogan of Turkiye Continue To Visit Capitals?
Host Guests In Ankara Leading To June 2023 (Or Earlier) Presidential Election?
Four Journeys Are Most Important Prior To UNGA
The 747-8 As Airborne Embassy
Diplomatic Deliverables And Presidential Feet On The Ground
If Turkiye Does Not Have An Ambassador In A Capital, Now Is The Time To Install One

For Recep Tayyip Erdogan (68), President of the Republic of Turkiye, to prevail in the presidential election scheduled for 23 June 2023 (or earlier), he and his political party (Justice and Development Party- AKP) must implement policies, regulations, and statutes that a) stabilize the Turkish Lira b) stabilize and then lessen inflation c) substantially increase convertible currency held by companies and financial institutions d) increase the diversity of direct foreign investment (DFI) and e) solidify Ankara’s relevance and influence on the global stage.  It is all about deliverables rather than promises of delivery. 

For the approximately thirteen million voters (out of approximately sixty-five million registered voters) in Turkiye who are defined as Generation X (born 1965 to 1980), they are generally more liberal in their thinking than those older- and they crave, and often insist upon societal elasticity rather than constraint and inflexibility.  President Erdogan will need navigate deftly.  The AKP must be viewed as a glidepath towards better rather than a gateway to stagnation.  Generation X embraces motion, and their voting will have influence- if they vote.  How Turkiye is relatable to its neighbors and how Turkiye is perceived globally will impact the direction of Generation X.  The votes of Generation X may determine the next president of the Republic of Turkiye. 

747-8 (With Its 9,000 Mile Range) 

President Erdogan should consider continuing travel not only to those countries with which Turkiye has commercial, economic, and political connectivity, but to those countries where Turkiye may have a fractured relationship, may have an underutilized relationship.   

For example, these issues: Russian Federation-Ukraine war, Astana (Nur-Sultan) Process for Syria, the near-far relationship with Greece, the four-way conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh, and accension of Finland and Sweden to membership in NATO. 

One issue is singularly the most important commercially, economically, and politically to the 85.3 million citizens of Turkiye and impacting approximately five million refugees residing (legally and absent authorization) in Turkiye: Syria.  The unresolved issues, directly and indirectly, continue to account for now eleven years of billions of U.S. Dollar-equivalent in taxpayer expenditures and the 2022 budget deficit is expected to exceed 3.5% of Gross Domestic Product (GDP), but not solely due to issues relating to Syria.  The substantial presence of refugees in Turkiye from Syria have in areas of concentration fractured an already delicate social fabric, compounded issues relating to employment, and become a domestic political issue with traction for the June 2023 presidential election campaign. 

Within the last weeks, President Erdogan has traveled to Tehran, Iran, and Sochi, Russian Federation, and hosted Mohammed bin Salman Al Saud, Crown Prince of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, after President Erdogan’s April 2022 visit to Saudi Arabia.  In February 2022, President Erdogan visited the United Arab Emirates and then Ukraine (to sign a free-trade agreement on 3 February 2022).  The common thread with the visits to Iran and Russian Federation is Vladimir Putin, President of the Russian Federation, who has become a global fulcrum upon which orbits hostilities, economic tumult for some and ruin for others, and energy supply constraints. 

President Erdogan’s second-most important stage this year, after his center-stage participation in the June 2022 thirty-member North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Summit in Madrid, Spain, will be remarks he delivers and the bilateral and multilateral meetings he hosts and attends in September 2022 during the annual United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) in New York, New York.   

His penultimate act prior to arriving in New York City will be, if he can execute it, to have confirmed that President Putin and Volodymyr Zelensky, President of Ukraine, will attend the UNGA.  There is no more appropriate setting for Presidents Putin and Zelensky to meet than in the United Nations building after they have delivered their remarks to representatives of the 193-members.  At the UNGA, most members are represented by their respective heads of state and heads of government. 

During his remarks to the UNGA, President Erdogan has a forum to provide statesman-like context, perspective, and solutions about the global commercial, economic, and political impact of the 24 February 2022 invasion of Ukraine by the armed forces of the Russian Federation and how (and why) Turkiye has crafted its positioning among the belligerents; explaining the necessity of participation-by-proxy of NATO of which Turkiye is a member; discuss bilateral and multilateral issues impacting Turkiye and its seven bordering countries (Armenia, Bulgaria, Georgia, Greece, Iran, Iraq, Syria); the effectiveness of sanctions as a tool to impact conflicts; and how is faith as a practicing Muslim, guides the decisions he makes as a man and as a president.   

For perspective, Turkiye ranks eighth among all countries in terms of sharing borders with the most countries.      

By the UNGA in September 2022, the following- at minimum the first four, would be a recommended itinerary for President Erdogan: 

First, a visit to Kyiv, Ukraine is symbolically important.  President Erdogan has met twice with President Putin since 24 February 2022.  He has not met with President Zelensky.  He should travel by aircraft to Kyiv.  The Boeing 747-8ZV BBJ (TC-TRK) presidential aircraft (an “Airborne Embassy”) could be accompanied by a Boeing 777 Turkish Airlines Cargo (an “Airborne Chamber of Commerce”) aircraft carrying products from Turkiye to inaugurate the re-opening of Borisol Airport (KBP) in Kyiv to commercial service.  [NOTE: Turkish Airlines has continued to operate since 24 February 2022 up to four flights (including wide-body aircraft) per day from Istanbul (IST) to Moscow (VKO)- with one-way fares having increased by more than 200% in some instances.]  If an S-400, Iron Dome (which can defend sixty square miles), or MIM-104 Patriot missile system needs to be deployed in advance at KBP, then do so.  Yes, there are optical issues with that deployment.  But, deployment should not be necessary.  A guarantee from President Putin should suffice. 

During the visit to Kyiv, President Zelensky would escort President Erdogan for a tour of areas surrounding Kyiv impacted by the war and visit citizens impacted by the war so President Erdogan would have an on-the-ground perspective rather than from reporting and images.  President Erdogan might also visit the port of Odessa to review the implementation of the four-way agreement that re-started agricultural commodity shipments.  Perhaps, an address to the Verkhovna Rada (Parliament of Ukraine).  There would be a press conference at the Embassy of Turkiye in Kyiv.   

President Erdogan would seek from President Zelensky a commitment to attend in person the UNGA.  The government of Turkiye could offer to provide the aircraft and necessary escorts from Kyiv to New York and from New York to Kyiv.  

A reminder that the government of Turkiye and government of Ukraine signed a free-trade agreement on 3 February 2022 that will expand upon an already robust commercial relationship (including daily flights by Turkish Airlines and Turkish Cargo from Istanbul to Kyiv).  President Erdogan traveled to Kyiv for the signing ceremony with President Zelensky. 

The United States Financial Crimes Enforcement Network included Turkiye in its list of eighteen countries that serve to bypass sanctions on the Russian Federation and Belarus.  A visit to Kyiv may provide President Erdogan an opportunity to explain further the decisions taken by the government of Turkiye- what may be unknown to and under-appreciated by the global community and specifically by the government of Ukraine.   

Second, a visit to Moscow, Russian Federation.  Traveling directly from KBP in Kyiv to Moscow would further attach symbolism to the journey- that Turkiye is a bridge of stability between Ukraine and the Russian Federation.  President Erdogan has twice met with President Putin during the last thirty days.  This journey would be different because President Erdogan now would carry a visual reminder of the carnage inflicted upon Kyiv and as a parent, grandfather those images would become a component of his narrative.  There would be a press conference at the Embassy of Turkiye in Moscow.     

President Erdogan could seek from President Putin a commitment to attend in person the UNGA.  At the UNGA, if requested to do so, President Erdogan could host the direct dialogue between President Putin and President Zelensky. 

• From Media: “According to data released by the Turkish Institute of Statistics, Turkish shipments to Russia climbed in June as more industrial and equipment shipments were added to the country's usual exports of groceries.  The research states that exports to Russia increased 46 percent year over year to USD791 million last month, putting the nation well on its path to moving up to the fifth position as Russia's top supplier of commodities from tenth place last year. Moscow imported less goods from "unfriendly" nations as a result of Western sanctions relating to the Ukraine, putting Turkey ahead of Italy, Poland, Japan, the Netherlands, France, and the United States. In May, Kazakhstan, China, Belarus, and Germany were Russia's top four suppliers, and analysts believe they is going to continue to hold those positions in the foreseeable future.  In June, shipments of Turkish fruits to Russia, including peaches and cherries, increased significantly. Last month, Turkish producers shipped USD168 million worth of fruits and nuts to Russia, which is twice as much as they supplied in May 2022 (USD72 million) and an increase of 33 percent over June 2021's USD138 million.” 

• From Media: “Turkey depends heavily on Russia and Ukraine for grain. Russia accounted for 56% of Turkish grain imports in 2021 at $2.24 billion, while imports from Ukraine amounted to $861 million.  Russian natural gas made up 45% of import-dependent Turkey's gas purchases last year, which hit a record level as a result of drought and a related rise in gas-driven power production.  Russian nuclear conglomerate Rosatom is also building a nuclear plant at Akkuyu in southern Turkey, which Putin has said will start working next year.  The plant is expected to provide up to 10% of Turkey's energy needs and will continue to be operated and managed by Rosatom for several decades.” 

Third, a visit to Damascus, Syria, or hosting Bashir al-Assad, President of Syria, at the presidential palace in Ankara, Turkiye.  There is no more consequential bilateral relationship today for Turkiye.  The commercial, economic, and political impact of approximately five million refugees from Syria residing within the territory of Turkiye has been profound.  The financial costs to the taxpayers of Turkiye show few sustained downward trajectories.  The twenty-seven member European Union (EU) promised substantial funding, in part delivered, for Turkiye to support programs for refugees from Syria.  The northern portions of Syria remain unstable with Russia, Turkiye, Syria, Iraq, and the United States having roles that need to be managed and lessened.  Companies in Turkiye had substantial opportunities in Syria and in 2022, 2023 and beyond need to explore them further.  Working north to south, Turkiye-based companies could construct and reconstruct substantial portions of Syria’s commercial, residential, and educational infrastructure.  Turkiye can again advocate to the Biden-Harris Administration (2021- ) and to President Putin that in their collective interest to permit a substantial portion of oil revenues from Syria to fund the effort.  If a bilateral meeting was too much for the political digestive tract to absorb, a summit in Damascus with the heads of state and heads of government of Syria, Jordan, Iraq, Lebanon, and Turkiye. 

• From Media: “Turkey has said that it is willing to support the Syrian regime of President Bashar al-Assad against the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF).  Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu made the surprise announcement in a television interview with Turkish Channel TV100 on Wednesday.  He also revealed that Turkey previously held talks with Syrian regime ally Iran regarding the expulsion of "terrorists" from Kurdish-controlled northeastern Syria.  Çavuşoğlu’s statements come after Turkey warned it could begin a military operation in Syria "at any time".  Turkey considers the Kurdish groups which make up the main component of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) to be "terrorists" and front organisations for the PKK, which has led an armed insurgency against the Turkish state in Kurdish-majority areas of Turkey since the 1980s.  "We will provide all kinds of political support for the [Syrian] regime's work in this regard,” Çavuşoğlu said in a television interview.  "It is the natural right of the Syrian regime to remove the terrorist organisation from its territory, but it is not right for the moderate opposition to be seen as terrorists," he continued.  Following Turkish threats of an operation, the Syrian regime fortified positions in SDF-held areas – in northern Syria - to prepare for “any possible aggression” by Turkey.  The Syrian regime does not recognise the SDF's control of northeastern Syria, but has cooperated with it in the past against Turkey and Syrian opposition groups.”

• From Media: “Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu says Ankara is prepared to assist the Syrian government in its efforts to flush out members of the US-backed Kurdish People's Protection Units (YPG) militant group from energy-rich areas in northeastern Syria.  Cavusoglu told the Turkish-language TV1000 television news station that his nation is prepared to cooperate with Damascus in such a campaign.  “We will give all kinds of political support to the work of the [Syrian] regime in this regard. It is the most natural right of the regime to clear a terrorist organization in its own territory,” the top Turkish diplomat said.  Cavusoglu’s remarks come amid President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s renewed threats of a new military operation in northern Syria.  Earlier this month, Erdogan said Ankara's plan for a new military offensive in northeast Syria against members of the YPG will remain on the agenda until security concerns are addressed.  Back on July 19, the Turkish president earned a rebuke for his push for the offensive from Leader of the Islamic Revolution Ayatollah Seyed Ali Khamenei, whose country has been helping Syria in its anti-terror campaign, in a bilateral meeting.  Ayatollah Khamenei told Erdogan that any Turkish offensive on Syria would be “detrimental” to Syria, Turkey itself, and the entire region, calling for the issue to be resolved through dialog between Ankara, Damascus, Moscow, and Tehran.  Moscow has also previously called on Ankara to “refrain” from an attack.  Erdogan on May 23 signaled a new Turkish cross-border operation in northern Syria with the declared aim of creating a 30-kilometer (18.6-mile) wide safe zone along Turkey’s border with Syria.  He did not provide further details but said the operation would be launched as soon as military, intelligence, and security forces have completed their preparations.”

Fourth, a one-day visit to Helsinki, Finland, and Stockholm, Sweden, would be bold.  The vote of the Parliament of Turkiye will determine if Finland and Sweden become the thirty-first and thirty-second members of NATO.  This visit to Helsinki and Stockholm would require finesse, patience, and tolerance, but the rewards would be of value to Turkiye on the important world stage.  The government of Turkiye is perceived today not only by Finland and Sweden, but by most NATO members as a blunt instrument rather than an partner.  This despite appreciation, empathy, understanding, and even agreement with concerns of importance to the government of Turkiye.  Optics matter, particularly to the introverted and circumspect societal norms of Nordic countries.  At the conclusion of discussions, essential for President Erdogan to participate in a press conference, engaging in public with journalists at the Embassy of Turkiye in Helsinki and Embassy of Turkiye in Stockholm.  An opportunity to make his case.  A significant point: NATO responsibilities divided amongst thirty-two members rather than thirty members mean potential savings for already budget-stressed governments. 

• From Media: “(Reuters)- Officials from Turkey, Finland and Sweden will meet in August to evaluate the progress made in fulfilling Ankara's counterterrorism demands from the Nordic countries to lift its veto on their NATO membership bid, Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu said on Thursday.  Finland and Sweden have applied for NATO membership in response to Russia's invasion of Ukraine, but were faced with opposition from Turkey, which accused them of supporting groups it deems terrorists.” 

Fifth, a visit to Athens, Greece.  Turkiye has issues with Greece and Greece has issues with Turkiye.  The countries share borders, including on the island of Cyprus.  There are issues with refugees.  Issues with territorial integrity, particularly relating to sourcing of energy.  Both are members of NATO; Greece is a member of the twenty-seven member European Union (EU).  The bilateral relationship has room for bold unilateral and bilateral initiatives. 

Sixth, a one-day visit to Yerevan, Armenia and Baku, Azerbaijan.  Each country has issues with the other, particularly relating to Nagorno-Karabakh.  Armenia and Turkiye have agreed to open their respective borders for travel by third-country nationals.  Next is a normalized border and re-establishing robust commercial, economic, and political relations.  Ambassadors need to be in their embassies.  Turkish Airlines and Turkish Cargo need to expand their operations.  The Turkiye-Armenia shared border makes inter-connectivity of value for the citizens of each country.  How goes the relationship between Armenia and Turkiye will directly influence the relationship between Armenia and Azerbaijan.  President Erdogan has the stature to connect the lines of this triangle. 

Seventh, a visit to Baghdad, Iraq.  The shared borders, particularly relating to Syria, require consistent dialogue as lack of resolution impacts substantially both countries, particularly with respect to budget expenditures.  

Eighth, a visit to Tehran, Iran.  Although President Erdogan has visited previously Iran, a visit after a dialogue with President Bashir al-Assad, President of Syria, would be of value. 

Ninth, a visit to Tbilisi, Georgia.  An expanding commercial, economic, and political relationship with Georgia should continue to be encouraged.  The presence in Abkhazia and South Ossetia since 7 August 2008 of armed forces of the Russian Federation remains an issue about which President Erdogan may have a role in dialogue with President Putin. 

Tenth, a visit to Sofia, Bulgaria.  Although a small country, its membership in the EU and location as a traveler and commercial entry point from Greece and Turkiye to the EU and shared border with Greece requires consistent dialogue.    

Whether some of the visits or all of the visits are completed in 2022, including those four recommended by the beginning of the UNGA in New York City, the citizens of Turkiye can benefit from the travels of President Erdogan, the Chief Marketing Officer of Turkiye. 

Just keep the 64,000-gallon fuel tank filled for the Presidential Boeing 747-8ZV BBJ (TC-TRK), a gift from the State of Qatar, and crew on standby… It’s range is approximately 9,000 miles.

LINK TO COMPLETE ANALYSIS IN PDF FORMAT