The governments (regimes) in an increasing number of countries, nations, states and territories are, with varying degrees of above-the-fold and below-the-fold advocacy seeking to maintain and, if required, create secured dependencies along their near and near-far borders.  The acquisition of territory is a component of some strategies.   

The governments likely to engage in territorial acquisition are those which have internal or external access to capital (financial and political), to natural resources and to energy supplies which buffet them from external pressures.  Resulting instability in global equity markets, bond markets and energy markets provide additional value as returning to normalcy can be a bargaining condition- we keep what we’ve taken and the world returns more quickly to a new normal. 

Governments do not necessarily countenance chronic instability along their respective borders, but they do seek relative ease of fostering targeted structural destabilization of political processes and economic foundations. 

The aggressors are typified by government structures administered by a strong executive or military; and there is little which is not transparent in terms of their ability to take decisions, implement those decisions and maintain the outcome of those decisions in response to multi-faceted multi-dimensional criticisms, actionable or otherwise, from outside (or inside) their borders.  

Their basis for action are the limited examples during the last forty years of governments engaging in territorial acquisition and then being impacted to such degree as they return what they have transacted without compensation.   

For some, centuries of history are the primal force from which territorial acquisition finds its basis or fulcrum.  For others, it’s a more mundane worldview where some play checkers and others practice chess.   

Governments will ask whether a level of pain inflicted upon an aggressor by the global marketplace cannot be overcome, compensated for, deflected, or repelled.  Most governments believe such pain is manageable. 

They absorb the following: Great Britain retains control of Northern Ireland; a prediction here that within five years, the United Kingdom will return control of Northern Ireland to Ireland.  Turkey and Greece remain in dispute within Cyprus; with Turkey seeking control.  Israel returned the Sinai Peninsula to Egypt; retains the Golan Heights in Syria; impacts the West bank and Gaza Strip.  The U.S.S.R. returned its fifteen republics and influence of Iron Curtain countries to varying levels of political and territorial independence and inter-dependence.  Iran and Iraq fought; are now uncomfortable allies.  A United States-led military invasion resulted in Iraq returning Kuwait.  Some would argue that the United States returned Iraq, twice.  The United States maintains a nearing twenty-year presence in Afghanistan.  Sudan separated; may recombine.  Saudi Arabia and Iran challenge one another directly and through territorial proxies; with interpretation of the Koran a foundation of their conflict- and too often (at one’s peril) forgotten, Iranians are Persians, not Arabs. 

Engagement through proxy will increasingly become a favored means by governments for disruption and acquisition.  Not dissimilar to hostile control of the controlling shareholder of a multi-national company; and with unified transactional interest shareholders combining their efforts, the outcomes generally equate with the more nefarious and more difficult to obstruct.   

With religion expected to retain a fundamental role in conflicts between countries located in the Middle East and Northern Africa, the use of electronic warfare will remain a less impactful means of influence than will weapons that release lead and require ammunition.  When religious text is a basis of conflict, resolution is binary- acquiesce or perish.   

In some locales, acquiring territory is virtual- it’s about expanding ideology (interpretation actually) rather than real estate.   

However, just as companies seek economies of scale from growth and resulting global presence- offices, manufacturing and service facilities, governments share that corporate profile- with sometimes gently (and opaque) hostile takeovers the preferred recipe.         

Potential acquirers also look to the following for reference: Did NATO send troops to forcibly remove troops of (or supported by) Russia in Georgia?  Did the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) send troops to forcibly remove troops of (or supported by) Russia in Ukraine?  Did NATO or the Clinton Administration do anything in 1993 to stop more than 700,000 residents of Rwanda from being murdered in ninety days while watching CNN?  The Clinton Administration and NATO did engage with what was the territory of Yugoslavia with varying degrees of success.  Did the United Nations, NATO, of European Union (EU) or Obama Administration require the re-establishment of the democratically-elected Muslim Brotherhood-led government of Egypt?  The United States required the Palestinian Territories to have an election; it did and Hamas-affiliated candidates won- and the United States recognized the process was fair.  But, did the United States work with those elected? No. 

Territorial acquirers view inconsistencies, no matter of depth or justification or spirit, as opportunities to restructure historical roots or create what will become new roots.  

Territorial acquirers appreciate that Rwanda happened after the creation of CNN, but before the creation of Fox News and Twitter and Facebook.  The events in Ukraine happened after the creation of Twitter and Facebook.  The Arab Spring and Syria’s civil war were subject to the full-engagement of electronic media platforms as were subsequent electoral processes throughout the world with varying degrees of impact, consequence and sustainability.   

Economic interests and political realities (televised images of dead troops and the response to electorates) often prevail over the direction of moral compasses.  Could or would the George W. Bush Administration have engaged with Iraq if Facebook, Instagram, Snapchat, WhatsApp and Twitter had been in use to the extent they were from 2014 through 2019? 

Will today the United Nations, NATO or the United States military (boots-on-the-ground) directly, not via proxy, engage, and at substantive scale with likely loss of life, the militaries of Russia or China or Turkey or Israel?  No.  Against North Korea?  Probably not.  Against Iran?  Probably not.   

Will assets of NATO or United States Department of Defense launch projectiles at an aircraft carrier or military aircraft or troops of the People’s Republic of China or Russian Federation with the public and explicit goal of sinking, downing or killing?  No. 

Can the financial sanctions arsenal within reach of the United States Department of the Treasury, United States Department of Commerce, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission and United States Federal Reserve have impact?  Yes.  Have they had impact?  Yes, they have.  Is the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) of the United States Department of the Treasury a weapon of potential mass destruction?  Yes, but it’s more a rifle than a shotgun.   

Examine, however, against whom robust economic sanctions have been targeted during the last twenty years and have those economic sanctions resulted in the desired outcome.  Important to acknowledge that “desired outcome” is fluid, as it often needs to be in conjunction with incremental results.  Has there been a global, regional, unilateral or bilateral economic sanctions regime that has resulted in complete capitulation after a perceived hostile act?  Nicolas Maduro remains in control of Venezuela despite sixty or so governments (including the United States) believing that not to be reality. 

There should be an expectation by the end of the Trump Administration:   

For China to have absorbed Taiwan (perhaps beginning with the Dongsha Islands) and permanently expanded its island-reach throughout the South China Sea.  

For Turkey to have annexed portions of Iraq and Syria in response to Kurdish ambitions; Turkey will eventually return the territory.  Absorb island territories of Greece, including control, by force if necessary, of Cyprus.   

For Azerbaijan to invade, alone or with assistance from Turkey, the area of Nagorno-Karabakh within Azerbaijan that is controlled by Armenia?  Perhaps, as only Russia and, possibly Iran could or would do anything practical to forestall an invasion, occupation, and annexation.

For the State of Israel to have formally absorbed the Golan Heights (seized in 1967 from Syria) and probably additional territory (zones of defense) in southern Syria and in southern Lebanon, not as a response to Syria, but issues relating to Iran.   

For the Russian Federation to expand and permanently annex additional territory in Ukraine and along or within other border countries and beyond. 

The ability of a government to be resolute is directly relatable to its value in the global marketplace, primarily economic, but geography is nearly parallel in creating the dynamic.  China has a political and economic system whereby it can deploy billions of dollars and billions of dollars of products and services at will, without public discourse; such flexibility is just what the salivary gland of a targeted authoritarian leader or in-need country will gravitate towards as a means to offset internal problems.     

China can deploy the value of the annual foreign assistance budget of the United States to a single country or multiple countries should it wish to do so.  Russia has energy for which consumers in Europe have few cost-effective alternatives.  Israel has the hyper-targeted political and economic muscle of influential constituencies in the United States to permit it to do wants to do in almost all circumstances.  Turkey’s east-west political and economic straddle, and stress fractures between secularization and influence of Islam has and will continue to create unpredictability, with muscularity a constant in behavior.  But, Turkey has geographic centrality; other (somewhat fragile European) countries may be permanently or temporarily destabilized by a change in the direction and flow rate of the border spigot. 

The Russian Federation has successfully withstood verbal threats and economic sanctions relating to its seizure (they would rephrase as return from land initially taken from Turkey during the reign of Catherine of Russia) of Crimea; portions of Ukraine; and destabilization of Georgia (Abkhazia and Ossetia).  The State of Israel controls the Golan Heights despite having returned the Sinai the Egypt, and has responsibility for the West Bank and Gaza Strip by exertion of complete economic control of each territory.   

Global territorial disputes, such as the Southern Kurils (as defined by the Russian Federation) and Northern Territories (as defined by Japan) may be resolved- by Russia officially annexing the islands.  Russia continues to construct facilities on the islands.  The issue of Macedonia (Greece and Macedonia) will be resolved.   

However, the trajectory is challenging because most governments view “settlement” as a binary contract, zero-sum where there is one defined winner and one defined loser.  No ambiguity.  This lessens opportunities for negotiation when the position of duality is “what’s mine is mine and what’s yours is negotiable.”