Officials in Hungary, Moldova, Poland, Romania, and Slovakia are discussing the implementation of variable ten-mile to forty-mile buffer zones extending from their borders into the territory of Ukraine.   

The goal is to provide increased efficiencies for roadway, railway, water (Dniester River) and airway usage particularly for the transport of passengers and cargo (commercial and humanitarian and military) to Ukraine and from Ukraine (grains, oils, minerals, industrial parts, etc.).  

• The city of Lviv, Ukraine, a primary transit destination for refugees, is forty miles from the border with Poland and a forty-mile buffer zone would re-enable the operation of Lviv Danylo Halystski International Airport (LWO). 

• Chernivtsi International Airport (CWC) located twenty-two miles from the Ukraine border with Romania. 

• Uzhhorod International Airport (UDJ) whose runway is located one hundred yards from the Ukraine border with Slovakia and eighteen miles from the Ukraine border with Hungary. 

There is debate, fulsome debate, about including military equipment at the perimeters of the respective buffer zones.  There has been an increase in belief that the Russian Federation will neither harm individuals within a buffer zone nor harm military hardware within the perimeters which are for defensive purposes.  The other option is for the buffer zones to be civilian-managed absent of military equipment.     

The buffer zones would provide for increased efficiencies to stage transportation of exports from Ukraine and transportation of imports to Ukraine.  Specific roadways and railroad lines would be dedicated for passengers and others for freight.  A discussion point is whether the staging of and movement of military equipment destined for Ukraine would be within the buffer zones. 

Much of the discussion focuses upon whether the creation of buffer zones would be daring the Russian Federation to attack the buffer zones.  There is a consensus building that the Russian Federation would not attack if the buffer zones were well-defined, fully-operational, and defended. 

Would an attack upon personnel of the thirty-member North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) countries who would be located within the territory of Ukraine serve as a trigger for a defensive response by the thirty-member NATO and offensive measures?  Yes. 

The Russian Federation position is if the armed forces of Ukraine would not engage in offensive and defensive activities, there would be no need for the armed forces of the Russian Federation to conduct both offensive and defensive activities.  Surrender is the final solution. 

As the Russian Federation increases, expands, what is indiscriminate infrastructure damage and infliction horrific of pain, suffering, and means of death for men, women, and children, the intestinal digestive tract of heads of state and heads of government is becoming fortified, rigid- and now ready to project strength towards the Russian Federation rather than reflect fear of the Russian Federation.   

Time not to be afraid of the Russian Federation “unknowns and unknown unknowns.”  Time to be confident in NATO knowns.  Time to be confident in one’s strength rather than fearful in the strength of an opponent.