What Happens To Russia-Ukraine Mediation Efforts If Turkiye President Erdogan Is Defeated In May 2023? Presidents Putin And Zelensky Might Want To Think About That. No Clean Hands. France Sanctions?
What Happens To Russian Federation-Ukraine Cooperation And Mediation Efforts If President Erdogan Of Turkiye Is Defeated In May 2023 Election?
There Are Constituencies Who Prefer The Absence Of A Muscular Interlocutor Not Tepid About Using That Muscularity.
There Are No “Clean Hands”
In Real Estate Terms, Turkiye Has “Location, Location, Location” Meaning A Seat At The Table. Head Of The Table?
On 24 February 2023, Where Should President Erdogan Be? Morning In Moscow With President Putin And Afternoon In Kyiv With President Zelensky. The Only Head Of State Whose Aircraft Would Be Permitted To Make The Journey. Advance Planning Might Forestall Decisions By Armed Forces Of Russian Federation For That Day.
Enduring Conflicts Can Be Profitable. The Russian Federation-Ukraine War Must Become Unprofitable As Soon As Possible.
Will BIS Sanction TAV Subsidiary Of EU-Domiciled Groupe ADP? Impact AYT, BJV, ESB, DLM, IST?
For constituencies believing in and advocating for a negotiated cessation, temporary or permanent- armistice, cease fire, frozen conflict, peacekeepers, peace treaty, however defined for the soon-to-be one-year Russian Federation-Ukraine war, a hard stop may be approaching.
On 24 February 2022, the armed forces of the Russian Federation invaded and further invaded the territory of Ukraine in what Vladimir Putin, President of the Russian Federation (2000-2008 and 2012- ), defined as a Special Military Operation [SMO] then on 22 December 2022 he redefined as a war. The initial invasion by the armed forces of the Russian Federation was in part from the territory of Belarus.
The war between the Russian Federation and Ukraine did not commence on 24 February 2022. The roots began their trajectories on 20 February 2014 when the armed forces of the Russian Federation invaded the Crimean Peninsula and the area known as the Donbas Region (Donetsk Oblast and Luhansk Oblast).
That hard stop moment is 14 May 2023 when approximately sixty-two million registered voters in the Republic of Turkiye will a) select their next head of state to serve a five-year term and b) select six hundred members (deputies) of the Grand National Assembly of Turkiye who serve five-year terms. The Republic of Turkiye has a voter participation rate of approximately 80%.
Other than military conflict, there has been one consistent connectivity between President Putin and Volodymyr Zelensky, President of Ukraine.
Recep Tayyip Erdogan (26 February 1954; 68 years old), President of the Republic of Turkiye (2014- ), has since 24 February 2022 maintained and increased substantially varying levels of commercial, economic, humanitarian, military, and political relationships with the public sectors and the private sectors in the Russian Federation and in Ukraine.
Although the economy of Turkiye has been impacted by the Russian Federation-Ukraine war, President Erdogan has sought to be less elastic than leadership in other governments with the level of economic and commercial pain due to the Russian Federation-Ukraine war he is willing to permit be directly inflicted upon the citizenry of the Republic of Turkiye. He will not easily sacrifice a Russian Federation marketplace of approximately 144 million citizens.
The economy of Turkiye does, however, have issues not related directly to the Russian Federation-Ukraine war:
President Erdogan’s stewardship of the economy of Turkiye has been questioned. According to economists (Turkiye-based and non-Turkiye-based), fiscal policies and monetary policies (changes to interest rates- lowering during periods of high inflation which contradicts traditional economic philosophies) of the Central Bank of the Republic of Turkiye (TCMB), which reflects decisions of the Erdogan Administration, have impacted currency exchange rates (2019- 5.2 Lira to US$; 2020-6.0 Lira to US$; 2021- 7.0 Lira to US$; 2022- 13.5 Lira to US$; 2023- 18.8 to US$) and impacted inflation rates (February): 2019- 19.7%; 2020- 12.4%; 2021- 15.6%; 2022- 54.4% (85.5%- October 2022); 2023- 57.6%. According to the Turkish Statistical Institute (TURKSTAT), the domestic producer price index is 86.4% on an annualized basis. Some economists predict the annualized inflation rate in Turkiye will be near 40% by 14 May 2023, election day. The TCMB projects nearer to 20%.
President Erdogan’s primary domestic foreign policy focus remains re-engagement with the Syrian Arab Republic. Millions of refugees from Syria settling in Turkiye have since 2011 created commercial, economic, educational, employment, healthcare, political, religious, and social fissures throughout Turkiye. The financial costs to taxpayers of Turkiye have been enormous. The government of the Russian Federation has substantial connectivity to and influence with Bashar Hafez al-Assad, President of Syria (2000- ), which is essential to President Erdogan as he seeks to re-develop commercial, economic, and political infrastructures within Syria, particularly the northern areas of the country, to stimulate the return of refugees from Syria who are residing in Turkiye. President Erdogan and President al-Assad are expected to meet prior to 14 May 2023.
President Erdogan’s primary baseline is a willingness to adhere to sanctions imposed by the United Nations Security Council, but not necessarily those implemented by individual countries or groups of countries. President Erdogan remains selective with the implementation of sanctions impacting the Russian Federation and other countries (Republic of Cuba, Islamic Republic of Iran, Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, etc.) regardless of duration, scale, target, or third-party impact.
United Nations Security Council: Five permanent members each of whom have a veto: China, France, Russian Federation, United Kingdom, and United States. Ten non-permanent members elected for two-year terms by the United Nations General Assembly (end of term year): Albania (2023), Brazil (2023), Ecuador (2024), Gabon (2023), Ghana (2023), Japan (2024), Malta (2024), Mozambique (2024), Switzerland (2024), United Arab Emirates (2023).
He has embraced consistently and effectively a commercial, economic, humanitarian, military, and political carrot-and-stick approach with allies, enemies, friends, and partners.
Those policies have resulted in benefits for the Russian Federation and Ukraine. Those policies have also resulted in disappointments for the Russian Federation and Ukraine. Has the government of Turkiye positioned itself in part on the side of the antagonist and in part on the side of the protagonist? Yes.
Some of President Erdogan’s decisions stem from ideology- a willingness to go it alone and if deemed appropriate, to go in defiance; and some of those decisions stem from politics- what is believed to be beneficial for President Erdogan. He is, after all, first a politician.
Like him or dislike him, and there are robust numbers on each side, there is a respect for President Erdogan in some capitals and even admiration that he has engaged with the Russian Federation and Ukraine despite pressure from allies, enemies, friends, and partners to alter course.
There are heads of state and heads of government who believe that President Erdogan’s style of simultaneous selective engagement with the public and private sectors in the Russian Federation and Ukraine contributes to a continuation of the Russian Federation-Ukraine war. That the government of Turkiye is supporting both sides to the conflict rather than constraining both sides to the conflict.
He has inconvenienced both President Putin and President Zelensky. Neither head of state has obtained from President Erdogan what they have wanted or what they have needed. President Erdogan has used hard power and soft power to achieve his goals:
The Erdogan Administration closed the Bosporus strait (the pathway linking the Mediterranean Sea and the Black Sea) to military vessels of the Russian Federation and Ukraine.
The Erdogan Administration has permitted the government of the Russian Federation to negate the optimal operational value of the triangular agricultural commodity arrangement brokered by the Erdogan Administration on 22 July 2022 among the governments of the Russian Federation and Ukraine along with the New York, New York-based United Nations (UN). Naval forces of Turkiye could effectively secure areas of the Black Sea which comprise the locations of ports in Ukraine towards maximizing agricultural commodity exports from Ukraine by providing escorts as necessary for vessels- and naval forces of the Russian Federation would unlikely interfere. The Erdogan Administration could also sideline the participation of Russian Federation port inspectors in Turkiye as they fail to maintain a robust pace. Why has President Erdogan thus far not embraced the use of hard power to expand to its fullest the delivery of agricultural commodities from Ukraine to countries throughout the world? Perhaps he believes continuing the quad-linked arrangement has more long-term value to maintaining connectivity between the Russian Federation and Ukraine, and to Turkiye, than forging with force (with the resulting expanded risk) the fullest efficiencies of a tri-linked arrangement. President Erdogan has used soft power- at the end of 2022 when the government of the Russian Federation declared its intention to suspend the agricultural commodity arrangement, President Erdogan mediated between President Putin and President Zelensky. The agricultural commodity arrangement has continued. Ironically, there are concerns within some of the twenty-seven member countries of the European Union (EU) that increasing quantities of agricultural commodities originating from Ukraine may be causing domestic pricing issues within the EU.
The Erdogan Administration continues to authorize the export of military drones to Ukraine- and a Turkiye-based company is committed to construction of a manufacturing facility in Ukraine.
The Erdogan Administration maintains military cooperation and energy cooperation with the Russian Federation. Turkiye-based companies have increased exponentially their product exports (and re-export of products from other countries) to the Russian Federation.
Istanbul, Turkiye-based Turkish Airlines (Türk Hava Yolları) which is 49.12% owned by the government of Turkiye through which the Erdogan Administration retains operational control, maintains a critical transportation lifeline for citizens (and government officials) of the Russian Federation to connect through Istanbul Ataturk Airport (IST) with other countries. Turkish Airlines flights operating to Vnukovo International Airport (VKO) in Moscow are the only efficient means for official and unofficial conduits to engage with the Putin Administration. Turkish Airlines has not since 24 February 2022 sought to resume operations to airports in Ukraine, including those furthest to the west and from active war zones, for example Lviv Danylo Halytskyi International Airport (LWO) which is near the border with the Republic of Poland. The government of Ukraine has closed its airspace to commercial aviation and general aviation. However, President Erdogan did secure (using soft power) on 20 December 2022 authorization from President Putin and President Zelensky for two aircraft owned by the armed forces of Turkiye to depart Boryspil International Airport (KBP) in Kyiv where the aircraft had remained since 24 February 2022.
The Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) of the United States Department of Commerce is poised to implement sanctions upon operators of airports in Turkiye. Targets include: Istanbul, Turkiye-based Istanbul Grand Airports (iGA) and Istanbul, Turkiye-based TAV Airports Holding (TAV), a subsidiary of Paris, France-based Aeroports de Paris (Groupe ADP). Airport targets include: Istanbul Ataturk Airport (IST); the capital, Ankara (ESB); and resort areas of Antalya (AYT), Bodrum (BJV), and Dalaman (DLM). These airports have thus far refused to suspend authorization for Moscow, Russian Federation-based PJSC Aeroflot Airlines and Minsk, Belarus-based Belavia Airlines to operate absent a license from the BIS aircraft manufactured Arlington, Virginia-based Boeing Company.
Istanbul, Turkiye-based Karpowership, a member of Istanbul, Turkiye-based Karadeniz Energy Group, which is a subsidiary of Istanbul, Turkiye-based Karadeniz Holding, signed an agreement with Ukraine government-operated JSC Energy Company of Ukraine (ECU) to provide electricity generating vessels which would be moored in Ukraine territorial waters near Moldova and Romania. One question would be the source of the oil or natural gas required to operate the vessels? Another question is who would pay Karpowership? The company’s traditional contracting model is a multi-year arrangement of requiring payment for 100% of a vessel’s electrical power generation regardless of the percentage used by the customer. The per kilowatt hour (kWh) charged by Karpowership is usually quite substantial (and controversial in some countries) compared to other sources of electrical power generation. Currently, 22.2% of the 36-vessel Karpowership fleet operates in the Republic of Cuba providing the archipelago with approximately 25% of its electricity.
While neither President Putin nor President Zelensky is fully-supportive of decisions taken by President Erdogan, each appreciates there is no other head of state who has the breath of bilateral and multilateral relationships with connectivity to both the Russian Federation and Ukraine. The government of Turkiye’s role as a conduit is in large measure due to its location- having access to both the Russian Federation and Ukraine.
Neither President Putin nor President Zelensky trust implicitly President Erdogan, nor are they enamored with him on a personal level. Would both mourn President Erdogan’s forced retirement on 14 May 2023? They would be conflicted. For each head of state, President Erdogan is the least offensive option for direct and indirect engagement and re-engagement. There is no one else on the near horizon who has the skill set- and is unabashed to use it to seek accommodation and compromise while permitting if needed the antagonists to take credit for the outcome- which is essential for domestic audiences in the Russian Federation and Ukraine and to a certain extent in Turkiye.
President Erdogan uses like a guided missile the Presidential Boeing 747-8ZV BBJ (TC-TRK), a gift from the State of Qatar, which has a 64,000-gallon fuel tank giving the aircraft a range of 9,000-miles. Consequential wherever the aircraft lands…
When President Putin and President Zelensky do engage directly, the expectation is for those conversations to be held at the Presidential Complex in Ankara, Turkiye, and hosted by President Erdogan.
Is there another head of state or head of government who can provide an environment for de-escalation?
The State of Qatar, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, or United Arab Emirates (UAE), the three of whom have increased in since 24 February 2022 their intermediary roles (particularly with prisoner exchanges), both directly and indirectly amongst the Russian Federation, Ukraine, and United States.
Emmanuel Macron, President of the French Republic, would be orgasmic at the opportunity to host conversations at the Élysée Palace in the capital, Paris. His brethren within the EU would be loath to grant him the limelight, yet would shed crocodile tears should he fail.
Olaf Scholz, Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany, desires to reformulate the commercial and economic relationships between the private sector in Germany and the private sector in the Russian Federation. Authorizing battle tanks to be exported to Ukraine creates obstacles with President Putin.
Narendra Modi, Prime Minister of the Republic of India? Possible, but the increasing energy product purchases from the Russian Federation would be problematic for President Zelensky. The government of India will host the Group of 20 (G20) on 9/10 September 2023 in the capital city of New Delhi, India, which would provide a forum for dialogue- particularly if President Putin and, if invited, President Zelensky, participate in person.
Members of the G20: Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, France, Germany, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Republic of Korea, Mexico, Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Turkiye, United Kingdom, United States, and the European Union (EU) representing collectively its twenty-seven country members.
Benjamin Netanyahu, Prime Minister of the State of Israel. Highly unlikely- and the worst possible choice as he would be rightly perceived as focusing solely towards advancing his interests with the Russian Federation relating to the Syrian Arab Republic, Islamic Republic of Iran, and United States. And, he would be far more focused upon what he could extract from the United States, primarily financial and military, not directly related to the Russian Federation-Ukraine war.
There is no head of state or head of government with global gravitas whose public sector or private sector has not in some manner retained connectivity to the Russian Federation and to Ukraine whether officially or unofficially.
The public sector and private sector in Turkiye have engaged profitably with the public sector and private sector in the Russian Federation and to a lesser degree with Ukraine since 24 February 2022 for the export of products and services. These engagements have been helpful, but not consequential, to altering the severe domestic commercial and economic issues impacting citizens of Turkiye. A Russian Federation and Ukraine not in conflict with one another will bring to Turkiye far more value.
There are no clean hands where a replacement for President Erdogan would be equally satisfying to President Putin and President Zelensky due to having no connectivity, thus no potential inclination to tip a scale during negotiations.
Absent President Erdogan, would Turkish Airlines (an “Airborne Embassy”) continue to operate multiple flights per day to VKO in Moscow and from VKO to resort locations in Turkiye?
There would be pressure, particularly by the United States and Ukraine, to end those flights. There is no unanimity amongst members of the EU with respect to the flights. At minimum, there would be a request for Turkish Airlines not to operate flights from VKO to tourist areas in Turkiye under the premise that citizens of the Russian Federation should not have opportunities to shelter from too much sun while citizens of Ukraine are sheltering from too many missiles.
Absent President Erdogan, would the Republic of Finland and Kingdom of Sweden ascend to membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)?
The next head of state of Turkiye will need to be supportive or at minimum less antagonistic towards Finland and Sweden becoming members of NATO. The successor to President Erdogan will need to reflect and respect the electorate and political party composition and ideological leanings of the Grand National Assembly of Turkiye whose members must approve the ascensions. However, Turkiye’s continuing commercial and economic challenges require resources from outside of Turkiye- most prominently from EU member countries, NATO member countries, and other countries- particularly NATO member the United States. The next head of state of Turkiye will need to seek engagement and re-engagement. Absent President Erdogan, there will be considerably less leverage available to his successor- and there may be efforts by governments to claw-back some of what President Erdogan had extracted during his nine years in office.
The immediate ascension of Finland is far more important than is the immediate ascension of Sweden given the 830-mile border shared by Finland with the Russian Federation while Sweden has no border with the Russian Federation. Unsurprising would be for the Grand National Assembly of Turkiye to approve Finland prior to election day on 14 May 2023 or by the 11/12 July 2023 NATO Summit in Vilnius, Lithuania.
President Erdogan’s successor would not arrive to the Presidential Complex in Ankara with the same global gravitas and ability to coerce when deemed essential to project and protect the interests of the Republic of Turkiye. A successor, who may focus energies towards domestic issues, will have to navigate efforts from governments to corral foreign policy decisions of the predecessor.
Awaiting An Answer
Absent President Erdogan, does the trajectory of the Russian Federation-Ukraine war maintain its trajectory, extend its trajectory, or does the trajectory contract if there are rapid and consequential changes to how the government of Turkiye engages, directly and indirectly, with the government of the Russian Federation and government of Ukraine?
If President Erdogan is re-elected, and he is then unshackled from a focus upon seeking another term in office, might he be emboldened and use soft power and hard power to their fullest in effort to bring an end to the Russian Federation-Ukraine war?
The answer will arrive on Sunday, 14 May 2023.
