Zelensky Screwed? U.S. Secretary Of State Blinken Confirms Ukraine Will Be Smaller. “Where the line is drawn on the map, at this point, I don’t think is fundamentally going to change very much”

United States Department of State
Washington DC
4 January 2025

United States Secretary Of State Antony J. Blinken With Lulu Garcia-Navarro of NYT’s “The Interview” Podcast 

excerpts 

QUESTION:  Six months after Afghanistan, Russia invaded Ukraine.  That was February of 2022.  I mean, I remember that moment of being – as being terrifying.  How close were we to direct conflict? 

SECRETARY BLINKEN:  Look, there have been different moments where we had real concerns about actions that Russia might take, including even potentially the use of nuclear weapons, that very much focused the mind.  But again, I think throughout, we’ve been able to navigate this in a way that has kept us away from direct conflict with Russia.  Now, Russia is engaged in all sorts of nefarious activities – so-called hybrid attacks of one kind or another, whether it’s in cyberspace, whether it’s acts of sabotage, assassination.  Those things are happening.  They’re happening in Europe, and this is something that we’re working very closely on with many of our partners.  But in terms of direct conflict, I don’t think we’ve been – I don’t think we’ve been close, but it’s something that we’ve had to be very, very mindful of. 

QUESTION:  You made two early strategic decisions on Ukraine.  The first – because of that fear of direct conflict – was to restrict Ukraine’s use of American weapons within Russia.  The second was to support Ukraine’s military offensive without a parallel diplomatic track to try and end the conflict.  How do you look back on those decisions now? 

SECRETARY BLINKEN:  So first, if you look at the trajectory of the conflict, because we saw it coming, we were able to make sure that not only were we prepared, and allies and partners were prepared, but that Ukraine was prepared.  We made sure that well before the Russian aggression happened, starting in September – the Russian aggression happened in February.  Starting in September and then again in December, we quietly got a lot of weapons to Ukraine to make sure that they had in hand what they needed to defended themselves – things like Stingers, Javelins that they could use that were instrumental in preventing Russia from taking Kyiv, from rolling over the country, erasing it from the map, and indeed pushing the Russians back. 

But I think what’s so important to understand is at different points in time, people get focused on one weapons system or another – is it an Abrams tank, is it an F-16, is it an ATACM, a missile?  What we’ve had to look at each and every time is not only should we give this particular system to the Ukrainians, but do they know to use it, do they have the requisite training, can they maintain it, is it part of a coherent plan?  All of those things have factored into the decisions we made on what to give them and when to give it, but in each and every time, it was to make sure that they had what they needed to defend themselves. 

In terms of diplomacy, look, we’ve exerted extraordinary diplomacy in bringing and keeping together more than 50 countries – not only in Europe but well beyond – in support of Ukraine and in defense of these principles that Russia also attacked back in February of that year.  Look, I worked very hard in the lead-up to the war – including meetings with my Russian counterpart, Sergey Lavrov, in Geneva a couple of months before the war – trying to find a way to see if we could prevent it, trying to test the proposition whether this was really about Russia’s concerns for its security, concerns somehow about Ukraine and the threat that it posed or NATO and the threat that it posed, or whether this is – was about what it in fact is about, which is Putin’s imperial ambitions and the desire to recreate a greater Russia, to subsume Ukraine back into Russia.

But we had to test that proposition, and we were intensely engaged diplomatically with Russia.  Since then – since then, had there been any opportunity to engage diplomatically in a way that could end the war on just and durable terms, we would have been the first to seize them.  Unfortunately, at least till this moment, we haven’t seen any signs that Russia has been genuinely prepared to engage.  I hope that that changes. 

QUESTION:  However, Ukraine has been left in this position now where a new administration is coming in, they have a very different view of the conflict.  And one could argue that Ukraine is not in a terribly strong position to be able to navigate what comes next.  We know that President-elect Trump has members of people that surround him that would – that are very willing to see Ukraine cede territory to Russia.  There has been no parallel diplomatic track.  And the weapons are probably going to be drying up.  So I mean, do you feel like you’ve left Ukraine in the strongest position that you could have, or what are the things that you could have done differently? 

SECRETARY BLINKEN:  Well, first, what we’ve left is Ukraine, which was not self-evident, because Putin’s ambition was to erase it from the map.  We stopped that.  Putin has failed.  His strategic objective in regaining Ukraine has failed and will not succeed.  Ukraine is standing.  And I believe it also has extraordinary potential not only to survive, but actually to thrive going forward, and that does depend on decisions that future administrations and many other countries will make.  Right now, where – as I’m looking at this, I think the real measure of success is whether, going forward, Ukraine will continue to stand strong as an independent country, increasingly integrated with Western institutions, and able to stand on its own feet militarily, economically, democratically.  And in each of those areas, we’ve put Ukraine on a trajectory to do that – extraordinary support-

QUESTION:  Do you think it’s time to end the war, though? 

SECRETARY BLINKEN:  These are decisions for Ukrainians to make.  They have to decide where their future is and how they want to get there.  Where the line is drawn on the map, at this point, I don’t think is fundamentally going to change very much.  The real question is:  Can we make sure that Ukraine is a position to move forward strongly? 

QUESTION:  You mean use – that the areas that Russia controls you feel — 

SECRETARY BLINKEN:  In — 

QUESTION:  — will have to be ceded? 

SECRETARY BLINKEN:  Ceded is not the question.  The question is – the line as a practical matter in the foreseeable future is unlikely to move very much.  Ukraine’s claim on that territory will always be there.  And the question is:  Will they find ways – with the support of others – to regain territory that’s been lost? 

I think the critical thing now going forward is this.  If there is going to be a resolution, or at least a near-term resolution – because it’s unlikely that Putin will give up on his ambitions.  If there’s a ceasefire, then in Putin’s mind the ceasefire is likely to give him time to rest, to refit, to reattack at some point in the future.  So what’s going to be critical to make sure that any ceasefire that comes about is actually enduring is to make sure that Ukraine has the capacity going forward to deter further aggression, and that can come in many forms.  It could come through NATO, and we’ve put Ukraine on a path to NATO membership.  It could come through security assurances, commitments, guarantees by different countries to make sure that Russia knows that if it re-attacks, it’s going to have a big problem.  That, I think, is going to be critical to making sure that any deal that’s negotiated actually endures, and then allows Ukraine the space, the time to grow strong as a country.

QUESTION:  It’s interesting – what I’m hearing you say is that Ukraine’s fate will no longer rest in its major supporter, the United States.  You see it as resting elsewhere – Europe, et cetera. 

SECRETARY BLINKEN:  Look, I hope very much – and I don’t want to say expect, but I certainly hope very much – that the United States will remain the vital supporter that it’s been for Ukraine.  Because again, this is not just about Ukraine – it’s never just been about Ukraine.