It’s Time For The Trump Administration To Appreciate The Outcome Desired Is Unlikely To Be The Outcome Available; And That Any Outcome Will Be In Parts Rather Than As A Whole.
It’s time for the Trump Administration to appreciate the outcome desired is unlikely to be the outcome available; and that any outcome will be in parts rather than as a whole.
The Trump Administration needs to pivot its strategy and focus upon narrowing the distance between what the Maduro Administration will do, the Guaido Administration can do, what Cuba will accept, what Russia will accept, what China will accept, what Turkey will accept, and what Colombia needs, and Brazil needs.
The belief that an outcome will be zero-sum, one winner and one loser, is unlikely to result in anything other than an optical moment or series or moment. The following might be doable:
Venezuela had an election for president that was scheduled for December 2018.
The president of Venezuela has a six-year term.
The next election is scheduled for December 2024.
President Maduro would agree to not seek re-election.
Interim President Guaido would agree to not seek election.
The Maduro Administration would agree to neither accept nor purchase any additional military equipment.
The United States would return all sequestered funds to the control of the National Assembly of Venezuela of which Mr. Guaido is President.
The Maduro Administration would agree to sell no gold without approval of the National Assembly of Venezuela of which Mr. Guaido is President.
The discounted oil agreement between the government of Venezuela and the government of the Republic of Cuba will be discontinued in December 2022.
The reported 23,000 Republic of Cuba nationals who are residing in Venezuela and employed through contracts between the government of Venezuela and government of the Republic of Cuba will be withdrawn by December 2022.
Four previously-published analyses with further details as to what would be required for President Maduro to relinquish office and the obstacles for the Trump Administration:
30 March 2019
The Unresolved Commercial, Economic And Political Issues In Venezuela Remain A Bilateral And Multilateral Contagion.
Until there is a resolution, or the perception of a resolution to Venezuela amongst impacted constituencies, challenging will be resolve by the Trump Administration to engage the Republic of Cuba in direct bilateral negotiations about the certified claims or any other issue of substance.
There are decisions which could be implemented in Venezuela and in the Republic of Cuba that might prompt a shift in the political compass (and calculus) of the Trump Administration from directionally limited to normal activity. For that to happen, the Trump Administration needs to be succinct in the logic and practicality of its strategy and its messaging.
The Trump Administration must provide assurances to Russia and China that monies owed to them by Venezuela will be repaid and that the Trump Administration will not seek to prohibit or deter companies from Russia and China from bidding on, implementing, and receiving payment from contracts in the future.
First, H.E. Juan Guaido, President of the National Assembly of Venezuela and self-declared Interim President of Venezuela, should be unequivocal in stating he will not become a presidential candidate when the next election is scheduled. By confirming that his role is solely guiding Venezuela to its next presidential election, he would assist, but not eliminate, perceptions that he is too influenced by and beholden to interests of the United States. His not seeking higher office removes an impediment to resolving the problems of Venezuela.
Interim-President Guaido has limited time within which to demonstrate a landscape of control of the government of Venezuela- especially relating to the provision of services and particularly with respect to the distribution of substantial quantities of United States Dollars and other currencies located outside of Venezuela which the Trump Administration and other governments have sequestered for his control and then use on behalf of the citizens of Venezuela. There may be a moment where citizens of Venezuela, despite support for Interim-President Guaido, decide that too many of their county’s financial resources are inaccessible unless they support President Nicolas Maduro; and the international community generally has limited patience in maintaining potentially billions of United States dollars and other currencies in perpetuity for a Maduro-less or Maduro-light government of Venezuela.
Second, the Trump Administration has increased its usage of the phrasing “recognizing the realities on the ground” to discuss territorial issues. The reality on the ground in Venezuela is those serving in the armed forces of Venezuela will determine whether President Maduro departs, when he departs and how he departs. Unless there is an amnesty which includes departure from the country, if desired, and a guarantee that the United States and other countries will not pursue individuals for additional criminal or civil actions, challenging will be creating an atmosphere where members of the armed forces will support meaningful- and permanent change in Venezuela.
Third, President Maduro, should he decide to resign and remain in Venezuela or depart for another country, would require assurances that he and his family would not be pursued for criminal and civil charges. Perhaps, an unsettling and unappetizing possibility, but lacking such “not-go-to-jail cards and get-of-of-jail cards” the process of crisis- and the pain inflicted upon the citizens of Venezuela will continue- as will a question for those opposing President Maduro: What is most important- President Maduro becoming Mr. Maduro or holding President Maduro accountable when he becomes Mr. Maduro? There may not be a reasonable option to pursue both- there might be a forced choice. Is the goal solving the problem or maintaining the problem?
Fourth, if President Maduro departs Venezuela and the Republic of Cuba agrees to provide him with temporary or permanent housing, what should be the conditions? Other countries who might host President Maduro include Russia, Turkey or one of the other thirteen members of the Vienna, Austria-based Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC).
The Republic of Cuba would want guarantees from the United States, Organization of American States (OAS), European Union (EU), United Nations (UN) and International Criminal Court (ICC) among others that Mr. Maduro would not be sought for extradition and the Republic of Cuba would not be penalized for providing housing to Mr. Maduro.
The United States would need to choose- the Trump Administration has defined President Maduro and what has happened within Venezuela as a [mostly] creation of the Republic of Cuba and has stated that if the Republic of Cuba withdrew its support (military and intelligence) for President Maduro, the problems of Venezuela would become those for Mr. Guaido (until a new president is elected) and supporters to repair.
Political realities are often not binary and are multi-dimensional and lacking zero-sum definitions. The Trump Administration will likely not inhabit the Venezuela it projects to seek in the short-term to medium-term unless there is an agreement with the Republic of Cuba- who will not agree to be blamed by the Trump Administration for what is happening in Venezuela while simultaneously being blamed if it takes a meaningful decision to change the equation to what is sought by the Trump Administration by providing safe harbor to Mr. Maduro. Such self-imposed constraints on the Trump Administration would be challenging and equally so for members of the United States Congress.
Fifth, if the Republic of Cuba were to agree to provide housing for Mr. Maduro, it would expectantly seek from the Trump Administration an agreement to reverse some decisions it has already taken or not implement what it has yet to do; perhaps including reinstatement to the OAS and lessening some international transaction restrictions.
There is also logic for the Republic of Cuba to seek nothing from the Trump Administration and extract global goodwill for solving a problem which, by doing so, will result in economic pain for the Republic of Cuba. The Republic of Cuba’s reliance on Venezuela has continued to decrease during the last four years; so, while painful, the Republic of Cuba could manage an elimination of its preferential commercial agreements. If the Trump Administration were to then implement additional measures, they would be perceived by other countries as punitive- and the Republic of Cuba would gain leverage in the global marketplace- and in some constituencies throughout the United States.
The primary question for the Trump Administration: President Maduro is willing to let his people suffer; is the Trump Administration willing to let his people suffer? President Maduro has now survived past the presented expectations of the Trump Administration, so the distance between the Trump Administration obtaining everything that it wants and what is likely available continues to increase- that’s a problem for the Trump Administration.
The likely predicted outcome for Venezuela will neither have a winner or a looser. With President Maduro’s absence, all stakeholders will continue to endure pain while gaining or regaining what they want.
7 September 2019
Will Cuba Accept Maduro? Yes. But, There’s At Least One Problem. Trust.
H.E. Nicolas Maduro, President of Venezuela, members of his immediate family, aides and members of the government, board an aircraft at Simon Bolivar International Airport (SMVI) or Generalissimo Francisco de Miranda Air Base (SVFM) near the capital, Caracas.
The aircraft may be the property of the government of Venezuela, the government of the Republic of Cuba, of a third country, or chartered by an international organization, such as the United Nations (UN).
Scenario One- The F-16’s
The aircraft departs Venezuela for the 1,342-mile, three-and-a-half-hour flight to Jose Marti International Airport (HAV) or military airports Managua Airport (MUMG) or San Antonio de los Banos Air Base (MUSA).
Soon after departing Venezuela airspace, The Honorable Donald Trump, President of the United States; The Honorable Michael Pompeo, United States Secretary of State; The Honorable John Bolton, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs; and The Honorable Elliott Abrams, Special Representative for Venezuela at the United States Department of State; along with members of the United States Congress, publish statements using the Twitter platform.
Collectively, the statements congratulate the citizens of Venezuela for obtaining their freedom, confirm that the United States will be supporting the citizens of Venezuela, confirm that commercial, economic and political sanctions will soon be removed, and note that the government of the Republic of Cuba “has now done what it should have done years ago. Maduro should still face justice for his crimes.”
Other statements, although more positive in tone, are issued by individual governments and by the one hundred ninety-three-member UN, twenty-eight member European Union (EU) and thirty-five-member Organization of American States (OAS).
Nearing the end of the journey, while over international waters, four (4) General Dynamics F-16 Fighting Falcon aircraft from the United States Air Force intercept the aircraft transporting Mr. Maduro and require the pilots to land either in the United States or a third country. If in a third country, Mr. Maduro is then flown to the United States, likely the state of Florida, where he is arrested, arraigned, charged and then remanded to custody at the Federal Courthouse in Miami, Florida. His mug shot is included in a Tweet published by President Trump.
Presumably, President Maduro would not depart Venezuela using an aircraft belonging to the government of Venezuela precisely to seek to prevent the aforementioned scenario- President of the National Assembly of Venezuela and Interim President Juan Guaido would likely not strenuously object to a redirection of the aircraft and would rescind any diplomatic immunity for those aboard the aircraft. If, however, the aircraft belongs to the government of the Republic of Cuba or another country (China, Russia or Turkey for example) or chartered by an international organization which has diplomatic status, would the United States feel encumbered by potential criticism? As of today, doubtful.
Scenario Two- Extradition
The aircraft departs Venezuela for the 1,342-mile, three-and-a-half-hour flight to commercial airport Jose Marti International Airport (HAV) or military airports Managua Airport (MUMG) or San Antonio de los Banos Air Base (MUSA).
Soon after departing Venezuela airspace, The Honorable Donald Trump, President of the United States; The Honorable Michael Pompeo, United States Secretary of State; The Honorable John Bolton, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs; and The Honorable Elliott Abrams, Special Representative for Venezuela at the United States Department of State; along with members of the United States Congress, publish statements using the Twitter platform.
Collectively, the statements congratulate the citizens of Venezuela for obtaining their freedom, confirm that the United States will be supporting the citizens of Venezuela, confirm that commercial, economic and political sanctions will soon be removed, and note that the government of the Republic of Cuba “has now done what it should have done years ago. The United States appreciates that President Diaz-Canel has helped to end the suffering of the citizens of Venezuela; now he should focus on ending the suffering in Cuba.”
Other statements, although more positive in tone, are issued by individual governments and by the one hundred ninety-three-member United Nations (UN), twenty-eight member European Union (EU) and thirty-five-member Organization of American States (OAS).
Upon landing, Mr. Maduro and his party are transferred to several secure protocol residences located in the Miramar District of Havana.
Hours later, there is a new series of statements from officials of the United States government and by members of the United States Congress: The government of the Republic of Cuba must “immediately extradite Maduro and others to face justice or Cuba will face even more severe consequences for harboring an international criminal and drug trafficker.”
Verbal whiplash for the [Miguel] Diaz-Canel Administration in Havana: At 10:00 am, President Maduro departed Venezuela. At 1:30 pm, he arrived in the Republic of Cuba. At 1:45 pm, the United States government confirmed the Republic of Cuba’s constructive role in resolving the problem for Venezuela. At 3:00 pm, the United States is again condemning and threatening the Republic of Cuba.
The Questions
For the government of the Republic of Cuba, determining its role in resolving the commercial, economic and political issues in Venezuela includes determining whether the United States wants to resolve a problem or maintain an issue. It’s about trust.
The United States proposal to the government of the Republic of Cuba: Accept President Maduro, his immediate family, aides and members of the government. In return, the United States will not seek the extradition of Mr. Maduro or any of the other members of the traveling party and will not criticize the Republic of Cuba for accepting Mr. Maduro or any of the other members of the traveling party. The United States will continue to search for assets connected to Mr. Maduro, his family, aides, and officials located outside of Venezuela and return those assets to Venezuela.
Even if the United States were to put the proposal in writing, and it was signed by President Trump, Secretary Pompeo, Ambassador Bolton and Ambassador Abrams, could and should the Diaz-Canel Administration and other governments have confidence that the agreement would binding… and for how long would be until the next statement issued using Twitter that the agreement was no longer valid?
19 September 2019
Will There Be A Venezuela Libertad Act? Will President Trump Sign It Into Law?
There is reporting by media that the government of Venezuela may be considering the expropriation of real estate from Venezuela nationals who have departed the country.
If true, there would be unflattering comparisons to the expropriation of assets (individual and company) without compensation beginning in 1959 by the government of the Republic of Cuba.
If H.E. Nicolas Maduro, President of Venezuela, were to sanction such a decision, and if the decision were implemented, there may be a legislative response by members of the United States Congress.
Provisions of any Venezuela-focused legislation would be expectantly be less globally robust than its Republic of Cuba-focused predecessor.
The 42-page Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act of 1996 (known as “Libertad Act”), whose purpose is “To seek international sanctions against the Castro government in Cuba, to plan for support of a transition government leading to a democratically elected government in Cuba, and for other purposes” includes four (4) Titles: Strengthening International Sanctions Against The Castro Government; Assistance To A Free And Independent Cuba; Protection Of Property Rights Of United States Nationals; and Exclusion Of Certain Aliens.
The Libertad Act would be the foundation for a “Venezuela Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act.”
Legislation would find genesis in the United States Senate with likely sponsors/co-sponsors including The Honorable Marco Rubio (R- Florida), The Honorable Rick Scott (R- Florida), and The Honorable Robert Menendez (D- New Jersey). In the United States House of Representatives, The Honorable Albio Sires (D- New Jersey 8th District) and The Honorable Mario Diaz-Balart (R- New Jersey 25th District) and The Honorable Chris Smith (R- New Jersey 4th District).
The Honorable Donald Trump, President of the United States, would be expected to sign the legislation into law if the Maduro Administration continues to defy United States public and private operations designed to hasten his departure from Venezuela.
Background On Cuba Libertad Act
In March 1996, the United States Congress passed and The Honorable William Clinton, President of the United States, signed into law the Libertad Act.
In 1995 and 1996, the legislation had been stymied in the United States Congress, particularly in the United States Senate, and was not expected to become law. However, after two aircraft operated by the Revolutionary Armed Forces of the Republic of Cuba (FAR) destroyed two general aviation aircraft killing four individuals, and with focus upon an uncertain reelection on 5 November 1996, President Clinton, who had opposed elements of the legislation, signed it.
The Trump Administration made operational Title III and further implemented Title IV of the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act of 1996 (known as “Libertad Act”).
Title III authorizes lawsuits in United States District Courts against companies and individuals who are using a certified claim or non-certified claim where the owner of the certified claim or non-certified claim has not received compensation from the Republic of Cuba or from a third-party who is using (“trafficking”) the asset.
Title IV authorizes the United States Secretary of State to restrict entry into the United States by individuals who have connectivity to unresolved certified claims or non-certified claims. Only one company, Toronto, Canada-based Sherritt International Corporation (2018 revenues approximately US$528 million), is known currently subject to this provision based upon a certified claim.
1 November 2018
What U.S. Does Towards Venezuela & Cuba Impacts Colombia, Brazil, Peru, Chile, Ecuador
Can Venezuela be repaired without jeopardizing the financial benefits received by Cuba?
Does Cuba benefit from a crisis-infused Venezuela which creates systemic commercial, economic and political issues for Colombia?
The government of the Republic of Cuba has no incentive to provoke measures that would replace the Maduro Administration when those measures will result in economic and financial pain for the Republic of Cuba and require the Republic of Cuba to make commercial and economic changes that it does not want to make and has not had to make because other countries (Venezuela, China, Russia, among others) have provided resources to forestall those decisions.
Since 2000, Venezuela has, beginning with the Chavez Administration and continuing through the Maduro Administration provided the Republic of Cuba with more than US$1 billion to upwards of US$4 billion annually in discounted oil (with multi-year repayment terms), import financing, loans, grants, and employment for thousands of Republic of Cuba nationals.
The United States government believes that the Maduro Administration remains in place due in large measure to efforts by the government of the Republic of Cuba.
The United States government believes the Revolutionary Armed Forces of the Republic of Cuba (FAR) and the Ministry of Interior of the Republic of Cuba (MININT) have the capability to organize the replacement of the Maduro Administration which would accelerate a stabilization and subsequent repair to the commercial, economic and political infrastructure within Venezuela.
The United States government believes that the exodus primarily to Colombia of more than 1 million citizens from Venezuela is a responsibility of the government of the Republic of Cuba. During the last two years, the exodus has increased the population of Colombia by more than 13%.
The government of the Republic of Cuba has a role in the peace process between the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the government of Colombia; some FARC members are attending educational workshops in the Republic of Cuba.
Venezuela & Oil & Cuba: Decisions Have Consequences For The United States
Increasing oil production in the United States creates employment opportunities. Consistent oil prices are good for United States consumers. Lower oil prices are good for United States consumers.
If oil prices become too low and remain too low, there is negative impact upon United States oil producers, particularly those involved in fracking.
Higher oil prices can permit oil-producing countries to increase their imports. However, oil prices need be below a level(s) that will decrease the consumption by importers.
Higher oil prices can increase revenues of United States-based oil producers, but at the potential expense of United States-based oil consumers. Oil producers prefer to export product when prices are higher rather than direct production within the United States.
A challenge is how to seek a price level for oil that is low enough to maintain and, if necessary, stimulate economic activity- spending by consumers and companies where oil is a significant input cost, and high enough to retain exploration expenditures and fund purchases by oil-producing countries whose revenues would be strained to manage imports.
Lower oil prices assist countries with limited or without domestic oil production including China and Republic of Cuba.
Lower oil prices are challenging for oil-producing countries (OPEC-members, Russia, Iran, Venezuela among others). Members of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC): Algeria, Angola, Congo, Ecuador, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Libya, Nigeria, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates and Venezuela. OPEC Observers include Egypt, Mexico, Norway, Oman and Russia among other countries.
Lower oil prices can stimulate a focus upon inefficiencies in oil-producing countries, particularly where governments lack transparency, accountability and democratic institutions. Those governments will adapt to survive; they are not typically suicidal. They may refocus on the non-oil-dependent sectors of their economies.
Higher oil prices can insulate countries considered autocratic or not-ideal democracies to continue behavior deemed detrimental to the interests of democracies. Venezuela will continue to assist the Republic of Cuba.
Lower oil prices would lessen revenues for Venezuela, which would complicate the ability for Venezuela to repay loans to China and Russia among others. Higher oil prices would accelerate the ability of Venezuela to repay China and Russia among others, but higher oil prices negatively impact the economy of China and the Republic of Cuba by increasing the cost of an important import.
If China and Russia choose not to continue their support the Maduro Administration, Venezuela will need to make survival choices- and a primary one is the elimination financial support to the Republic of Cuba and to other Caribbean Sea-area countries.
Russia and Saudi Arabia among other OPEC members may desire a hobbled Venezuela as the result is a lessening of oil supplies which assist to maintain higher oil prices.
The Trump Administration must balance the impact of lessening oil production from Iran, which the Trump Administration supports, with a decrease in global oil production, which may result in higher oil prices. There is value in an increase in countries contributing oil to the global marketplace- lower and consistent oil prices.
However, if Venezuela increases its oil production, there could be downward pricing, which would benefit the United States- and allies and foes. Increasing oil production by Venezuela could also stabilize the Maduro Administration- which would result in the Republic of Cuba continuing to receive financial support from Venezuela.
A stabilized Venezuela may also positively impact Colombia, which would likely see a lessening of migration from Venezuela.
The impact of decisions by the United States government to influence commercial, economic and political outcomes in Venezuela and the Republic of Cuba cannot today be siloed from collateral impact towards allies and towards foes.