How Might Belarus Trigger Invasion By Ukraine?
President Lukashenko Faces Infestation: Fjellfross, Vielfraß, Gulo Gulo
Ukraine Redefining “Defense” And Attack Into Belarus & Russia
Rationale Based Upon Turkiye And Israel
Use NATO (Including United States) Equipment Regardless Of Requests Not To Do So

For Germany, Optics of Bundeswehr Heer Tanks Rolling Through Ukraine Into Belarus And Russia Brings Memories Of WWII Too Near For Comfort.  Russian People Would Remember Too. Operation Barbarossa was the German code name for the 22 June 1941 invasion of the U.S.S.R.  Its ultimate failure was an important turning point in World War II.

Belarus An Unindicted Co-Conspirator- Will Change Quickly If Again Provides Platform For Ground Attack Into Ukraine

When Will Belarus Be Fully-Throttled For Continuing To Permit Missile Launches Into Ukraine? 
Ten Rounds Of EU Sanctions Upon Russia Will Descend All At Once Upon Belarus

From A Head Of Government: “To borrow from our American friends, this would be a ‘shock and awe’ moment for Mr. Lukashenko.  So far, he has been an observer of sanctions.  There has been too little bite.  This sting could be and should be fatal.”

Governments Remain Focused Upon “What Comes After”

Alexander Lukashenko, President of the Republic of Belarus (1994- ), must be realistic as to what he and the 9.3 million citizens he represents will encounter in terms of military conflict and additional commercial, economic, and political sanctions should he again permit the armed forces of the Russian Federation to deploy from Belarus into the territory of Ukraine- regardless of whether he also deploys the armed forces of Belarus into the territory of Ukraine.   

• On 24 February 2022, the armed forces of the Russian Federation invaded and further invaded the territory of Ukraine in what Vladimir Putin, President of the Russian Federation (2000-2008 and 2012- ), then defined as a Special Military Operation [SMO] and 22 December 2022 he redefined as a war.  The initial invasion by the armed forces of the Russian Federation was in part from the territory of Belarus.    

• Belarus shares 1,845 miles of land borders with Latvia (European Union and NATO member), Lithuania (European Union and NATO member), Poland (European Union and NATO member), Russian Federation, and Ukraine (European Union candidate member since 23 June 2022).   

• Russian Federation shares 2,770 miles of land borders with Finland (European and soon-to-be NATO member), Latvia (European Union and NATO member), Lithuania (European Union and NATO member), Norway (NATO member), Poland (European Union and NATO member), Ukraine (European Union candidate member since 23 June 2022), and a maritime boundary with the United States (NATO member). 

If the armed forces of the Russian Federation use again the territory of Belarus through which to invade the territory of Ukraine, the armed forces of Ukraine will target into the territory of Belarus and the territory of the Russian Federation.  They will aim in front of advancing personnel, aim behind advancing personnel, aim at ammunition depots, aim at missile launch sites, aim at drone launch sites, and aim at infrastructure, including railways and roads.  If it moves, the armed forces of Ukraine will aim at it.   

The rationale will not be dissimilar to that of the government of Republic of Turkiye relating to its imposition of a temporary “buffer zone” twenty kilometers inside of the Syrian Arab Republic and the State of Israel with its temporary “buffer zone” that became an illegal annexation of the Golan Heights area within the territory of Syria- with the support of the United States government in 2019 during the [Donald] Trump-[Mike] Pence Administration (2017-2021). 

To accomplish these defensive goals and offensive goals, the armed forces of Ukraine will use their arsenal- including equipment provided by the United States, by a reported twenty-five of the thirty country members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and by other countries.   

• This includes Challenger II tanks from the United Kingdom (England, Scotland, Wales, Northern Ireland); Leopard II tanks from the Federal Republic of Germany- which have yet to be confirmed for delivery both directly from Germany and from countries with Leopard II tanks in their inventories (which require authorization from Germany) and agreed to provide them to the armed forces of Ukraine; AMX-10 RC armored fighting vehicles from France; Bradley, Humvee, Stryker, M113, M1117, MRAP armored personnel vehicles from the United States; Senator APC (Armored Personnel Carrier) from Canada; Marder infantry fighting vehicles from Germany; and TB2 drones and reportedly dual-purpose improved conventional munitions (DPICMs) from Turkiye.  In 2022, the government of the Republic of Poland delivered a reported two hundred U.S.S.R./Russian Federation-era T-72 tanks to Ukraine.  

Governments are properly concerned that military equipment technology provided to the armed forces of Ukraine could be compromised if obtained by the armed forces of the Russian Federation.  This would result in potentially billions of dollars in taxpayer funds directed to the development of technology for military use (which could also have other commercial uses) transferred to an adversary- who in turn could transfer the knowledge to another adversary(s)- for example from the Russian Federation to the People’s Republic of China which could use the intelligence for its focus upon the Republic of China (Taiwan) which has a substantial quantity of United States-manufactured military equipment; or to the Islamic Republic of Iran, or to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (North Korea). 

• Who would have thought that countries on the European Continent, particularly Ukraine and those countries bordering Ukraine, would not only welcome, but encourage military hardware- tanks specifically, to roll by railways and transported by aircraft from Germany into what was the territory of the U.S.S.R. (Ukraine) and then rumble perhaps into Belarus and the Russian Federation?  All the while live-streamed by drones…  Cue-up Leipzig, Germany-born Wilhelm Richard Wagner’s “Ride of the Valkyries”

An important unknown are the quantities of military equipment and quantities of military personnel available to the armed forces of Ukraine and to the armed forces of the Russian Federation if they seek to re-engage one another with ground forces in areas near the border with Belarus while simultaneously continuing engagements with one another in other areas of Ukraine.  

If the armed forces of Ukraine venture into the territory of Belarus and/or the territory of the Russian Federation and there are Belarusian casualties and Russian Federation casualties, out-of-country commercial, economic, humanitarian, military, and political support to Ukraine will be compromised and might be interrupted.    

President Putin will again share that with the armed forces of Ukraine entering the sovereign territory of Belarus and the sovereign territory of the Russian Federation, the government of Ukraine is acting as would a member of NATO- had a member of NATO been attacked.   

From his perspective, NATO would be participating (by proxy and directly) in an escalatory war against the armed forces of the Russian Federation and possibility armed forces of Belarus.  With members of the government of Ukraine continuing, as they have prior to 24 February 2022, to maintain the government of Ukraine is a de facto member of NATO, President Putin will gain opportunities for increasing domestic support for what was an SMO and has transitioned into a war. 

Volodymyr Zelensky, President of Ukraine (2019- ), will not be dissuaded by guidance, requests, pleadings, or orders not to use whatever equipment is in the territory of Ukraine to venture into the territory of Belarus and the territory of the Russian Federation.   

President Zelensky will dare governments supporting the government of Ukraine to lessen or withdraw their support.  He may well be victorious in the short-term.  He will appropriately reference statements from government officials that have far too often been vague and contradictory.  There are also statements by government officials which have been on point (see below from the United States Department of State).  Ignoring directives however sublime will have consequences with long-term implications including delays in completing memberships in those commercial, economic, military, and political organizations which President Zelensky has maintained are essential for Ukraine’s future development and security.  However, for President Zelensky, the definition of “long-term” is day-to-day so focusing upon organization memberships- which are years or a decade away, may be of little concern other than for domestic rhetorical purposes.    

United States Department of State
Washington DC
18 January 2023

• QUESTION: Over the course of the last year, has the U.S. ever put limits on where Ukraine can or cannot use their weapons? Have they been allowed to use those weapons to attack Russians in the Crimean Peninsula or in Crimea?

• MR PRICE: We are, of course, not making targeting decisions on behalf of our Ukrainian partners. These decisions are up to them… We have provided our Ukrainian partners with precisely what they need to take on the threat where it is raging most violently… Now, what we have not done, we have neither encouraged nor enabled our Ukrainian partners to strike beyond their borders. Everything we are providing to Ukraine is for a singular purpose, and that’s for its self-defense…. So we are not calling the shots when it comes to targeting. We are – and when I say “we,” in this case it’s our Department of Defense counterparts – they are in constant conversation with our Ukrainian partners about the dynamics, about the systems that would be appropriate for the threat that Ukraine is facing at each moment during the course of this invasion. But ultimately, it is up to our Ukrainian partners to determine how – how best, where – to use these weapons and supplies to defend their sovereign territory. 

Another incursion of personnel from the armed forces of the Russian Federation into the territory of Ukraine would expect to be transiting the same routes used by the armed forces of the Russian Federation from 24 February 2022 to 4 April 2022 towards the capital of Ukraine, Kyiv, and its surrounding areas (Brovary, Bucha, Chernihiv, Irpin among other towns and villages).  Many of these villages and towns and their respective infrastructure along those routes remain mostly today ruinous.   

For the armed forces of Ukraine, less important will be care not to harm further infrastructure in those already ruinous areas as it implements both defensive and offensive strategies into the territory of Belarus and territory of the Russian Federation.  Those areas will need to be rebuilt anyway, so the focus will be towards preserving the territory of Ukraine rather than preserving remnants of what will need to be replaced.   

This perspective provides the government of Ukraine with elasticity in terms of messaging to the public why towns and villages may be targeted possibly four times- first by the armed forces of the Russian Federation on offense, then by the armed forces of Ukraine on defence, then by the armed forces of the Russian Federation on offense, and then by the armed forces of Ukraine on defense and then again on offense.  An ugly yet potentially probable cycle.    

Personnel of the armed forces of Ukraine will have in view- and in memory, the results from a near three-month occupation of the areas by the armed forces of the Russian Federation.  That is an enormous quantity of memories- assault, death, destruction, injury, kidnapping, and rape from which to fuel revenge.  The wolverine has a reputation for ferocity and strength out of proportion to its size.  A vengeful wolverine might well be a beast left undisturbed. 

• The armed forces of Ukraine will target positions in Belarus to forestall the advance of the armed forces of the Russian Federation (and armed forces of Belarus if they participate) into the territory of Ukraine.   

• The armed forces of Ukraine will target positions in Belarus behind the armed forces of the Russian Federation (and armed forces of Belarus if they participate) to prevent their withdrawal when that serves operational strategy.   

• The government of Ukraine will shift from a defensive posture to an offensive posture in terms of protecting its territorial integrity. 

During the last eleven months, who is on offence and defense has altered many times- and will continue to do so.  When the armed forces of the Russian Federation invade the territory of Ukraine, the armed forces of Ukraine are on the defensive.  When the armed forces of Ukraine reclaim territory, it is on offense.  When the armed forces of the Russian Federation reclaim territory they previously departed, it is on offense.  When the armed forces of Ukraine reclaim territory they previously departed, reclaimed, and departed, they are on offense. 

Unindicted To Indicted 

The government of Belarus has since 24 February 2022 authorized the armed forces of the Russian Federation to use the territory of Belarus to launch missiles into the territory of Ukraine.  Railways and roadways have been used by the armed forces of the Russian Federation to transport military equipment from the Russian Federation into Belarus for deployment into the territory of Ukraine.

If the Lukashenko Administration does permit again use of its territory by the armed forces of the Russian Federation for another ground invasion of the territory of Ukraine, with or absent the armed forces of Belarus, expect the totality of sanctions implemented since 24 February 2022 against the government of the Russian Federation and government-owned and privately-owned companies within the Russian Federation will be swiftly recrafted, retargeted, and then implemented against the government of Belarus and government-owned and privately-owned companies within Belarus. 

There continues a robust discussion by governments in those countries supporting the government of Ukraine not to await movement by ground forces from Belarus into the territory of Ukraine and implement immediately those sanctions planned in conjunction with a ground invasion.  The recently-convened prosecutions in Minsk, the capital of Belarus, of individuals- both in person and in absentia, are considered useful triggering events.   

If fully-throttled sanctions against Belarus are implemented prior to a ground invasion, the decision would align with the pleadings of the government of Ukraine prior to 24 February 2022 when it advocated for sanctions upon the Russian Federation (public sectors and private sectors) to serve as a deterrent.  There is a belief amongst intelligence agencies that the Lukashenko Administration would have far less elasticity than did or does the Putin Administration to absorb and deflect the impact of fully-throttled sanctions. 

• From The European Council (EC): “Following the fraudulent presidential elections in Belarus in August 2020, the EU has progressively expanded restrictive measures against individuals and entities in Belarus.  Since October 2020, the EU has imposed five packages of sanctions in connection with the situation in Belarus, targeting a total of 195 individuals and 35 entities.”   

Since 2014, the EC has adopted nine packages of sanctions upon the Russian Federation with a tenth expected soon. 

• As one head of government shared, “To borrow from our American friends, this would be a ‘shock and awe’ moment for Mr. Lukashenko.  So far, he has been an observer of sanctions.  There has been too little bite.  This sting could be and should be fatal.” 

This head of government means removal of all Belarus-based financial entities from the global transaction network managed by the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication (S.W.I.F.T.); MasterCard and Visa credit cards and debit cards issued by Belarus-based financial entities would not be valid for use within those countries implementing sanctions; MasterCard and Visa credit cards and debit cards issued by financial institutions located in those countries implementing sanctions would not be valid for use in Belarus; and hotels, restaurants, and retail stores managed by companies within those countries implementing sanctions would no longer be operational.  A passport issued by the government of Belarus may become temporarily invalid to those countries sharing a border with Belarus. 

A risk from the imposition of fully-throttled commercial, economic, military, and political sanctions upon Belarus is the Lukashenko Administration will move further, and do so more swiftly into the commercial, economic, humanitarian, military, and political sphere of the government the Russian Federation.  There is a risk of a wave of migration from Belarus.  There is a risk for a rally-around-the-flag (and the president) moment should Belarus be invaded by the armed forces of Ukraine.  Intelligence agencies believe the majority of the population would use a breach of territorial integrity as an opportunity for work stoppages and protests against the Lukashenko Administration.    

There is a risk that a collapse of the Lukashenko Administration would result in the armed forces of the Russian Federation marshalling the annexation and absorption of Belarus into the territory of the Russian Federation.  While unlikely, it is possible.   

A collapse and de facto control of Belarus by the government of the Russian Federation could leave the Russian Federation 1,574 miles of land borders with Finland (European and soon-to-be NATO member), Latvia (European Union and NATO member), Lithuania (European Union and NATO member), Norway (NATO member), Poland (European Union and NATO member), and a maritime boundary with the United States (NATO member).  One certain result is more taxpayer-funded military hardware directed to those front-line countries. 

Intelligence agencies have modeled acceptable risk thresholds to their commercial, economic, military, and political interests, short-term, medium-term, and long-term resulting from the implementation of further sanctions upon Belarus and of any territorial incursion(s) into Belarus by the armed forces of Ukraine.   

The assessments coincide: There are enough citizens of Belarus who will as they did in 2020, but far more forcefully in 2023, cause a change in government- even if bloodshed is required. 

Considerations… 

With the Russian Federation-Ukraine war, neither the Putin Administration nor the Zelensky Administration have reached their thresholds where the numbers of dead, wounded, maimed, assaulted, missing, infrastructure damaged and destroyed, and taxpayer funds spent have reached levels requiring face-to-face conversations by the respective heads of state.  For each head of state, the longer in duration is the war, the move likely definition(s) of “victory” continue to gain flexibility rather than entrenchment.  There are two “guarantees” from this war- human cost and financial cost.  

Any face-to-face conversations would probably be held at the Presidential Complex in Ankara, Turkiye, and hosted by Recep Tayyip Erdogan, President of the Republic of Turkiye (2014- ).  Elections are scheduled in Turkiye for 14 May 2023.  President Erdogan is seeking re-election.  If he is defeated, finding a replacement who can provide a negotiation forum will be problematic as no other head of state has continuing relationships with President Putin and President Zelensky.  Election uncertainty in Turkiye may provide a stimulus to President Putin and President Zelensky. 

The Inconvenient Truth remains too- some of the same governments opposing the Russian Federation and supporting Ukraine are providing resources to both the Russian Federation and Ukraine.    

For President Lukashenko, however, his acceptable risk levels are decreasing by the day and shifting from unindicted co-conspirator to indicted co-conspirator is near.  If he makes the wrong choice, there is no redemption. 

LINK TO PREVIOUS ANALYSIS: 2/14/22- Thus Far, The Biden-Harris Administration Has Avoided Outlining Consequences For Belarus If It Permits Russian Federation Military To Use Territory For Invasion Of Ukraine. Why? 

Focus Upon “What Comes After” 

Increasingly, governments supporting and supporting not-so-much the government of Ukraine are preparing for “what comes after” the war is deemed to be something other than a war.  Germany is an example- which had a substantial commercial relationship with companies located in the Russian Federation and continues with some of them.  Turkiye is another example where the country maintains and has increased its commercial and economic relationship with the Russian Federation since 24 February 2022.   

There remain 146 million consumers in the Russian Federation.  They reside within eleven time zones extending east-to-west for approximately 5,600 miles.  Those consumers, particularly in the capital, Moscow, and second-largest city, St. Petersburg, remain enamored with brands which must be imported and the companies that own those brands remain wanting of access to those customers.   

Although challenging to envision today, once there is what does not exist today- where political conflict between the Russian Federation and Ukraine may remain, but the physical conflict has become what the government of each country and those governments providing taxpayer funds supporting the war efforts of both the Russian Federation and Ukraine determine is manageable, governments will again seek for companies access to the Russian Federation- products will be exported, services will be re-established, financing will be available, and there will be a marketplace for energy-related products sourced from the Russian Federation.   

Although time will be required by the citizenry of both countries, the Russian Federation and Ukraine will eventually re-emerge with a commercial, economic, and political relationship due primarily to an approximately 1,300-mile shared border where there is a natural pathway for imports, exports, and services.   

For examples of time changing behavior: The 21st Century commercial, economic, military, and political relationships amongst the protagonists and antagonists participating in or impacted by 20th Century events- World War I, World War II, and Vietnam War.

LINK TO COMPLETE ANALYSIS IN PDF FORMAT

Related Article

The Hill
Washington DC
18 December 2022
Belarus leader says situation ‘escalating’ ahead of rare Putin visit
By Brad Dress 

Alexander Lukashenko, the autocratic president of Belarus, is accused of using massive fraud to steal his 2020 re-election and of the violent mistreatment of protesters in a democracy movement.  Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko is striking a defiant tone ahead of a rare meeting this week with Russian President Vladimir Putin amid growing concerns that Belarus could be pulled into Russia’s war in Ukraine. 

Lukashenko, emphasizing his country’s sovereignty at a Friday meeting in Minsk on Russia-Belarus cooperation, said the situation was “escalating” as he prepares to talk with Putin on Monday.  The Belarusian leader refuted the “whispering” in his country that “Russians are already walking and running the country.”  “I would like to emphasize this feature once again: no one, except us, governs Belarus,”  Lukashenko said, according to remarks published by the presidential press service.

“We must always proceed from the fact that we are a sovereign state and independent.”  Putin will travel to Belarus and meet with Lukashenko on Monday in his first state visit to the country in three years.  The two leaders are expected to discuss “key aspects” of their partnership as well as other international and regional issues, a statement from the Kremlin said.  Lukashenko last week said the main topic would be economics but added he and Putin will also discuss defense and security in the region, according to the Belarusian presidential press service. 

Belarus served as a staging ground for Russia early in the war against Ukraine when Putin mobilized troops and arms that he sent into Ukraine in late February.  In October, Belarus also deployed thousands of troops with Russia to conduct joint military drills, renewing fears that Putin’s ally would commit forces to the war.  But Lukashenko has resisted joining the war directly, even as Ukrainian officials warn Russia is ramping up efforts to rope its neighbor into the conflict.  In the meeting on Friday in Minsk, Lukashenko defended his frequent meetings with Putin and Russian leaders, saying it was critical to coordinate and respond to “tactical issues” such as economic sanctions from the West. 

Lukashenko also emphasized strong ties with Russia and stressed that Belarus would “never be enemies” with the country.  “This is the state closest to us, the peoples closest to us,” he said. “I think that as long as we are in power, we will adhere to this trend. If it were otherwise, it would be like in Ukraine.”