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Thus Far, The Biden-Harris Administration Has Avoided Outlining Consequences For Belarus If It Permits Russian Federation Military To Use Territory For Invasion Of Ukraine. Why?

Thus far, the United States Government not outlined, in general or with specificity, what it and like-minded partner countries, including the collective twenty-seven member European Union (EU) and/or members of the EU, and other countries, will inflict upon Belarus if military assets of the Russian Federation cross from the territory of Belarus into the territory of Ukraine.  Why? 

Thus far, the United States Government has outlined, in general and with specificity, what it and like-minded partner countries, including the collective EU and/or members of the EU, and other countries, will inflict upon the Russian Federation if military assets of the country cross into Ukraine. 

Thus far, the United States Government has not outlined, in general or with specificity, what it and like-minded partner countries, including the collective EU and/or members of the EU, and other countries, will inflict upon the People’s Republic of China should it provide commercial, economic, or political assistance to the Russian Federation with a goal of mitigating whatever commercial, economic, and political punishment is directed toward the Russian Federation if its military assets cross into Ukraine. 

At present, Belarus (2020 election issues; commercial aircraft diversion; migration issues, etc.), Russian Federation, and People’s Republic of China are under sanctions by the United States, EU, and other countries for issues not related to Ukraine.   

For the Russian Federation, previously-invoked sanctions by the United States, EU, and other countries include those relating to intra-Russian Federation issues (Russia and Moldova Jackson-Vanik Repeal and Sergei Magnitsky Rule of Law Accountability Act of 2012 known as “The Magnitsky Act”; Nord Stream II natural gas pipeline, etc.) and for issues relating to Ukraine (occupation of Crimean Peninsula) and to Georgia (occupation of Abkhazia and South Ossetia).  

Reportedly, an option under consideration: Ukraine agrees to not seek membership in the thirty-member Brussels, Belgium-based North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) for a fixed period.   

Although with this history as the background: The Minsk Protocol signed on 5 September 2014 by the governments of Ukraine and Russian Federation along with the Helsinki, Finland-based Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), followed by the additional measures (Minsk II) signed on 12 February 2015, was designed to end, but in reality retain the status quo in terms of territorial conflict in the Donbas region (Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts) of Ukraine. 

Given the government of Ukraine believes that its signature to the Minsk Protocol (and Minsk II) was under duress, invalidating it, at some point during the next five to ten years Ukraine would ask to become a member of NATO and the organization would commence the process regardless of protests from the Russian Federation. 

The EU is likely to agree during the next years to designate Ukraine as a “Candidate Country” with a goal of Ukraine becoming a member of the EU.  There is a constituency who believes the Russian Federation would be deferential from initiating territorial acquisition toward an EU-member country. 

The expectation being that by the time Ukraine becomes a member of the EU and of NATO, the leadership of the Russian Federation will have changed, and the status of Ukraine will no longer be as significant as it is today.   

This expectation depends upon a belief that the issues of today are President Vladimir Putin-centric rather than Russian Federation-centric; that they do not remain past President Putin’s time in office. 

The goal is to keep the clock ticking rather than an alarm sounding- meaning time is up.

One key date: 20 February 2022, when the joint “suppressing and repelling external aggression during a defensive operation” by forces of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation and Ministry of Defense of Belarus are to cease.

There does also appear current and former officials in varied governments, current and former officers in military of varied governments, outside of government pundits, and journalists who seem to find disappointment with a lack of conflict.  A professional sadness, emptiness that absent conflict their sometimes dire, and contradictory warnings, almost adolescent anticipation, outline of scenarios, pre-conflict zones travel, will not provide an opportunity for continued self-promotion, for conflict zone “street-cred.”  In these instances, tragically, the citizens of Ukraine and Russian Federation become disposable extras in a global made-for-television event.