With UK Prime Minister Resignation, Consequences For Russia, Turkiye, Ukraine, United States. Ukraine- Easier To Lessen Support? Turkiye- Next Prime Minister Could Be Kurdish; 2023 Election Decision.
Boris Johnson, Prime Minister since 2019 of the United Kingdom (England, Scotland, Wales, Northern Ireland) has resigned as leader of the Conservative Party and resigned as Prime Minister.
When the moving van arrives to 10 Downing Street, the residence of the Prime Minister, has yet to be confirmed. Nor is known if Mr. Johnson will resign his seat in Parliament.
For the twenty-seven country members of the Brussels, Belgium-based European Union (EU) and the thirty country members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the departure of Mr. Johnson, who for some heads of state and heads of government has been the unwelcomed spirit of Donald Trump, 45th President of the United States (2017-2021), was an early birthday present. Like Mr. Trump, some of what Mr. Johnson advocated as policy was supportable- and even advisable. It was his delivery, the mechanics of his presentation, his untruthfulness that, like President Trump, put off many of his leadership colleagues and resulted in an agenda incomplete, also like President Trump.
The next Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, the fourth in six years, will not have the bubble of personality that surrounded Mr. Johnson. His successor (also a member of the Conservative Party in Parliament and determined by approximately 200,000 party voters) will be a more traditional, refined (less cheerleader), a consistently comfortable with accuracy technocrat rather than, as Vladimir Putin, President of the Russian Federation, recently referenced the trademarked perpetually-uncoiffed, untucked, poorly-fitted, unpolished, questionably postured, and embarrassingly overweight Mr. Johnson.
Some potential successor candidates: Mr. Dominic Raab, Deputy Prime Minister (who could be a caretaker as he has indicated he would not stand for the top job, but that may be a ploy to get it); Ms. Liz Truss, Foreign Secretary (who wants it); Mr. Ben Wallace, Defence Secretary (who wants it); Ms. Suella Braverman, Attorney General (already announced wants it); Nadham Zahawi (who is of Kurdish descent which is of interest to the government of Turkiye, wants it), Chancellor of the Exchequer; Penny Mordaunt, Trade Minister; and ex-Cabinet members Mr. Sajid Javid (wants it), Mr. Rishi Sunak (wants it), and Jeremy Hunt.
The next Prime Minister, who may be a caretaker until the Conservative Party selects a permanent Prime Minister, will need focus immediately upon an enormously complex agenda:
Possible recession in 2022 and/or 2023;
Pound Sterling that is decreasing in value (which does assist United Kingdom-based exporters by making their products less expensive, although transportation costs remain quite high); issues with staffing and services delivered for the publicly-funded National Health Service (NHS);
Staffing and services for education;
Increasing pension expenditures;
Negotiations with the EU about Brexit (Northern Ireland customs, fishing (France), English Channel migration (France), etc.);
Negotiations with the United States for a trade agreement;
Plans to increase substantially defense spending (in large measure a result of the events in Ukraine);
Continuing support for Ukraine.
The next Prime Minister will need to manage this agenda- promised by Mr. Johnson, that includes an income tax decrease and fee decrease, both of which have increased during the last two years- the theory being less initial income to the government will result in more income for taxpayers and companies, so with the resulting growth in the economy, the government will eventually receive additional funds from taxes and fees which existing programs may be enhanced and new programs may be implemented. Given the current account balance for the government of the United Kingdom, any tax decrease and fee decrease will mean additional borrowing.
There will be consequences for the foreign policy of the United Kingdom. Most members of the pre-8 July 2022 cabinet supported publicly the Prime Minister's focus toward the 24 February 2022 attack by the armed forces of the Russian Federation upon Ukraine- including directing billions of pounds in military hardware exports, training for personnel, and humanitarian assistance; supported publicly increases to defense spending; supported expanded integration with NATO; supported trade agreements with the United States; supported Brexit, but with differentiation as to tonality; and supported (cautiously) engagement and re-engagement with Turkiye.
The next Prime Minister will be hard pressed to continue long-term the current Prime Minister’s level of attention and support for Ukraine and level of efforts against the Russian Federation, as well as seek an increase in defense spending.
This will primarily be due to encircling the four corners of the United Kingdom since January 2020 increasing inflation, higher energy costs, higher fuel costs, higher food costs, higher interest rates, labor shortages, and continuing COVID-19 pandemic impact upon the sixty-six million citizens of the United Kingdom. Expect a former Prime Minister Johnson, who may continue as a member of Parliament, to continue advocacy for unfettered support for Ukraine. The effectiveness of that advocacy will be in question.
With each day, although the imagery could change and certainly the government of Ukraine wants that change, if there is demonstrated further that the square footage of the territory of Ukraine gained by the armed forces of the Russian Federation since 20 February 2014 and then gained additionally since 24 February 2022 will not be altered significantly, if at all, the domestic political calculus for the next Prime Minister of the United Kingdom will be whether to attempt to convince an already edgy electorate to send abroad resources when the television screens, printed pages, and radio broadcasts convey a status quo.
Ukraine needs quickly to not solely demonstrate continued resolve, but demonstrate sustained offensive capacity- defined as not only preventing advance by the armed forces of the Russian Federation, but forcing a retreat by the armed forces of the Russian Federation- returning inside of its internationally-recognized borders. The ability of the armed forces of Ukraine to demonstrate sustained offensive capacity is determined with substantiality by its acquisition and operation of equipment provided by NATO members.
Absent sustained offensive successes, political leadership in the United Kingdom, and other countries, will encounter increasing resistance from their constituencies to export increasingly scarce financial resources abroad- including to Ukraine. Particularly, when those financial resources must be borrowed and become a burden for taxpayers. If the armed forces of Ukraine were on the offensive in a meaningful trajectory, then the narrative could change- and do so in a dramatic and escalatory fashion.
Joseph Biden, 46th President of the United States, will hesitate to advocate in the global political arena for the United States to replace whatever support decreases from the United Kingdom. President Biden too will continue to refocus within, particularly guided by domestic spending with the approaching 8 November 2022 mid-term elections. His focus will also be impacted by increasing bipartisan speculation and increasing bipartisan preference that he does not seek re-election on 5 November 2024. On the horizon, in the spring of 2024, the Biden-Harris Administration (2021- ) may submit to the United States Congress, and the United States Congress may create on its own, the first defense budget of US$1 trillion. This would create a firestorm of debate, and that debate will be tri-partisan.
If the United Kingdom lessens its support (some might suggest resolve is more accurate) for Ukraine, and the offensive-defensive postures of the conflict in Ukraine remain sedentary, less problematic for other governments not to make up the difference in support as they too turn inward- as domestic issues trump foreign policy agendas. The question for officials in capitals will be for how long to support what is not changing- and continuing support for a conflict results in continuing a conflict, deaths, and damage to infrastructure that will need be rebuilt?
Few question that the government of the Russian Federation should direct the armed forces of the Russian Federation to return to within the internationally-recognized borders of the Russian Federation. The question for those funding the government of Ukraine and armed forces of Ukraine continues to be at what cost to their respective taxpayers is that effort worth pursuing, and worth pursuing for what duration?
For the United Kingdom relationship with Turkiye, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, President of the Republic of Turkiye since 2014 and who is seeking another term (voting on 23 June 2023- or earlier) will not miss Mr. Johnson, as erudite a figure as Mr. Johnson may project. Relationships with Mr. Johnson required effort and patience and constant maintenance; for a leader like President Erdogan, akin to enduring political stress fractures or political shin splints. Neither of which President Erdogan embraces, though he will tolerate if necessary for a transaction- as do other heads of state and heads of government.
The next Prime Minister of the United Kingdom will not support the re-election of President Erdogan. Nor will the majorities of members of the EU and NATO. Nor will the Biden-Harris Administration. Nor will most members of the United States Congress (100-member Senate and 435-member House of Representatives). These positions by governments will not necessarily be in the public domain because doing so could shift support to President Erdogan and distort further an already complex structure for both Finland and Sweden to become the thirty-first and thirty-second members of NATO. Expect narratives to be distributed through media channels, through non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and through former government officials reflecting the potential for Turkiye in a post-Erdogan Administration.
Known in advance is President Erdogan will not obtain all that he is requiring from Finland and Sweden. Unknown if he is comfortable with scuttling the accession process on principal (what he believes he was promised and what is written in the documents) and whether he believes doing so, particularly regarding issues relating to individuals of Kurdish descent, will enhance his prospects for re-election and strengthen the domestic, regional, and global interests of Turkiye.
Members of NATO will continue to strive mightily to maintain separations between NATO expansion; purchase by Turkiye of new F-16 aircraft and modernization packages for existing F-16 aircraft, both of which are supported by the Biden-Harris Administration and some members of the United States Congress; the potentiality of Turkiye-Greece military conflict, two NATO members with shared borders; and the statutorily-required sanctions (including removal from the parts manufacturing program and ability to purchase the F-35 aircraft) implemented in December 2020 by the United States for the purchase by Turkiye of the S-400 missile system from the Russian Federation. There will be debate within the United States Congress, which must approve the F-16 and related exports.
While governments (and their respective intelligence agencies) prefer certainty rather than uncertainty, with respect to the 2023 (or earlier) election in Turkiye, they are willing to visit a political casino and roll the dice with whomever would succeed President Erdogan.
The resignation of Prime Minister Johnson has consequences far outside of the borders of the United Kingdom. There will be a “ripple effect.” Governments will determine whether an initiative-taking approach or reactive approach will better serve their bilateral and multilateral interests, with officials in Kyiv and Istanbul taking particular attention.
