Ukrainian Spring Offensives Successes Will Be Defined By Moscow Not Kyiv. Once It Starts, Excuses/Blaming Must Stop. Expandable Hourglass Might Be Useful. Preparing Ukrainians For Digesting A Stone.
Ukrainian Successes With Spring 2023 Offensives Will Be Defined By Moscow Not Kyiv
Once It Starts, No Blaming Those Who Provided Military Equipment
Quadrilateral Landscape: Russian Federation-Ukraine-NATO-United States
Channeling Donald Rumsfeld
Expandable Hourglass Might Be Useful
Preparing Ukrainian Citizens For Digesting A Stone
Volodymyr Zelensky, President of Ukraine (2019- ), will soon deliver to senior members of his government and to leadership of the armed forces of Ukraine an order to commence the largest offensives since the initial offensives throughout the territory of Ukraine by the armed forces of the Russian Federation beginning with Kharkiv (population 1.4 million), the second-largest city in Ukraine, in the early hours of 24 February 2022.
The most common descriptive of planning by the armed forces of Ukraine is “offensive” which is a misnomer. There will not be one “offensive.” There will be “offensives.” They will not all commence from the same location or at the same time. Available equipment and personnel will determine the initial depth, duration, timing, and width of what happens.
One indication the offensives may not be far off? Journalists, presenters, producers, and reporters along with intelligence assets are positioning or preparing to position in hotels and in apartments located as near as possible to anticipated areas of attack due to an expectation the armed forces of Ukraine will restrict/prohibit access once offensives have commenced.
Questions Posed
For this scenario, the armed forces of Ukraine commence their offensives, but one or more stall, with limited headway and incurring substantial Ukrainian casualties. How might that result be received by the Biden-Harris Administration (2021- ) and how might it affect United States institutional, media, political, and public support to Ukraine?
There would be pressure within Ukraine and from benefactors outside of Ukraine for President Zelensky to engage with Vladimir Putin, President of the Russian Federation (2000-2008 and 2012- ). Those negotiations, which might first be led by the ministers of foreign affairs and ministers of defense from each country, would likely be in the Presidential Complex in the capital of Turkiye, Ankara, regardless of re-election victory or defeat for Recep Tayyip Erdogan (2014- ), President of Turkiye, in the 14 May 2023 (with potential run-off on 28 May 2023) election.
What are the critical benchmarks of success from the perspective of continuing United States institutional, media, political, and public support to the government of Ukraine that the government of Ukraine must aim for or risk substantially eroding that institutional, media, political, and public support?
A certain number of casualties among members of the armed forces of the Russian Federation? Yes, in the thousands along with images of thousands of members of the armed forces of the Russian Federation returning into the pre-2014 territory of the Russian Federation.
A certain distance of territory of Ukraine liberated? The armed forces of the Russian Federation must be permanently dislodged from real estate they now occupy- not only pre-24 February 2022, but pre-20 February 2014.
Movement by the government of the Russian Federation on negotiations? Welcomed, but not immediately essential.
BBC, CNBC, CNN, Fox News, MSNBC, NPR, New York Post, New York Times, Newsmax, NewsNation, PBS, Politico, The Hill, Wall Street Journal, and Washington Post among others including supportive images (and descriptions) of the armed forces of Ukraine liberating cities, towns, and villages? Managing the narrative critical. However, the narrative must be factual rather than inspirational and aspirational. Included in reporting will be analyses as to the performance of military equipment provided to the armed forces of Ukraine- have the tanks, armored vehicles, weapons systems, and other equipment been demonstrative, been instrumental in defeating the armed forces of the Russian Federation. Any of the equipment destroyed or captured by the armed forces of the Russian Federation?
From the Washington DC/Inside-the-Beltway perspective, what might define a successful offensive by the armed forces of Ukraine?
The most critical benchmarks for evaluating success or failure of the offensives by the armed forces of Ukraine will be the response by the government of the Russian Federation, media in the Russian Federation, pundits in the Russian Federation, and citizens of the Russian Federation. If there is an acknowledgement of failure- significantly an acknowledgement that absent possible use of nuclear weapons- the territories lost in Ukraine are irretrievable, that would be consequential. NOTE: The government of the Russian Federation will not use nuclear weapons in Ukraine, but will continue to include them in the conversation about the Russian Federation-Ukraine war, particularly that the armed forces of the Russian Federation are not fighting against the armed forces of Ukraine, they are fighting against the thirty-one country Brussels, Belgium-based North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and specifically the nuclear-provisioned armed forces of the United States.
NATO members (31): United States, United Kingdom, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Albania, Lithuania, Bulgaria, Montenegro, Croatia, Czech Republic, Poland, Estonia, Romania, Germany, Slovakia, Greece, Slovenia, Hungary, Spain, Turkiye, Latvia, and North Macedonia. The Kingdom of Sweden awaits approval from the governments of the Republic of Hungary and the Republic of Turkiye.
For the armed forces of Ukraine, its benchmarks are to hit everything they aim at, shoot down everything they aim at, blow-up everything they target, not have any military equipment destroyed or captured which was provided by NATO members, other countries, and particularly by the armed forces of the United States. Lastly, never fall back, never retreat. Don’t hold real estate- keep retaking real estate.
Offensives Not Offensive
When the armed forces of Ukraine commence their offensives against the armed forces of the Russian Federation, the operations will less resemble the Germany into Poland “blitzkrieg” on 1 September 1939 and more akin to the armed forces of the Russian Federation multiple location strategy into the territory of Ukraine on 24 February 2022. The offensives will commence with a series of moments- neither evenly timed nor evenly spaced.
Whatever the armed forces of Ukraine undertake in their mission to remove the armed forces of the Russian Federation from the territory of Ukraine, decisions will be constrained by the following factors:
Has all equipment promised by members of NATO and other countries been delivered, is it operable, is it serviceable, and does it have sufficient quantities of ammunition required to implement the offensive and, critically, have resources available should they be required for defensive responses- meaning that the offensives become defensives. NATO leadership reports and the armed forces of Ukraine confirms that 98% of promised military equipment has been delivered to the armed forces of Ukraine.
Do the armed forces of Ukraine have a sufficient number of active-duty personnel and a sufficient number of reserve personnel required to implement offensives and their aftermaths- if something goes terrible wrong, are there enough personnel for second, third, fourth, and fifth waves of assault?
Knowing there are optical and political timetables within those countries providing commercial, economic, humanitarian, military, and political support to the government of Ukraine, the Zelensky Administration might feel compelled to order the armed forces of Ukraine to commence offensives absent what has been modeled as necessary by resources within Ukraine and resources outside of Ukraine- meaning those who have provided the military equipment.
The last factor is the most terrifying for President Zelensky to answer. He will be challenged by the same statement uttered by Donald Rumsfeld, United States Secretary of Defense (1975-1977 and 2001-2006): “You go to war with the army you have, not the army you might want or wish to have at a later time.” For President Zelensky, the question is an iteration of that statement: “Do I go to war with the army I have, not the army I might want or wish to have at a later time? Do I wait?”
The paramount issues for President Zelensky are 1) the patience of leadership of governments and the taxpayers who fund those governments and 2) an increasing number of citizens of Ukraine who do not want to serve on the battlefield. These issues are like sands in an hourglass. President Zelensky can’t add more sand, can’t increase the size of the glass, and can’t continue turning it over and over seeking to restart the clock.
During the last several months, President Zelensky and members of his administration have commenced what for them is equal to digesting a stone.
They have begun to condition softly the citizens of Ukraine- those who remain within its borders and those who have departed (hopefully temporarily) and significantly, leadership of governments who are supporting Ukraine, that negotiations are likely, that territory (particularly the Crimean Peninsula) might be negotiable, that he may need to sit across from President Putin at a table probably at the Presidential Complex in the capital of Turkiye, Ankara. The conditioning includes statements by officials of the Zelensky Administration and individuals within the “Zelensky Orbit” where the statements are then contradicted, nuanced, or deftly explained. What continues with subtlety are consistent themes using various adjectives and adverbs.
For President Zelensky, imagining the scene in Ankara- which given his previous profession in television production he can easily create would be gut-wrenching for him. His preferred outcome would be a carefully staged death scene for President Putin.
If the offensives by the armed forces of Ukraine are successful, how will “success” then be defined? Be presented? Be marketed?
Absent spectacular success of the offensives by the armed forces of Ukraine, which by definition would require spectacular defeats of the armed forces of the Russian Federation, governments will become far more visible in seeking accountability for what exceeds US$220 billion in commercial, economic, financial, humanitarian, military, and political resources committed to Ukraine since 24 February 2022 with some already approved funding materializing past the fourth quarter of 2023 and into 2024. Reasons for the focus include country elections in 2024- in some of the thirty-one NATO member countries, within the twenty-seven member Brussels, Belgium-based European Union (EU) including leadership positions, and most consequently in the United States.
EU members: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Republic of Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, and Sweden.
What defines a “spectacular success”?
When the government of the Russian Federation, media within the Russian Federation, pundits within the Russian Federation, government leadership in countries not necessarily aligned with the government of the Russian Federation, but those with commercial, economic, military, and political connectivity, provide official, on-the-record, on background, and off-the-record comments that the gains by the armed forces of Ukraine are irreversible, are permanent.
The armed forces of Ukraine shift the permanent boundaries of the battlefields within the territory of Ukraine to at minimum the real estate controlled by the armed forces of the Russian Federation as of the day before 24 February 2022. That’s a minimum.
There will be pressure on the armed forces of Ukraine to achieve more- meaning the totality of real estate that existed on the day before 20 February 2014 (invasion of the Crimean Peninsula) and the day before 12 April 2014 (invasion of the Donbas Region- Donetsk Oblast and Luhansk Oblast).
What To Target?
Unknown if the armed forces of Ukraine will focus upon retaking the Crimean Peninsula. If the armed forces of Ukraine do focus upon the Crimean Peninsula, there may be criticism- officially, on background, and off-the-record from NATO members and commentators. The message will be President Zelensky has let his ego take charge of what is on a trajectory to US$100 billion in military equipment provided by taxpayers throughout the world toward achieving a goal that is not nearly as consequential as removing the armed forces of Ukraine from the Donbas Region and then moving southward to separate- like parting the sea in biblical times, the “land bridge” from Donetsk Oblast to Zaporizhia Oblast to Kherson Oblast connecting the Crimean Peninsula with the territory of Ukraine.
The Donbas Region is far more significant because the government of the Russian Federation annexed portions of the Donbas Region without having military or governmental control of the totality of the Donetsk Oblast and Luhansk Oblast. This was believed a mistake by President Putin- he should have waited until complete control and then annex, incorporate, federalize, etc. He may, however, have believed that control in totality would be elusive, so he went with the map he had rather than the map he wanted- another paraphrasing of Mr. Rumsfeld’s statement.
Can the armed forces of Ukraine afford a spectacular or even moderate beginning for its offensives and then a stall- a stalemate, temporary or permanent. Will offensives be subject to reporting- officially-sanctioned and not so, from sourcing throughout the world?
President Zelensky and members of his administration will need to think carefully before projecting responsibility for any stall, stalemate- temporary or permanent, defeat, or destruction of newly provided military equipment onto leadership of NATO and other countries. A potentially catastrophic mistake will be to express that failure was due to lack of military equipment, lack of training, lack of intelligence, and constraints placed upon the government of Ukraine and the armed forces of Ukraine, specifically with respect to limited reach of projectiles and requirement that projectiles delivered by NATO members are not launched into the territory (based upon 1991 borders) of the Russian Federation. Basically- that Kyiv was set up to fail because it did not receive what it wanted- it received only what others believed it needed: Had the outside world listened to Kyiv before, Kyiv would not be where it is today. As a result, President Zelensky must face President Putin to negotiate.
The offensives by the armed forces of Ukraine will be the first time the most sophisticated equipment of armed forces of the Russian Federation will be directly challenged by the some of the most sophisticated equipment of NATO members, specifically that sourced from the Germany, United Kingdom, and United States. All participants will want to share in real time their successes and in real time the failure of their opponent(s).
Televised and printed images of the armed forces of Ukraine, and of President Zelensky visiting re-conquered villages and towns and cities will not be enough for the government of Ukraine to use as a yardstick by which to request, require, demand additional military equipment from NATO members and other countries. What will be required are televised and printed images of the armed forces of the Russian Federation surrendering and their most advanced equipment destroyed.
Essential will be for those televised and printed images not only to present that the armed forces of the Russian Federation no longer occupy real estate. The optic must include the armed forces of the Russian Federation returning to within the internationally recognized borders of the Russian Federation as they existed in 1991- and specifically prior to 2014.
President Zelensky must be able to stand on territory of Ukraine looking to the horizon- into the territory of the Russian Federation and with a wave of his hand say, as from the motion picture, The Sound of Music (1965)- “So long, farewell, auf wiedersehen, adieu. adieu, adieu, to yieu and yieu and yieu. So long, farewell, au revoir, auf wiedersehen… So long, farewell, auf wiedersehen, goodbye….”
The government of Ukraine must also model the expectation that the armed forces of the Russian Federation will continue to engage and target asymmetrically with the armed forces of Ukraine. Non-military-related infrastructure (apartments, churches, hospitals, railway stations, schools, etc.) which have been impacted directly or indirectly, by intent or by mistake, will continue to be impacted. The more spectacular the successes by the armed forces of Ukraine, the more likely damage to non-military-related infrastructure in Ukraine. And increasing civilian casualties.
The other issue for the Zelensky Administration will be increasing pressure once the offensives commence to provide its citizens will real time data as to dead, wounded, and missing. The more secretive remains the government of Ukraine, the more citizens of Ukraine will believe the worst. If citizens of Ukraine believe the numbers are far higher than reported or they are higher than reported, pressure will build upon President Zelensky to seek a negotiation with President Putin. The same scenario will exist for President Putin in the Russian Federation, but the distance between public concern transitioning from anger to protest is far greater in the Russian Federation than in Ukraine.
An Healthy Perception
There remains an unhealthy perception since 24 February 2022 that the Zelensky Administration wants the Russian Federation-Ukraine war to continue with an ultimate goal of providing a direct trajectory for the armed forces of Ukraine to become a member of NATO (and then immediately request assistance from NATO members- which they will not readily provide) and for the government of Ukraine to become a member of the EU.
Unfortunately, the perception also transforms into the question: How many citizens of Ukraine is President Zelensky prepared to sacrifice in the quest for membership in NATO and for membership in the EU?
He knows that neither NATO membership nor EU membership will be forthcoming to a country at war- or a country nominally at peace with a neighbor, but which prepares for war.
President Zelensky’s response: If the Russian Federation conquers Ukraine, NATO will need to transition from a defensive alliance to an offensive alliance and the EU will awake and go to sleep one border crossing from instability and uncertainty. Their choice.
