If agricultural commodity exports from Ukraine are essential to importing countries, then those countries opposing the Russian Federation’s euphemism for its declared war- “special military operation” within the borders of Ukraine should consider:

• Matching constraints upon agricultural commodity exports from the Russian Federation with constraints imposed by the Russian Federation upon agricultural commodity exports from Ukraine; and

• Encouraging the State of Israel and the Republic of Turkey, the two most prominent self-presented “mediator countries” to provide escort vessels from the Israeli Navy and Turkish Naval Forces for a Food Flotilla of fifty bulk cargo vessels chartered by Israel-based companies and Turkey-based companies transiting from the Bosporus strait through the Sea of Marmara and into the Black Sea with destinations the Port of Mariupol, the Port of Mykolaiv, and the Port of Odessa.  Each vessel would have the name of the destination country prominently displayed along its bow.   

Companies could include Haifa, Israel-based Zim Integrated Shipping Services Ltd., Istanbul, Turkey-based Bayraktar Shipping Group, and Istanbul, Turkey-based Ciner Shipping. 

The government of the Russian Federation may believe that it can manage additional sanctions upon its exports as a reasonable cost for maintaining constraints upon agricultural commodity exports from Ukraine.  There has been reporting that agricultural commodities from Ukraine have been authorized by the government of the Russian Federation for delivery to Syria absent authorization from the government of Ukraine. 

A Food Flotilla would be a provocative act.  Would the Russian Navy use force to deter naval vessels flying the flags of the State of Israel and Republic of Turkey?  Unlikely.  The expected response would be to use Russian Navy vessels to block the ports.  One result would be highly-visible and shared live on television and Internet platforms throughout the world, video and images of fifty or more large bulk cargo vessels each up to 984-feet in length facing-off against vessels of the Russian Navy.

Republican Policy Institute
Washington DC
3 May 2022

Putin's Global Food Crisis 

Together, Russia and Ukraine generally account for one-quarter of global wheat exports, three-quarters of sunflower oil exports, and one-sixth of corn exports. The region also produces raw materials used for fertilizer production.  Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has disrupted processing and export of previously grown products and is likely to prevent spring planting in many areas of Ukraine. 

Commodity prices spiked following Russia’s February 24 invasion. These price hikes come on top of ongoing global food inflation; the food price index was up 38% from January 2020 to February 2022, then climbed another 12.7% from February to March, reaching a new record high. 

Russia’s war against Ukraine has disrupted shipping and agricultural production, and it is exacerbating price inflation for commodities. A prolonged conflict could upend the food supply chain and undermine global food security. 

Ukraine and Russia are major producers and exporters of grains and oilseeds. Typically, Ukraine supplies 48% of the world’s sunflower oil exports, 10% of the wheat, and 14% of the corn. Russia accounts for around 16% of the world’s wheat exports, 2% of the corn, and 29% of the sunflower oil. Wheat is a staple cereal grain and primary food source for 35% of the world’s population. Sunflower oil, like other vegetable oils, is used for frying and roasting; it accounts for about 9% of global vegetable oil consumption. 

The region produces nitrogen, phosphate, and potassium, raw materials critical for fertilizer production. Russia is a top producer of potash and nitrogen fertilizers. According to an analysis by the American Farm Bureau Federation, Russia was the global leader in nitrogen exports in 2018. It ranked third in phosphate and potassium exports the same year. 

Ukraine’s seaports – the primary means of export for its agricultural products – have not been operational since Russia began its attack. The country’s exports of grains and oilseeds dropped to just 3% of their usual monthly volume in March. In mid-April, the Ukrainian minister of agrarian policy and food said that around 1.25 million metric tons of grains and oilseeds are blocked at seaports. Russia’s attacks also have targeted infrastructure critical to commodity processing and shipping, such as major grain-export facilities. 

The war is likely not only to disrupt exports of agriculture products that were previously grown and processed, but also may prevent some spring planting in parts of Ukraine. Some areas where crops would normally be sown are now under siege, and there are reports that farmers have returned in other places to find their fields mined. Other regions face shortages of fertilizer, fuel, or labor. Ukraine’s 2022 grain harvest could fall more than 54%, and its harvest of sunflower seeds could decline by as much as 42%, by some estimates. 

Because commodities operate in an interconnected, global marketplace, regional shocks in supply can have worldwide implications. Global supplies of many food products are sufficient to prevent shortages, but an unanticipated hole in global production and the expected drawdown of stockpiles has already pushed prices higher across the supply chain. Food commodity prices were already elevated as a result of pandemic supply chain snarls, and they have climbed even higher following Russia’s February 24 invasion. 

The U.N. Food and Agriculture Organization’s food price index, which measures changes in international prices of food, was up 38% from January 2020 to February 2022, then climbed another 12.7% from February to March, reaching a new record high. The cereal price index, which reflects price hikes in wheat and grains, climbed 17.1% in March, and the vegetable oil index jumped 23.2%. The International Monetary Fund has predicted that food costs will increase globally by 14% in 2022 and continue climbing into next year. 

Food supply-chain shocks disproportionately harm people in relatively poor countries that rely on food imports. Yemen, which sourced 58% of its wheat imports from Ukraine and Russia, imported 125 kilograms of wheat per person in 2018. At approximately 3,400 calories per kg of wheat, this equates to relying on imports for more than 1,100 calories a day – about 80% of the average calories consumed by a person in Yemen each day. Ukraine exported 382 kg of wheat per capita that year. 

Rising food prices are also linked to increases in global poverty. While citizens of more developed countries have higher nominal food expenses, families in less-developed countries must devote a significantly larger share of their income to food. There is also an inverse relationship between the proportion of household expenses attributable to food and per capita calorie availability, a proxy for the likelihood of people going hungry. The Center for Global Development estimates that at least 40 million people will move into extreme poverty as a result of the food price spike following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. 

Russia’s aggression in Ukraine is driving up food prices around the world. The war is provoking a global food security crisis and will have profound effects far beyond Ukraine’s borders.