Russia-Ukraine “Frozen Conflict” Does Not Mean Solid And Unmovable, Does Not Mean Military Operations Continue. “Stability” Without “Peace”? Go As Far As Possible And Then Wait?
Defining Post 24 February 2022 Russian Federation-Ukraine “Frozen Conflict”
One Government’s Frozen May Be Another Government’s Defrosting
Frozen Conflict Does Necessarily Mean Military Operations Continue.
Implementing Cease Fire Whose Purpose Is To Identify Issues And Negotiate Resolutions For Those Issues Can Transition To A Frozen Conflict If Cease Fire Remains Operational While Diplomatic Negotiations Continue, And Perhaps Some Issues Resolved, But Absent A Negotiated Peace Agreement.
Frozen Does Not Necessarily Mean Solid And Unmovable. Can Be Porus. Look At The Arctic And South Pole Ice Sheets.
Kyiv Does Not Trust Moscow To Honor A Peace Agreement. Moscow Does Not Trust Kyiv To Honor A Peace Agreement. That Leaves Fighting With A Frozen Conflict, Fighting Without A Frozen Conflict, No Fighting With A Frozen Conflict, No Fighting Without A Frozen Conflict.
Here Thirteen Frozen Conflicts Where Territory Is Stabilized And Antagonists (Mostly) Engage (Mostly) Diplomatically, Commercially, Economically, Financially, And Politically.
Ukraine Does Not Trust Russia. Russia Does Not Trust Ukraine. EU Does Not Trust Russia. Russia Does Not Trust EU. NATO Does Not Trust Russia. Russia Does Not Trust NATO. Pressure Builds On Ukraine To Sign Document That Mostly Appeases Russia. Then Wait. Kicking Down Conflict Road.
Ukraine Should Focus On Membership In The EU. Process Can Exist Parallel To Frozen Conflict With The Russian Federation. How Far Can Process Go With Active Battlefields?
President Trump Does Not View Ukraine As A Partner, An Ally. He Views Ukraine As A Customer, A Client… Who Owes Him Money.
Volodymyr Zelensky, President of Ukraine (2019-2024; term extended due to imposition of martial law in 2022), members of the Zelensky Administration, and most members of the 450-seat parliament, Verkhovna Rada, echo a familiar position that the government of Ukraine will not accede to, agree to, condone, embrace, permit, sign, or support a cease fire agreement or peace agreement which become foundational for a frozen conflict.
On 24 February 2022, the armed forces of the Russian Federation invaded and further invaded the territory of Ukraine in what Vladimir Putin, President of the Russian Federation (2000-2008 and 2012- ), defined as a Special Military Operation [SMO] then on 22 December 2022 he redefined as a war. The initial invasion of Ukraine by the armed forces of the Russian Federation was in part from the territory of Belarus.
The war between the Russian Federation and Ukraine did not commence on 24 February 2022. The roots began their trajectories on 20 February 2014 when the armed forces of the Russian Federation invaded the Crimean Peninsula and the area known as the Donbas Region (Donetsk Oblast and Luhansk Oblast).
The challenge to the position of the government of Ukraine arrives in the form of one man: President Putin. He brings along with him the realities on the ground from 2014 which remained static until the early morning of 24 February 2022.
From his perspective, a frozen conflict existed for ten years without defrosting. So, why the urgency to defrost what existed prior to 24 February 2022 along with defrosting any of what remains of efforts commenced on 24 February 2022 and what remains of those efforts as of 6 April 2025? Despite significant investment in equipment and personnel, the armed forces of the Russian Federation have not (yet) achieved their expectations.
For Donald Trump, 47th President of the United States (2025-2029), a cease fire agreement is not a peace agreement and not necessarily the framework for a peace agreement. It represents an initial stage of a multi-stage process where each stage necessarily builds a foundation for the next stage.
A cease fire agreement ends, albeit temporarily (but potentially for much longer), the exchange of bullets, drones, missiles, and rockets between the armed forces of the Russian Federation and armed forces of Ukraine. During a cease fire, the antagonists would begin a process to construct a negotiation format for issues that each have with the other.
Some issues may find solutions. Other issues may find temporary solutions. Other issues, particularly those which are financial and/or require judicial findings, may take years- or may not be resolved. For example, judgements issued by courts that remain unfulfilled.
For President Trump, a cease fire suspends “[e]very day people are dying. Young handsome soldiers are being killed. Young men, like my sons. On both sides. All over the battlefield.”
That outcome is what he wants credit for and what he believes sets in motion the production for a United States government (along with the private sector) re-engagement with the government (along with the private sector) of the Russian Federation. A Trump-Putin summit. Commercial, diplomatic, and military bilateral agreements. Gradual cessation/suspension/revocation of bilateral commercial, economic, financial, and political sanctions. Invitation to the government of the Russian Federation to a reconstituted G8 from the current G7.
The Group of Seven (2014-Present) includes Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, United Kingdom, and United States. The Russian Federation was excluded in 2014 because of its military actions on the Crimean Peninsula.
4/22/20- President Trump Should Replace G7 With G10; Adding China, India And Returning Russia; From 9% To 47%
President Trump knows- and does not truly consider that a reproachment of the government of the United States and government of the Russian Federation absent a government of Ukraine-defined “fair and just peace” will result in a blood pressure reading for President Zelensky that will defy survivability by healthcare professionals.
A peace agreement which satisfies the government of Ukraine will take many years- and may never reach anything but an artificially-accepted status where some issues are resolved, but others remain not only unresolved, but disputed by one side or the other as legitimate.
If President Zelensky’s position for the internationally-recognized territory of Ukraine prior to 24 February 2024 is “[w]e will not recognize Ukrainian occupied territories as Russian” while President Putin’s position is those territories are no longer within the internationally-recognized territory of Ukraine, how is that mindset distance narrowed? Can it be narrowed? Should that discussion, that negotiation, be left for the successors of President Zelensky and President Putin?
“We have been very clear that we will never agree to a frozen conflict. We are very much against it, and our positions align with our American partners.” Mr. Andriy Yermak, Head of the Office of the President of Ukraine
The decision is not Mr. Yermak’s to make and his belief that the Trump-Vance Administration (2025-2029) aligns with the position of the government of Ukraine is misguided. President Trump does not view the government of Ukraine as a partner, but rather the government of Ukraine as a client, a customer to which services may be provided if appropriate compensation is rendered.
A frozen conflict is likely because through a cease fire agreement, which would be expected to be extended by the government of the Russian Federation and the government of Ukraine as negotiating teams craft the production schedule to begin negotiations for a peace agreement, will take time and often will derail and require rerailing.
The debate is not about the existence of a frozen conflict- that is fact since 2014. The debate will be how much time can a cease fire exist, and thus a frozen conflict, before the armed forces of the Russian Federation and the armed forces of Ukraine re-engage with one another.
Unknown will be the response to any cease fire breech. How and if the government of the United States; the thirty-two member countries of the Brussels, Belgium-based North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO); and the twenty-seven member countries of the Brussels, Belgium-based European Union (EU) will react. More importantly, what will be the distance between what they say and what they do. Thus far, there are both distance and speed differentials.
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO): United States, United Kingdom, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Albania, Lithuania, Bulgaria, Montenegro, Croatia, Czech Republic, Poland, Estonia, Romania, Germany, Slovakia, Greece, Slovenia, Hungary, Spain, Turkiye, Latvia, and North Macedonia, Sweden.
European Union (EU): Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden.
There are two best known examples of how governments respond to one country extracting internationally-recognized territory from another country. How euphemistically rich for heads of state and heads of government, particularly among NATO members and EU members, to pontificate about concerns perceived as rewarding the government of the Russian Federation for its occupation of real estate within the internationally-recognized territory of Ukraine.
Their non-dissuasive responses were noted in 2008 when the armed forces of the Russian Federation invaded Georgia and again in 2014 when the armed forces of the Russian Federation invaded Ukraine.
Seems a concrete or frozen conflict is most likely to most observers where the realities on the ground are recognized, not accepted, though remain unwelcome with hope for a change.
There is precedent where the government of Ukraine could continue not recognizing territory within the internationally-recognized border of Ukraine which are occupied by the armed forces of the Russian Federation. That has been the position since 2014.
Frozen Conflicts
These are conflicts in varying stages of political permafrost where the governments involved mostly maintain in some format commercial, diplomatic, economic, financial, political, and social connectivity:
Is the island of Cyprus a frozen conflict between the Republic of Turkiye and the Hellenic Republic (Grece)?
Is the territory of Northern Ireland a frozen conflict between the Republic of Ireland and the United Kingdom (England, Scotland, Wales, Northen Ireland)?
Is the island of Taiwan a frozen conflict between the Republic of China (Taiwan) and the People’s Republic of China?
Are the Republic of Korea and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea in a frozen conflict at the 38th Parallel?
Is the territory of Gibraltar on the tip of the Iberian Peninsula (Spain) a frozen conflict between the Kingdom of Spain and United Kingdom (England, Scotland, Wales, Northern Ireland)?
Are the territories of Abkhazia and South Ossetia in Georgia frozen conflicts between Georgia and the Russian Federation?
Is the Golan Heights in Syria a frozen conflict between the Syrian Arab Republic and the State of Israel?
Are the Falkland Islands off the coast of Argentina a frozen conflict between the United Kingdom (England, Scotland, and Wales) and Argentine Republic?
Is the Pridnestrovian Moldavian Republic (PMR) adjacent to the Republic of Moldova a frozen conflict between the PMR and the Republic of Moldova, and too the government of the Russian Federation?
Are Canada, Greenland, and Panama frozen conflicts between the United States and the governments of Canada, Kingdom of Denmark, and Republic of Panama at least until 12:00 pm on 20 January 2029 with the conclusion of the Trump-Vance Administration?
There are functioning frozen conflicts. Neither party thrilled, but the frozen conflict does not prevent or paralyze bilateral and multilateral engagement.
There is also a historical component. The government of Ukraine, along with members of the EU and NATO, do not trust President Putin to honor any agreement, peace treaty, any document to which he affixes his signature.
However, whether he will honor a document signed by him in 2025 or 2026 remains unknown. There is only precedent. Unknown too is the extent a document signed by President Putin will be enforced by his successor and their successors. Or, by the successors to President Zelensky.
Meaning, for the government of Ukraine, if the belief is the government of the Russian Federation will not abide by a signed document, an option is to then adopt the same position.
Whatever is signed is elastic, adaptable, dynamic, and cancellable. So, if there are components of the document to which the government of Ukraine objects, do not object publicly, plan to do later “at a time of its choosing” what it wants when it wants to.
Two countries at war are like reservoirs- each need to continually fill commercially, economically, financially, militarily, and politically. Each need outside resources to replenish. The amount of time to replenish varies. The country unable to replenish or replenish at a satisfactory rate will lose.
Focus On EU Membership
For the government of Ukraine, NATO membership is not as important to the future of the country than is EU membership.
The armed forces of the Russian Federation have neither invaded an EU member country nor a NATO member country.
There are six countries with NATO membership who share borders with the Russian Federation- Estonia, Finland, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, and Norway. Five of the six are also members of the EU- Estonia, Finland, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland.
This space has believed NATO membership for government of Ukraine was not as objectional to the government of the Russian Federation than was and remains EU membership for the government of Ukraine.
As an EU member, a country as large as Ukraine, sharing a border of approximately one thousand miles with the Russian Federation, would serve as a visible showcase for what the Russian Federation is and is not in terms of consumer global connectivity. Cross-border engagement by companies, families, and friends would be a daily reminder of diversified prosperity- what is available and what is not.
As an EU member, the government of Ukraine would be required to publicly embrace statues addressing corruption, an independent judiciary, transparent enforcement of its financial marketplace, and an election process devoid of pressures.
However, the government of Ukraine will encounter increasing challenges, opposition, from individual EU member countries the closer EU membership becomes.
In some instances, the closer the government of Ukraine becomes to membership in the EU, the further away from membership it will be.
Negotiations about macro issues are often far easier than negotiations about micro issues as often the more detailed in nature an agreement must be results in emboldened constituencies who may view their livelihoods at stake.
Since 24 February 2022, the political statements and discussions by EU leadership in Brussels are primarily macro in nature and embraced and embellished. Appointed EU Political leadership in Brussels do not have to endure the rath of taxpayers for their decisions, as do heads of state and heads of government among the twenty-seven EU member countries.
Once discussion begins about how many members of the European Parliament will be from Ukraine, how much EU collective funding will flow to Ukraine, and what will be the negative impact upon member countries from the movement of products and services out of Ukraine and into the EU, out of Ukraine and transiting the EU to other markets, and into Ukraine and out of the EU- and then back again to the EU, curiosity and support about a new EU member will shift by many into commercial terror.
Solidarity with Ukraine due to the war with the Russian Federation will have increasingly expanded limitations.
The most contentious issue will come from votes in the European Commission (EC) and European Council (EC) where many decisions must be unanimous and in the European Parliament where a large voting block may sway the legislative process. The government of Ukraine will presumably with laser-light intensity focus upon the government of the Russian Federation and, in what could result in a rupture of hospitality toward the government of Ukraine, a focus upon those EU member countries who engage and engaged, and support and supported the government of the Russian Federation and private sector within the Russian Federation. There will be a revenge factor inhabiting members of the European Parliament representing the government of Ukraine.
With a current population of approximately 38.9 million, Ukraine would rank 5th among EU member countries with Poland 6th with a population of approximately 38.5 million.
Ukraine could surpass Poland if some of the approximately seven million citizens of Ukraine who departed from 24 February 2024 return to Ukraine.
Either ranking within what would then be twenty-eight EU member countries would provide the government of Ukraine with extraordinary administrative and legislative leverage.
As the EU collectively will want to re-engage with the public sector and private sector within the Russian Federation, will a singular vote by the government of Ukraine prevent that re-engagement? Will the government of Ukraine use its vote and votes to hold hostage any EU re-engagement unless government of Ukraine issues with the government of the Russian Federation are resolved? Likely.
Meaning that government of Ukraine membership in the EU and within the EU Parliament may make what current EU members Hungary and Slovakia are doing relating to Russian Federation-related issues look quite restrained.
A result could be members of the EU decide that unanimity and super-majorities are detrimental to the efficient operation and desired global policy decisions of the EU.
Thus, the government of Ukraine as an EU member, with its singular focus upon the government of the Russian Federation, may result in a fundamental change in how the EU makes decisions. For many, that result would weaken it. Might that also be a goal of the government of the Russian Federation?
