BSGI Decision By Midnight Depends Upon How Putin And Zelensky Believe They Gain Leverage, Value From Suspension. President Erdogan Also Has A Role. Decision For All Not Linear.
BSGI Decision By Midnight Depends Upon How Putin And Zelensky Believe They Gain Leverage, Value From Suspension. President Erdogan Also Has A Role. Decision For All Not Linear.
The government of the Russian Federation has legitimate issues with the implementation of the Black Sea Grain Initiative (BSGI). Agricultural commodities sourced from the Russian Federation, primarily fertilizers, have encountered impediments entering the global marketplace. There are two primary reasons:
1) issues relating to payments- the removal of Moscow, Russian Federation-based Rosselkhozbank (Agrobank) from connectivity to the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication (S.W.I.F.T.) global payment facilitation system which can be remedied with relative ease and;
2) issues relating to the export of ammonia using in part a pipeline transiting Ukraine from the Port of Togliati, Russian Federation, to the Black Sea Port of Pivdennyi in Ukraine near Odesa;
3) issues relating to lack of interest by brokers, transporters, insurers, and purchasers to risk incurring sanctions from the European Union (EU) collectively and individual countries, primarily the government of the United States; and concern by brokers, transporters, insurers, and purchasers of reputational risk for engagement with any transaction with the government of the Russian Federation- whether directly or indirectly. Even if the government of the Russian Federation receives the payment facilitation it seeks, there is no mechanism to force purchasers to source agricultural commodities from the Russian Federation.
European Union (EU): Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, and Sweden.
The global value of the BSGI has diminished since its implementation on 27 July 2022 due to the creativity of the marketplace. Purchasers have identified sources other than the Russian Federation and Ukraine. Purchasers have focused efforts to replace agricultural commodities from the Russian Federation and Ukraine with similar agricultural commodities- with attempts to lower expenditures. Purchasers have focused upon creating additional domestic infrastructure to grow at least some of the agricultural commodities currently imported.
The diminishing global value of the BSGI creates a question for Vladimir Putin, President of the Russian Federation (2000-2008 and 2012- ), to determine which has greater domestic and global value to the government of the Russian Federation: 1) greater leverage from suspending the BSGI or 2) greater leverage from maintaining the BSGI despite the disadvantages to the government of the Russian Federation.
The BSGI has created political value for the government of the Russian Federation particularly from countries in The Americas, in Caribbean Sea-are countries, on the continent of Africa, and in the Middle East region where particularly economically distressed and financially distressed countries are the primary destinations for BSGI commodities.
To the frustration of the government of the Russian Federation, the majority of agricultural commodities departing the three Black Sea authorized ports are sourced from Ukraine rather than from the Russian Federation.
Antonio Guterres, Secretary-General of the New York, New York-based United Nations (UN) which is a party to the BSGI along with the government of the Russian Federation, government of Turkiye, and government of Ukraine, is attempting to obtain from President Putin an extension of the BSGI while he negotiates with representatives of the EU and the government of the United States to reinstate the connectivity of Rosselkhozbank to S.W.I.F.T. Thus far, there has been discussion of the EU and the government of the United States permitting a subsidiary of Rosselkhozbank to connect to S.W.I.F.T. which the government of the Russian Federation has thus far reportedly rejected.
For Volodymyr Zelensky, President of Ukraine (2019- ), the suspension of the BSGI may be of value to the government of Ukraine. First, overland (rail and road) and river (Danube) transportation routes for agricultural commodities have been conceived, developed, implemented, and expanded particularly through the countries of Hungary, Moldova, Poland, Romania, and Slovakia. This lessens the impact of a suspension of the BSGI. Second, a lack of commercial operations in the Black Sea provides a more compliant landscape for military operations against the armed forces of the Russian Federation, particularly focusing on the Crimean Peninsula and its surrounding areas. This may be far more tempting a result for the armed forces of Ukraine.
However, for Recep Tayyip Erdogan, President of the Republic of Turkiye (2014- ), who was re-elected on 28 May 2023 to a final five-year term, suspension of the BSGI has consequences to the government of Turkiye. Since 24 February 2022, President Erdogan has been the only head of state to consistently engage with President Putin and President Zelensky, who visited Istanbul on 7/8 July 2023.
The renewal of the BSGI will be another test of diplomacy President Erdogan. He will advocate to his fellow NATO member (and those who are members of the EU) heads of state and heads of government to re-authorize Rosselkhozbank to connect to S.W.I.F.T. He will obtain cooperation from President Putin and President Zelensky for the release from ports in Ukraine approximately sixty merchant vessels and crews with connectivity to Turkiye-based companies.
On 20 December 2022, President Erdogan obtained release of two Turkish Air Force aircraft stranded since 24 February 2022 at Boryspil international airport in Kyiv- which required authorization from President Putin and Volodymyr Zelensky, President of Ukraine.
The Russian Federation-Ukraine war has provided the government of Turkiye with commercial, economic, financial, humanitarian, military, and political opportunities. To date, President Erdogan has successfully exploited these opportunities- extracting the desired whether directly or indirectly connected. These include exporting weapons to Ukraine while importing fuels, investments, and visitors from the Russian Federation.
Simultaneously, there have been negatively impactful results from certain domestic policies implemented by the government of Turkiye, some of which were focused upon seeking political benefits while testing the viability ranges of traditionally accepted fiscal and monetary orthodoxy.
The Black Sea Grain Initiative was implemented on 27 July 2022 from negotiations by the government of the Russian Federation, government of Turkiye, government of Ukraine, and the New York, New York-based United Nations (UN). The most recent extension expires at midnight on 17 July 2023.
“The Joint Coordination Centre was established under the Black Sea Grain Initiative in Istanbul on 27 July 2022. It comprises senior representatives from the Russian Federation, Türkiye, Ukraine and United Nations and its role is to enable the safe transportation, by merchant ships, of grain and other foodstuffs and fertilizers from three key Ukrainian ports in the Black Sea to the rest of the world.” The first shipment of over 26,000 tons of Ukrainian food under a Black Sea Grain Initiative was cleared to proceed on 3 August, towards its destination in Lebanon. LINK: https://www.un.org/en/black-sea-grain-initiative/vessel-movements
In July 2023 and in June 2023 there were reported by the government of the Russian Federation and by the government of Ukraine, with denials by each, of military operations surrounding and within the Black Sea, which has borders with the Bulgaria (EU member; NATO member), Georgia, Romania (EU; NATO member), Russian Federation, Turkiye (NATO member), and Ukraine.
Text Of Initiative on the Safe Transportation of Grain and Foodstuffs from Ukrainian Ports
“1. The Parties to this Initiative are the Republic of Türkiye, the Russian Federation and Ukraine as proposed by the Secretary-General of the United Nations.
2. This Initiative is based on agreements of parties of the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, 1974, as amended, (SOLAS), Regulations XI-2/11 and the International Ship and Port Facility Security Code (ISPS Code), Part B, paragraph 4.26;
3. The purpose of this Initiative is to facilitate the safe navigation for the export of grain and related foodstuffs and fertilizers, including ammonia from the Ports of Odesa, Chernomorsk and Yuzhny (“the Ukrainian ports”).
4. The Parties recognize the role of the Secretary-General of the United Nations in securing the discussions for this initiative and request his further assistance in its implementation, in the furtherance of the humanitarian mission of the United Nations and subject to its authorities and mandates.
5. To achieve the purposes of this Initiative, and to provide for the safe navigation of vessels carrying grain and foodstuffs, the Parties agree as follows: Primary Aspects of the Initiative
A. This Initiative assumes that all Parties will provide maximum assurances regarding a safe and secure environment for all vessels engaged in this Initiative. Prior to operations commencing, a coordination structure will be established. A Joint Coordination Centre (JCC) shall be set up in Istanbul under the auspices of the United Nations and includes representatives of the Parties and the United Nations. The JCC shall conduct general oversight and coordination of this Initiative. Each Party and the United Nations will be represented in the JCC by one senior official and an agreed upon, required number of personnel.
B. Inspection teams will be set up in Türkiye. The inspection teams in Türkiye will consist of representatives from all Parties and the UN. Vessels will transit to and enter the Ukrainian ports in line with the JCC-approved schedule upon the vessels’ inspection by an Inspection Team. The primary responsibility of the Inspection Teams will be to check for the absence of unauthorised cargoes and personnel on board vessels inbound to or outbound from the Ukrainian ports.
C. All activities in Ukrainian territorial waters will be under authority and responsibility of Ukraine. The Parties will not undertake any attacks against merchant vessels and other civilian vessels and port facilities engaged in this Initiative. Should demining be required, a minesweeper of another country, agreed by all Parties, shall sweep the approaches to the Ukrainian ports, as necessary.
D. Merchant vessels will be prior registered in the JCC, verifying their details and confirming their loading port, having liaised closely with port authorities. Vessels will be technically monitored for the duration of their passage. Vessels will proceed through the maritime humanitarian corridor, agreed by all Parties. The JCC will develop and disseminate a detailed operational and communications plan, including identification of safe harbours and medical relief options.
E. To prevent any provocations and incidents, the movement of vessels transiting the maritime humanitarian corridor will be monitored by the Parties remotely. No military ships, aircraft, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) may approach the maritime humanitarian corridor closer than a distance agreed by the JCC, without the authorization of the JCC, and after consultation with all Parties.
F. Should any suspicious activities, or non-compliance with the rules of this operation or emergencies occur on a vessel transiting the maritime humanitarian corridor, depending on its location, upon the request of a Party to the JCC and under international maritime law, the Parties will provide the required assistance to the crew or conduct an inspection against the security guarantees.
G. All merchant vessels taking part in this Initiative shall be subject to inspection conducted by an Inspection Team in the harbours determined by Türkiye at the entry/exit to/from the Turkish strait.
H. This initiative will remain in effect for 120 days from the date of signature by all Parties and can be extended automatically for the same period, unless one of the Parties notifies the other of the intent to terminate the initiative, or to modify it.
I. Nothing in this Initiative will be deemed as a waiver, express or implied, of the privileges and immunities of the United Nations, and the Parties will ensure that the Initiative does not entail any liabilities for the United Nations. Done in Istanbul on the 22nd day of July, 2022.”
On 24 February 2022, the armed forces of the Russian Federation invaded and further invaded the territory of Ukraine in what Vladimir Putin, President of the Russian Federation (2000-2008 and 2012- ), defined as a Special Military Operation [SMO] then on 22 December 2022 he redefined as a war. The initial invasion of Ukraine by the armed forces of the Russian Federation was in part from the territory of Belarus.
The war between the Russian Federation and Ukraine did not commence on 24 February 2022. The roots began their trajectories on 20 February 2014 when the armed forces of the Russian Federation invaded the Crimean Peninsula and the area known as the Donbas Region (Donetsk Oblast and Luhansk Oblast).
