NATO’s Inventory Problem. “Buffer Zones” Inside Russia And Belarus? Israel And Turkiye Have In Syria. Waiting For A “General Patton” Moment. Ukrainian Territory Destroyed Twice- Taking And Taking Back
NATO Has An Inventory Problem
What Happens When Russia And Ukraine Are Simultaneously On Offense And Defense In Each Other’s Territory… And In Belarus?
A “Buffer Zone” For Ukraine Inside Belarus And Russian Federation? Turkiye And Israel Have Done It
Might There Be A Ukrainian Patton Versus A Russian Patton And A Belarusian Patton?
Ukrainian Territory Destroyed Twice- Armed Forces Of The Russian Federation Taking It And Armed Forces Of Ukraine Taking It Back
Engage with students at schools in the capital cities of Kyiv (Ukraine), Minsk (Belarus), and Moscow (Russian Federation) with the question “Should the war end?” and there is near unanimity- yes it should. Where the question is “How should the war end” near unanimity disintegrates.
For that second question, students have a similar philosophical conundrum as adults to debate: Death has a purpose and its justification bends toward those who believe their actions more righteous than their opponent.
Jans Stoltenberg, Secretary General of the thirty-country member Brussels, Belgium-based North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and a two-time prime minister (2000-2001 and 2005-2013) of the Kingdom of Norway (a NATO member), believes members must deliver immediately additional weapons to the armed forces of Ukraine.
“We need to provide support to Ukraine now, including military support, because that's the only way to convince Russia that they have to sit down and negotiate in good faith and respect Ukraine as a sovereign independent nation in Europe. What we do know is that what Ukraine can achieve around that table is totally dependent on the strength on the battlefield.” Successes and impediments to that goal include:
An official of the government of Ukraine shared that the armed forces of Ukraine would not cease operations until the territorial boundaries of Ukraine as they existed in 1991 have been restored fully. An understandable position. A bold statement without acknowledging those operations are viable only when paid for by taxpayers in other countries- and those taxpayers have limitations- and the government of Ukraine should acknowledge that reality.
The [Joseph] Biden-[Kamala] Harris Administration (2021- ) is providing fifty Bradley M2A2 armored fighting vehicles to the armed forces of Ukraine. Olaf Scholz, Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany, is providing by March 2023- with some arriving earlier, approximately forty Marder infantry fighting vehicles (IFVs) to the armed forces of Ukraine. Emmanuel Macron, President of the Republic of France, is providing approximately thirty AMX-10 RC armored fighting vehicles to the armed forces of Ukraine. Kyriakos Mitsotakis, Prime Minister of the Hellenic Republic (Greece) is reported to have agreed to delay receipt of an order of Marder IFVs so the order may be redirected to Ukraine. Greece is also donating forty of its then-U.S.S.R.-manufactured BMP-1 amphibious tracked infantry fighting vehicles to Ukraine in exchange for forty Marder infantry armored fighting vehicles from Germany. What is relevant- the nearer a country is to Ukraine, the less likely it is to relinquish its military equipment to Ukraine absent not only promises of replacements from military equipment sources, but immediate delivery of those replacements. Even if a country has no realistic threat to its territorial sovereignty, domestic politics requires that a government not be perceived as placing at risk its territorial sovereignty. The winner? Manufacturers of military equipment.
In December 2022, President Macron hosted a conference in Paris where he focused upon Quid Pro Quo. The government of the Republic of France expects its support for Ukraine entitles France-based companies to a meaningful share of the reconstruction monies in the form of contracts. Recently, the government of the Republic of France announced it was providing US$122 million to the government of Ukraine to fund purchases of France-manufactured military equipment. Not a donation. Not a gift. A loan which the taxpayers of the Republic of France expect to be repaid.
The Biden-Harris Administration announced US$225 million in Foreign Military Financing for the armed forces of Ukraine to construct its “long-term capacity and support modernization.” Like taxpayers in the Republic of France, taxpayers in the United States expect to be repaid and the 118th United States Congress will be far more aggressive towards requiring accountability from the government of Ukraine. There is no “blank check” for the more than US$100 billion directed because of Ukraine in 2022 and thus far in 2023- and potentially another request for approximately US$50 billion by the end of 2023. That further request for assistance absent of significant territorial retakings and territorial holdings by the armed forces of Ukraine and officially confirmed permanent relinquishments by the armed forces of the Russian Federation will find an unreceptive, needing to be convinced audience in the 535-member 118th United States Congress.
The Rishi Sunak Administration in the United Kingdom (England, Scotland, Wales, Northern Ireland) announced it would maintain in 2023, not increase its US$2.3 billion in financial support to Ukraine. Governments will only seek limited elasticity from their constituents in terms of the sacrifices asked of them by those who are elected and appointed to serve them- particularly when those constituents are stressed economically, as they are now in the United Kingdom.
Dmytro Kuleba, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine, shared “Hungary is playing its own game. It took Ukraine as a hostage for its fight for money it believes the [European] Commission owes to them. The good news is that the Commission found the way how to make this financial aid to Ukraine possible without securing a vote by Hungary, so now we know for critical cases there is a solution.” Minister Kuleba is misreading the meaning of what happened- in the larger and more important context. The European Union (EU) had twenty-eight members until the United Kingdom departed in 2020. For the last five years, members of the EU have found consensus (unanimity) more challenging to achieve for matters deemed critical to matters deemed insignificant. The EU is shifting from requiring unanimity to requiring fewer for decisions by the EC and the EU to be adopted. While today one member of the EU may delay or derail a decision, in the future there might be blocs of members whose singular interests combine to prevent decisions- such as for Ukraine becoming a member of the EU. Being smug can be costly.
Mr. Stoltenberg believes too that NATO members must immediately increase their deliveries and installation of weapons within their own territories to prevent, or at least deter the armed forces of the Russian Federation if the territory of Ukraine is compromised to the extent that NATO members for example Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, and Slovakia need to fear a direct attack by the armed forces of the Russian Federation from the territory of Ukraine and/or from the territory of Belarus; or from the armed forces of Belarus.
The problem is there are not enough weapons available for immediate delivery neither to Ukraine nor to NATO members who have borders with Ukraine and Russian Federation as manufacturing of weapons is often a multi-year process and most NATO members want replacements prior to weapons transfers to Ukraine.
The only viable method for Mr. Stoltenberg to accomplish his goal is for NATO, the collective organization, to convince Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, and Slovakia that if they relinquish weapons to Ukraine, and if the armed forces of the Russian Federation or the armed forces of the Republic of Belarus were to prepared to attack, then NATO, the collective organization, would defend, no, would repel any attack. Given that all NATO members do not support NATO policies relating to Ukraine and Russian Federation, there is no possibility that countries will transfer the majority of their defensive weapons and offensive weapons to Ukraine based upon a promise by Mr. Stoltenberg- given how reluctant NATO, the collective organization, was prior to 24 February 2022 and continues since to detour directly and pro-actively the interests of the government of the Russian Federation. NOTE: Article Five of the NATO Charter does not require a NATO member to do anything. Further questions impacting the goals of Mr. Stoltenberg:
When do the decisions implemented by the armed forces of Ukraine transition from defined as defensive to defined as offensive? On the offensive within the 1991 territorial borders of Ukraine, but what about on the offensive into the 1991 territorial borders of the Russian Federation?
How many members of NATO and the EU will support the armed forces of Ukraine not only launching drones, missiles, and shells into the territory of the Russian Federation and Republic of Belarus as a deterrent to offensive action by the armed forces of the Russian Federation and armed forces of the Republic of Belarus, but personnel from the armed forces of Ukraine entering the territory of the Russian Federation and Republic of Belarus and establishing a multi-kilometer “buffer zone”? Echoes of the government of the Republic of Turkiye with its “buffer zone” inside the territory of the Syrian Arab Republic and the State of Israel with its “buffer zone” that became an annexation of the Golan Heights area within the territory of the Syrian Arab Republic- with the support of the United States government in 2019 during the [Donald] Trump-[Mike] Pence Administration (2017-2021).
What happens when the armed forces of the Russian Federation determine that decisions implemented by the armed forces of Ukraine using military equipment provided by NATO members and non-NATO members are offensive rather than defensive? Officially declare that the Russian Federation is at war with NATO with the reasoning that the armed forces of Ukraine have NATO equipment, NATO training, NATO support, NATO targeting assistance, NATO intelligence gathering, NATO technicians providing online and remote visual guidance including for the repair of equipment, and NATO personnel within the territory of Ukraine so the totality has morphed from a war-by-proxy (which has existed since 2014 and again since 24 February 2022) to a 21st Century direct conflict?
Prepping For Patton
In secure and not-so-secure briefing facilities in some capitals of NATO members and non-NATO members (including Kyiv, Minsk, and Moscow), there are near rapturous orgasmic private and not-so-private interludes by political figures (elected and appointed) and military officers in their impressively decorated uniforms as they fantasize about hundreds of continuous track vehicles (tanks, etc.) advancing towards one another firing-at-will while they stand atop a hillside looking through binoculars to absorb and delight in the spectacle they produced unfolding below. The Jerry Goldsmith crafted soundtrack from the 1970 motion picture “Patton” (about General George S. Patton’s Third Army and Seventh Army exploits during World War II) thundering in secret though their heads. Prepping for the resulting parades, medals, awards, and re-elections.
They long for moments (most virtually) to lead the charge or take credit for it- A Ukrainian Patton versus a Russian Patton and a Belarusian Patton? They choose not to consider the human factor- the cost of a life taken. Yes, a life given for the cause, but also a life no longer benefiting from the cause.
A must remember: Ukrainian territory is being destroyed twice- first by the armed forces of the Russian federation when taking it and then by the armed forces of Ukraine when taking it back. The citizens of those conflict areas are expendable, and thus valueless ping pong balls.
Zelensky And EU And NATO
Volodymyr Zelensky, President of Ukraine, has sought from his inauguration in 2019 for the EU and NATO to become involved directly within Ukraine: The EU to provide support and then permit Ukraine to leap over all other candidates and NATO so the organization would then be coerced to enter directly the conflict with the Russian Federation. NOTE: Article Five of the NATO Charter does not require a NATO member to do anything.
Ukraine, which was granted EU candidacy status in June 2022, will not become a member EU until well after the war with the Russia Federation has not only ceased, but fossilized- that means a long time.
There is no unanimity within the EU as to membership for Ukraine. Those countries previously in line for membership do not deserve to be usurped by Ukraine solely because the armed forces of the Russian Federation invaded the territory of Ukraine. That the territorial boundaries of Ukraine have been unstable since 2014 is precisely a valid reason for any decision about Ukraine membership in the EU to be deferred until the war has ended and there is a commercial, economic, military, and political reproachment with the government of the Russian Federation.
If the war ends with a commercially, economically, and politically unstable Russian Federation, there exists a high probability of exiles, migrants, refugees, and those with family relationships including dual nationals from the Russian Federation seeking to enter Ukraine through its 1,426-mile border with Ukraine; and to exit the Russian Federation through those countries bordering the Russian Federation including Estonia, Finland, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland (with Kaliningrad Oblast of the Russian Federation), and Norway.
The EU does not need the forty-four million citizens of Ukraine as a member. Not a necessity. A benefit once the government of Ukraine and the private sectors in Ukraine have in place permanent impediments to the endemic corruption that has inflicted the country since its creation in 1991.
The more President Zelensky pushes for immediate membership in the EU and NATO, the more will be a backlash, resistance, and resentment. Just because Ukraine was invaded in 2014 and again in 2022 does not mean that there is an automatic membership lane for Ukraine to be a member of the EU and of NATO.
Message
Essential for the heads of state and heads of government of those countries providing commercial, economic, humanitarian, political, and military support to the government of Ukraine and heads of state and heads of government of those countries continuing to engage commercially, economically, and politically with the government of the Russian Federation to maintain public pressure upon Vladimir Putin, President of the Russian Federation, and President Zelensky to engage directly with one another.
And for Alexander Lukashenko, President of the Republic of Belarus, to appreciate more fulsomely what he and the 9.3 million citizens he represents will encounter in terms of military conflict and additional commercial, economic, and political sanctions should he deploy publicly members of the armed forces of Belarus into the territory of Ukraine. More on this coming…
