EU/US Scared To Seize US$340 Billion Russia Central Bank Assets. How About Giving Ukraine Only The Interest The Money Is Earning? That’s US$279 Million Per Month; US$2.3 Billion Since 24 February 2022
EU, UK, And US Need Not Look Far For US$9.3 Million Per Day, US$279 Million Per Month For Ukraine- Or US$2.3 Billion Up Front
How Can Russian Oligarch Money Be Illicit Enough To Seize And Confiscate, But Russian Government Funds Are Illicit Enough To Freeze, But Not Illicit Enough To Confiscate? Use To Pay For Damage Armed Forces Of Russia Have Inflicted In Ukraine.
1.3 Million Legal Hours To Craft Rounds Of EU, UK, US Sanctions And Attorneys Still Cannot Answer Most Important Question
Analogy: Rent House. Tenant Trashes It. Return Security Deposit. Obtain Bank Loan For Repairs. Nuts? That’s What Didier Reynders, Dominic Raab, Janet Yellen Are Doing.
Jeopardy Question: Elvira Nabiullina’s BFFs: Who Are Didier Reynders, Dominic Raab, Janet Yellen
If Russian Oligarch Assets Are Extension Of Moscow, So Too Are Central Bank Accounts.
Brussels, London, Washington Must Stop Fearing “What If…”
Taxpayers And Taxpayer-Funded Financial Institutions Should Not Be Source For Ukraine Funding. The Russian Federation Caused The Damage- Only It Should Pay For What It Has Done.
How Will Presidents Biden, Macron, Von Der Leyen, Chancellor Scholz Defend Wire Transfer Of US$340 Billion To President Putin After Asking Taxpayers To Borrow US$200 Billion- Thus Far? Voters Will Hold Them Accountable.
250 days ago, on 24 February 2022, the armed forces of the Russian Federation invaded and invaded further into the territory of Ukraine.
In response, the Brussels, Belgium-based European Commission (EC), the executive body for the twenty-seven-member (27) country European Union (EU), has progressed through eight rounds of sanctions- considering each one, writing draft proposals, agreeing to proposals, sharing proposals amongst the twenty-seven members, reviewing suggested revisions, debating suggested revisions, voting upon proposals, and then implementing the final texts of each proposal.
Added to that EU process are multilateral consultations, particularly with the governments of Australia, Canada, Japan, South Korea, United Kingdom, and United States so decisions are coordinated in conjunction with sanctions programs implemented by those countries.
Once a proposal is implemented, there remains a continuing in-real-time monitoring process to determine if what was implemented is doing what the framers expected it to do in terms of impacting directly or indirectly the public and private sectors of the Russian Federation.
Government and non-government attorneys working with the EC and for individual member countries of the EU, along with their colleagues in Australia, Canada, Japan, South Korea, United Kingdom, and United States among others have estimated that for each round of sanctions implemented by the EU and the other countries, there was beforehand approximately 1,360,000 hours consumed by attorneys. The calculation baseline: 250+ attorneys in thirty-three countries working forty-hour weeks for thirty days during an eight (thus far) month period. One month per round of sanctions.
What did these attorneys do? They determined whether a sanction was legal (constitutional)- was there precedent, was it enforceable, would courts uphold it among other questions.
One of the most consequential sanctions-related questions was how to determine that individuals subject to Russian Federation jurisdiction could be defined as instrumentalities of the government of the Russian Federation.
That the wealth of certain persons was created and further accumulated due to direct connectivity to the government of the Russian Federation. A legal nexus was created whereby the assets of these individuals were deemed beneficial assets of the government of the Russian Federation. Thus, the assets could be frozen, confiscated, seized, and redirected. Taking the assets of the individuals was the same as taking the assets of the government of the Russian Federation. Thus far, both the seizure and redirection component of sanctions towards individuals has been limited due to jurisdictional issues, preventative measures taken by individuals, and efforts of attorneys from multiple law firms retained by the individuals.
So, eight rounds of sanctions implemented by the EU, many more sanctions programs implemented by other countries. Yet, the leadership of the EC and some EU-member country heads of state and heads of government contort themselves to defend why attorneys could spend during the last eight months more than one million hours determining the legality of sanctions, but are unable to determine if US$340 billion in Central Bank of the Russian Federation (CBRF) funds residing in accounts at various financial institutions located outside of the Russian Federation may shift from having been frozen to confiscated and then to redirected for uses relating to Ukraine. This is not credible.
Thus far, government leadership on this issue has been cowardly because the indecision is based not upon reality, but upon “what might happen if…”
Government leadership is terrified that central banks, companies, and individuals may shun those countries who crafted and implemented a legal mechanism to seize “sovereign” assets. The fear is depositors will redirect their assets to, for example, financial institutions located in safer, more transparent, more liquid locations including China, Cuba, Russia, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Syria, and Venezuela. “Good luck with that,” shared one prominent economist.
To date, government leadership has been robust, even muscular when identifying and justifying legal principles as reasons for preventing the government of the Russian Federation and entities subject to Russian Federation jurisdiction from earning revenue. Unfortunately, the political testosterone has been less than exemplary when journeying from justifying the freezing of assets to confiscation those assets and then making use of them.
NOTE: After an eighth month absence, within recent weeks there have been comments from government officials and former government officials in countries whose financial institutions hold CBRF funds that those accounts should shift from frozen to confiscated to re-directed towards purposes relating to Ukraine. Thus suggests a shift in opinion as the topic becomes of increased interest by journalists. There is also a commonsense aspect: Why should any government (meaning their respective taxpayers) other than the government of the Russian Federation provide financial resources to Ukraine and reimburse each of those governments which have provided resources to Ukraine? First off, think Hungary, Moldova, Poland, Romania, and Slovakia which have absorbed billions of U.S. dollars in expenses relating to the millions of citizens of Ukraine who they have welcomed within their borders.
What About Using Only The Interest?
If the EC, United States, and other countries remain politically constipated by an effort to seize the US$340 billion in assets of the CBRF, then what about directing to Ukraine at least the interest that the assets are earning?
In 250 days, using a 1% annual rate (which might be higher) the interest earned thus far is approximately US$2,328,767,123.28. Reviewing another way, the frozen assets are likely earning US$279,450,000.00 per month or US$9,315,000.00 per day.
Is there not the collective bandwidth from the efforts of 250 attorneys to craft language for a statute, regulation, or policy to support the seizure, confiscation, repurposing of assets of a central bank when the government controlling the central bank has engaged in behavior that has met the threshold for a global sanctions regime? And if not, why not?
How can the government of the Russian Federation be culpable for the actions of the armed forces of the Russian Federation, but the government of the Russian Federation is deemed separate from the CBRF into which flows the earnings of Russian Federation government-controlled entities?
How can Australia, Canada, EC/EU, Japan, South Korea, United Kingdom, and United States identify a nexus between control and behavior for oligarchs, armed forces, and government-controlled entities, but not identify nexus between the earnings of each and where those earning are stored? An individual’s bank account is fair-game for freezing and seizing, but a government’s bank account has a built-in get-out-of-jail-free card?
