With Detention Release, Was President Erdogan Testing The Elasticity Of, Introducing Belligerency Into His Relationship With President Putin? Compromising Its Effectiveness? Message To NATO, Ukraine?
Saturday, 8 July 2023, Was A Significant Moment For Three Heads Of State.
Why Did Turkiye President Erdogan Permit Members Of The Armed Forces Of Ukraine Who Were Released By The Government Of The Russian Federation And Required To Remain In Turkiye To Depart Turkiye For Ukraine Without Notification To The Government Of The Russian Federation?
The last sixteen months have been defined by a series of moments, some with more significance than others.
On Saturday, 8 July 2023, in Istanbul, Turkiye, was one of those significant moments, albeit this moment was not the moment- as that moment will mark the end of the Russian Federation-Ukraine war.
The decision by Recep Tayyip Erdogan, President of the Republic of Turkiye (2014- ), who was re-elected on 28 May 2023 to a final five-year term, to permit the transfer of members of the armed forces of Ukraine to Volodymyr Zelensky, President of Ukraine (2019- ), who traveled to Istanbul in an aircraft provided by the government of the Czech Republic, and then returned to Ukraine- and do so publicly, was a remarkable optic.
The optic was transformed into a trilateral political issue because Dimitri Peskov, spokesperson for Vladimir Putin, President of the Russian Federation (2000-2008 and 2012- ), said publicly the transfer violated its agreement with both the government of Ukraine and the government of Turkiye; and had been initiated, acted upon, and completed absent the knowledge of the government of the Russian Federation.
And with that there are more questions…
Did President Erdogan inform NATO members prior to the decision to transfer the members of the armed forces of Ukraine?
From where was the genesis for the decision? Ankara, Kyiv, Washington, another capital?
Such a unilateral decision by President Erdogan, along with endorsing NATO membership for Ukraine (also in the early morning of 8 July 2023), may signal President Erdogan believes the trajectory for the outcome of the Russian Federation-Ukraine war will favor Ukraine.
And, significantly, that President Erdogan can insert increased elasticity, even belligerency into his relationship with President Putin without compromising its effectiveness.
Was President Erdogan probing, testing the relationship with President Putin- testing the elasticity? Was he doing so in consultation with NATO members- particularly with the United States?
Might the Ministry of Interior of Turkiye and/or the Ministry of Defense of Turkiye have information about President Putin and the government of the Russian Federation that other NATO members do not have? This is consequential given the announcement by President Erdogan that President Putin will visit Turkiye in August 2023, or will the visit now be in jeopardy and more importantly, will the relationship now be in jeopardy?
Will President Erdogan Meet President Putin In Istanbul Rather Than At The Presidential Complex In Ankara?
If In Istanbul, Will President Erdogan Use The Same Room Where He Met President Zelensky And Seat President Putin In The Same Chair As President Zelensky?
Critical for a renewal of the Black Sea Grain Initiative (BSGI) which was implemented on 27 July 2022 from negotiations by the government of the Russian Federation, government of Turkiye, government of Ukraine, and the New York, New York-based United Nations (UN). The most recent extension expires on 17 July 2023.
“The Joint Coordination Centre was established under the Black Sea Grain Initiative in Istanbul on 27 July 2022. It comprises senior representatives from the Russian Federation, Türkiye, Ukraine and United Nations and its role is to enable the safe transportation, by merchant ships, of grain and other foodstuffs and fertilizers from three key Ukrainian ports in the Black Sea to the rest of the world.” The first shipment of over 26,000 tons of Ukrainian food under a Black Sea Grain Initiative was cleared to proceed on 3 August, towards its destination in Lebanon. LINK: https://www.un.org/en/black-sea-grain-initiative/vessel-movements
In June 2023 reported by both governments with expected denials by both governments of military operations surrounding and within the Black Sea, which has borders with the Bulgaria (EU member), Georgia, Romania (EU and NATO member), Russian Federation, Turkiye (NATO member), and Ukraine.
The renewal of the BSGI will be another test of diplomacy President Erdogan. He will advocate to his fellow NATO member (and those who are members of the twenty-seven country European Union) heads of state and heads of government to re-authorize Moscow, Russian Federation-based Rosselkhozbank (Agrobank) to connect to Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication (S.W.I.F.T.) to facilitate payments of authorized agricultural commodity exports from the Russian Federation. He will obtain cooperation from President Putin and President Zelensky for the release from ports in Ukraine vessels and crews with connectivity to Turkiye-based companies. He will seek from President Putin a two-year renewal of the BSGI, but will accept one-year- or perhaps to 24 February 2024. He will seek an increase in the number of BSGI inspectors from the government of the Russian Federation, UN, and government of Ukraine.
On 24 February 2022, the armed forces of the Russian Federation invaded and further invaded the territory of Ukraine in what Vladimir Putin, President of the Russian Federation (2000-2008 and 2012- ), defined as a Special Military Operation [SMO] then on 22 December 2022 he redefined as a war. The initial invasion of Ukraine by the armed forces of the Russian Federation was in part from the territory of Belarus.
The war between the Russian Federation and Ukraine did not commence on 24 February 2022. The roots began their trajectories on 20 February 2014 when the armed forces of the Russian Federation invaded the Crimean Peninsula and the area known as the Donbas Region (Donetsk Oblast and Luhansk Oblast).
